

COALITIONS, EXTERNAL SUBSYSTEM EVENTS, AND THE POLICY PROCESS:  
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, 1945-1947

by

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## ABSTRACT

Pierce, Jonathan Jeffrey (Ph.D., Public Affairs)

Coalitions, External Subsystem Events, and the Policy Process: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Question of Palestine, 1945-1947

Thesis directed by Distinguished Professor Peter deLeon

This dissertation uses the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to examine U.S. foreign policy applied to the question of Palestine from 1945 – November 1947. It includes seven chapters, four of which are empirical research on the issue. Chapter I is an introduction to the purpose of the research, a literature review of the ACF and description of the purpose of the case study. Chapter II chronicles the development of Zionism and the objective of the recognition of a Jewish state, the British Mandate for Palestine, and the evolution of U.S. foreign policy culminating in the recognition of the state of Israel. Chapter III examines the beliefs and rationale of U.S. President Harry S. Truman to understand the development of U.S. Government policy towards Palestine as an alternative explanation of the ACF. It found that President Truman had a humanitarian rationale for understanding the problem of Jewish welfare and security applied to the Jewish Displaced Persons (DPs) in Europe after the Holocaust, but was influenced by domestic and international politics in supporting immigration of Jewish DPs to Palestine. Chapter IV identifies the advocacy coalition members from 1945 – November 1947 based upon their belief systems. It found that the polarity between the Arab coalition and the Zionist coalition was relatively stable over time, but the Zionist coalition merged with the Anglo-American coalition in 1946 and all of the coalitions faced some membership defection. Chapter V analyzes policy elite attention and found that policy elites pay

greater attention to relatively stable parameters (e.g. Arab-Jewish conflict) than to external subsystem events (e.g. the Holocaust). Chapter VI identifies individual policy elites within coalitions using pooled panel data and examines the association between coalition membership and attention to various events external to the subsystem. It found that coalition membership effected attention to the Arab-Jewish conflict, but not to the other events external to the subsystem such as the Holocaust and elections. Lastly, a conclusion to the dissertation summarizes the findings, contributions to the ACF and the case study, limitations of all these chapters, as well as a brief outline of a future research agenda.

The format and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication.

Approved: Peter deLeon

## DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to Peter deLeon and Chris Weible.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I first came to the University of Colorado Denver, School of Public Affairs in the Fall of 2006, I wanted to see further by standing on the shoulders of giants. I found a school and a broader community that was full of giants, whose perspective greatly exceeded my own. I soon learned that I would not be scaling these giants, and instead I needed to learn how to walk before climbing to greater heights.

I want to thank my dissertation committee, Peter deLeon, Chris Weible, Tom Birkland and Brian Gerber for their help and patience. Each of them played an important role in the completion of this research. Chris Weible has taught me how to become a social scientist; what it means to not only think critically, but how to create new knowledge. He constantly challenges, instructs, and supports me to excel and maximize my potential. If it was not for him, I would not be here today. Peter deLeon is the definition of a giant in the field of public policy and is a personal role model. His enlightened presence and care are steadfast, and he gave me the opportunity to succeed.

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## CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

### Purpose of the Study

Over the past twenty-five years, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) has established itself as one of the leading frameworks of the policy process in terms of total applications (Weible et al., 2009) and development (Schlager, 2007). In light of these applications and developments, the framework has been revised, evolving over time (c.f. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). In the genesis of the framework in 1988, Paul Sabatier established the research questions that would be its basis. “How is one to understand the incredibly complex process of policy change over periods of one or several decades? What are the principal causal factors?” (130). Since then, some critics (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Cairney, 1997; Zahariadis, 1998; Sato, 1999; Schlager, 1999; and Nohrstedt, 2010) have argued that previous research of the ACF has overlooked the identification of these “principal causal factors” that bring about policy change.

This dissertation has three purposes. First, it seeks to assess the applicability of the ACF outside of domestic and technical oriented policy making upon which it has been traditionally tested (Litfin, 2000; Weible et al, 2009). To do so, it will apply the ACF to a foreign and normatively oriented policy. The issue of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, specifically the determination of sovereignty in or over Palestine<sup>1</sup>, is foreign policy because the target of the policy is outside the borders of the United States. It is

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<sup>1</sup> Palestine is defined as the territory of the British Mandate for Palestine after 1922 when Transjordan was separated into an autonomous state. The borders include Egypt and Arabia (later Saudi Arabia) to the south, Transjordan to the east, Syria and Iraq to the north, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. It existed for the duration of this case study from 1922 – 1948.



normatively oriented because it is concerned about whose welfare matters more – Arabs or Jews – and the identification of which of these two peoples should have sovereignty over Palestine.

The ACF's focus on technical information and tendency to be applied on environmental and energy policy domains may raise questions about the external validity of applying the framework to such an issue. Sabatier (1998) addresses this issue explicitly:

Several people have wondered whether the ACF applies to policy domains – such as abortion, gun control, human rights, gay rights, school prayer, gender politics – in which technical issues are dominated by normative and identity concerns. In my view, it should work very well in these areas. Clearly, these subsystems seem to be characterized by well-defined coalitions driven by belief-driven conflict (122-123).

Sabatier (1998) has suggested that future research should be conducted to test the applicability of the framework to normative policies “driven by belief-driven conflict”.

The second purpose of this dissertation is to build upon past ACF studies by examining the explanatory capability of previously identified variables, specifically belief systems, advocacy coalitions, relatively stable parameters, and external subsystem events and whether they are related to changes in public policy (Sabatier, 1988, 1998).

The basic argument of the ACF is that, although policy-oriented learning often alters secondary aspects of a coalition's belief system, changes in the policy core aspects of a governmental program require a perturbation in non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 123).

It is common within the policy process literature to connect focusing events with policy change (e.g. Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Birkland, 1998). Within the ACF, past studies have supported this identified correlation (e.g. Zafonte and Sabatier,

2004; Meijerink, 2005) while others have not (e.g. Nohrstedt, 2010). Therefore, it is still unclear how such events may cause policy change (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Zahariadis, 1998; and Nohrstedt, 2005).

Third, this dissertation uses empirical analysis to bring new depth to the study of U.S. foreign policy and the question of Palestine. It seeks to achieve this goal on two levels. It applies the ACF as well as actor specific model from foreign policy literature will be applied to understand the policy process. Actor specific models been applied multiple times to this case (e.g. Cohen, 1990; Benson, 1997). In such models the individual decision-maker is the level and unit of analysis and researchers focuses upon their belief systems to explain a policy decision (George, 1969; Axelrod, 1976; Holsti, 1977). This dissertation juxtaposes this approach of the individual as the level of analysis with the broader meso-level subsystem approach of the ACF. This provides both contrasting as well as complimentary explanations for U.S. foreign policy applied to the question of Palestine.

Past studies of U.S. foreign policy towards the question of Palestine have not used empirical driven approaches to understand this policy issue. This may be the case because gathering data for empirical studies of current policy issues tends to raise fewer methodological problems, in comparison to the multiple limitations raised by using historical sources of data (Buthe, 2002; Trachtenberg, 2006). Another reason for the lack of empirical examination is that the question of Palestine today is a historical policy problem, studied by historians using narrative approaches (e.g. Schechtman, 1966; Snetsinger, 1974; Grose, 1983; Cohen, 1990; Radosh and Radosh, 2009). This seemingly historical policy is relevant for current U.S. policy towards the conflict between Israelis

and Palestinians because as Pierson (1993, 2004) and Peters et al. (2005) argue, earlier policies constrain subsequent policy choices. The process by which the U.S. came to recognize Israel as sovereign over Palestine continues to influence U.S. foreign policy towards Israel, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, as well as towards the Middle East in general.

As this dissertation includes four separate empirical chapters with different research questions, hypotheses, data, and research designs each of which is discussed in-depth in each chapter, their discussion is outside the scope of this introduction. Instead, a brief discussion of the theoretical literature, case study, and overall organization of the dissertation follows.

## **Theoretical Literature Review**

### **Actor Specific Model**

The U.S. President possesses various structural and functional capabilities that allow him to dominate foreign policy making (McCormick, 2010). Because of the unique position of the President in the U.S. Government, a compelling analysis of foreign policy cannot treat the President as exogenous to the process (Hermann and Kegley, 1994). Therefore, the study of the role of the president and his influence on foreign policy has led to a great amount of research with particular attention to his beliefs and attitudes (De Rivera, 1968; George, 1969; Hermann, 1970, 1978; Holsti, 1977; Jervis, 1976). In addition to these more general studies of the President as foreign policy decision-maker, scholars have also focused upon specific policies or programs to examine the beliefs of Presidents and argue their motives behind various decisions (Barber, 1972; Khong, 1992; Stewart, 1977).

Studies of individual policymakers include cognitive and motivational constraints that affect decision-making outcomes. These constraints include limits on an individual's capacity to receive, process, and assimilate information; inability to identify all of the alternatives; fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of each alternative; and an inability to order preferences on a single scale (March and Simon 1958; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Kahneman 2011). In other words, individuals are not pure rational calculators, but rather possess belief systems that effect decision-making and therefore public policy.

The study of policy elite beliefs builds upon Converse's (1964) research that found little consistency between foreign policy attitudes and a liberal-conservative dichotomy. Instead Converse (1964) argued that relative to foreign policy, beliefs and attitudes derive from more "superordinate values or postures" (211). This argument has been supported by subsequent research using surveys, questionnaires, and/or content analysis that has found consistency between foreign policy preferences and more general beliefs and attitudes among citizens and policy elites (Verba et al., 1967; Marcus et al., 1974; Jervis, 1976; Bardes and Oldendick, 1978; Maggiotto and Wittkeopf, 1981; Wittkopf, 1981; Conover and Feldman, 1984; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985). These scholars have found support that super-ordinate values are utilized in the structuring of belief systems for organizing policy preferences in foreign policy. This finding combined with the authority of the President in foreign policymaking, makes the President's beliefs a key variable in understanding policy outcomes. Therefore, the research questions for chapter three are what did President Truman believe in relation to the question of Palestine, and what was his rationale for these beliefs?

## **Advocacy Coalition Framework**

The ACF serves as the primary guide for this analysis (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). The framework focuses on competition among coalitions of policy elites seeking to influence public policy. These coalitions compete within a policy subsystem that may be affected by external subsystem events such as elections and changes in public opinion. Such events may enhance or constrain the resources and/or beliefs of these coalitions and may provide the opportunity for major policy change (Sabatier and Weible 2007).

Based upon the work of Paul Sabatier, Hank Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999), and others (e.g. Weible and Sabatier, 2007), it was initially a response to the perceived limitations of the policy stages framework (Nakamura, 1987; Sabatier, 1991). When it came to understanding policy change and the principal causal factors of such change, the ACF builds upon the work of many scholars (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Hecl, 1974; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1980; and Mazur 1981).

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) revised the ACF to include several basic assumptions that were the basis for the hypotheses developed within the framework. They positioned the ACF as a policy process framework based upon the following six assumptions: (i) a central role of scientific and technical information in policy processes; (ii) a time perspective of ten years or more to understand policy change; (iii) policy subsystems as the primary unit of analysis; (iv) a broad set of subsystem actors that includes actors from all levels of government, consultants, scientists and members of the media; (v) policies and programs are best viewed as the translation of beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999); and (vi) a model of the individual who is boundedly rational

with limited abilities to process stimuli (Simon, 1985), relies on beliefs as the principal heuristic to simplify, filter, and at times distort stimuli (Scholz and Pinney, 1995) and remembers losses more than gains (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988). However, as the framework continued to be applied, there was a need for these assumptions to be revised.

Instead of basing the ACF upon a list of assumptions that must be met, Sabatier and Weible (2007) argued that the ACF was now based upon three “foundation stones.” The first encompasses the processes of policy change outlined by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993). It states that at the macro or systemic level, policymaking tends to occur among specialists within a policy subsystem, but their behavior and beliefs are constrained and provided resources by the broader socioeconomic and political environment. The second foundation stone focuses on the group level, and argues that the best way to deal with multiple actors within a subsystem is to aggregate them into an advocacy coalition. The final foundation stone examines the micro or individual level and draws from multiple assumptions from social psychology assuming bounded rationality as the model of the individual (Simon, 1985). Together, these foundation stones serve as the basis for the research questions and hypotheses that will be examined in this dissertation.

There are four main components of the ACF that will be identified and defined for this study: (i) the policy subsystem, (ii) advocacy coalitions, (iii) belief systems and (iv) and external subsystem events.

**Policy Subsystem.** The unit of analysis in the ACF is the policy subsystem, defined by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) as,

those actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue, such as air pollution control, and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain (119).

Supplementing this definition, Sabatier and Weible (2007, 192) argue a subsystem is characterized by the scope of a functional / substantive domain, and a territorial domain (Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). Therefore, identifying a subsystem will depend upon identifying the following elements: (i) the policy problem or issue; (ii) the scope of actors seeking to influence a functional or substantive domain; or (iii) a territorial domain.

The first component for identifying a policy subsystem is limiting a study to a policy problem or issue. Researchers have tended to apply the ACF most frequently to environmental/energy issues (Weible et al., 2007), but other issues include natural disasters (Albright, 2011), health (Kubler, 2001; Farquharson, 2003), biotechnology (Montpetit, 2011), intelligence (Nohrstedt, 2011), and foreign policy (Pierce, 2011).

Identifying a policy problem or issue is not sufficient for identifying a policy subsystem, but such problems or issues provide guidance of a political system. For example, environmental issues of pollution may appear separate from issues of health at times, but also may be the causes of serious health issues. One way to untangle these interdependencies is to focus upon a specific functional or substantive domain. For example, an examination of environmental policy may only focus upon the regulation of pollution or functional operation of a subsystem rather than the long-term health effects of such pollution. Thus, focusing upon those actors seeking to influence regulation of pollution rather than studying those involved in health issues may provide some limits on the scope of a study. On the other hand, the scope of a functional or substantive domain

may also be complicated by the existence of overlapping and nested subsystems (Fenger and Klok, 2001; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Sabatier and Weible (2007) note such nested subsystems may be common when it comes to international issues because there is ambivalent legal authority at the international level. To overcome this problem, Sabatier and Weible (2007) suggest a focus on the formal state institutions (for example, government agencies) that structure interaction. Therefore, a policy subsystem is limited to a single state or international authoritative institution when being applied to an international problem or issue.

While in domestic cases a territorial domain may apply this is arguably not the case for international issues. There has been a lack of a single territorial domain in multiple studies applying the ACF to international treaties, trade agreements, crises, and health issues (Farquharson, 2003; Richardson, 1996). These studies support the argument by Litfin (2000) that a single territorial dimension is not needed for ACF studies with an international dimension. Therefore, the emphasis when identifying a policy subsystem should be placed upon the policy problem or issue and the scope of actors seeking to influence a functional or substantive domain (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 119).

**Advocacy Coalitions.** The ACF aggregates multiple actors in a policy subsystem into advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Weible 2007). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 25) state that an advocacy coalition includes,

people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system – that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time.



Coordination along with policy core beliefs are the two constructs of an advocacy coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). But as Schlager (1995) argues, most ACF research assumes that finding policy participants with similar policy core beliefs automatically lead to coordination. In this case, coordination is beyond the scope of this study due to historical data collection constraints. However, in past studies of the ACF actors clustered into coalitions based upon their belief systems have been found to have a high-level of correlation with those identifying coalitions based upon the sharing of information (Weible, 2005). This provides some support for only providing empirical data on policy core beliefs and not coordination but still remaining within the framework. To emphasize that coordination is not established through data analysis, this research will refer to identified clusters as coalitions or belief coalitions rather than advocacy coalitions similar to Zafonte and Sabatier (2004).

**Belief Systems.** Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argue that these actors or policy elites possess a three-tiered model of beliefs and are motivated to translate these beliefs into policy. These belief systems are hierarchical in their abstractness in relation to the policy issue and their transformative nature. The most abstract and least transformative beliefs are deep core beliefs that span multiple subsystems. In comparison, policy core beliefs are relatively more transformative and applied to the policy issue and span the subsystem. These beliefs are very resistant to change and act as the glue of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1998). Individuals are motivated to convert these deep and policy core beliefs into policies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The secondary aspects of the beliefs are the most tangible and transformative and apply to sub-

components of the subsystem and tend to be instrumental in nature (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

These belief systems are not purely rational as individuals possess bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). The development of these beliefs is the result of socialization making them relatively stable over time (Festinger, 1957). As actors receive external stimuli they will filter out information that is counter to their existing belief systems (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). Therefore, people who have different belief systems, which the ACF aggregates into different advocacy coalitions, will interpret the same information differently. This will lead to a suspicion of the motives and objectives of opponent coalitions. Once coalitions are formed around these belief systems, hostility between coalitions is exacerbated because of the tendency for members to remember losses more than gains (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988). This results in an increase in the short-term costs of defection to an opposing coalition and enhances the benefits of long-term solidarity to one's current advocacy coalition.

Therefore, on major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of coalition members as allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999).

This hypothesis has been tested by a handful of studies of the ACF including Jenkins-Smith et al. (1991), Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair (1993), Zafonte and Sabatier (2004). These studies found that advocacy coalition structure was stable over time while an advocacy coalition may face some defection by members, perhaps from external subsystem events.

**External Subsystem Events.** External subsystem events are defined as events occurring in the relative political environment, but existing outside of the limited scope of the subsystem. There are two types of external subsystem events: relatively stable parameters and the external system events. The basic difference between the two categories is stability over time. External system events are more dynamic and may change at a high frequency or cyclically, perhaps by the decade. In contrast, relatively stable parameters are less likely to change and, arguably, more difficult to change (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Therefore, there are two defining components for identifying relatively stable parameters compared to external system events: (i) durability of the events and (ii) the process of the event occurring over a decade or more.

Sabatier (1998) provides a list of relatively stable parameters as well as external system events. The relatively stable parameters are (i) basic attributes of the problem area, (ii) basic distribution of natural resources, (iii) fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure, and (iv) basic constitutional structure. The external system events are (i) changes in socio-economic conditions, (ii) changes in public opinion, (iii) changes in systemic governing coalition, (iv) policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems.

These eight different types of events are hypothesized by the ACF to be necessary for significant policy change. “[P]erturbations provide an opportunity for major policy change, but such change will not occur unless that opportunity is skillfully exploited by proponents of change” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 148). This condition of necessity but not sufficiency for change explain why external events are sometimes (Dudley and Richardson, 1999; Kubler, 2001), but not always, followed by major policy changes in policy (Carvalho, 2001; Burnett and Davis, 2002). Existing studies have

examined the role of the coalitions in manipulating and exploiting such external events to bring about policy change (e.g., Albright, 2011). Not studied are the diverse patterns of policy elite attention toward different events over time. Only once we can identify which type of events policy elites pay the most attention to, relatively stable parameters or external system events, can we then begin to limit our examination of what events advocacy coalitions are attempting to exploit to bring about policy change.

Based upon the distinction between the two types of external events to the policy subsystem this dissertation hypothesizes that when changes are occurring at both levels of relatively stable parameters and external system events, policy elites will pay the same amount of attention to both sets of events.

Attention to relatively stable parameters and external system events within a policy subsystem may differ within a subsystem but it may also differ between coalitions within the same subsystem. This is because coalitions filter information differently dependent upon their belief systems (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). Different belief systems may lead to different patterns of understanding the problems or issues a subsystem faces leading to coalitions paying attention to different external subsystem events. Therefore, do different advocacy coalitions pay relatively the same amount of attention to external subsystem events?

### **Purpose of the Case Study<sup>2</sup>**

This research seeks to advance our understanding of the ACF. It does this by following the prescription for advancing theories of the policy process by Sabatier (2007) of applying the following critical characteristics of science: (i) data acquisition and

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<sup>2</sup> A detailed account of this case study can be found in Chapter II of this dissertation.

analysis should be presented sufficiently and replicable; (ii) concepts and propositions are clearly defined and logically consistent in a manner that they may be proved false; (iii) propositions should be general and explicitly address relevant uncertainties; and (iv) methods and concepts should be self-consciously subjected to criticism and evaluation by experts in the field (Nagel, 1961; Lave and March, 1975; King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). In other words, in order to make theories better they must be made to stand up to the rigors of science.

The advancement of theory is not only dependent on the use of scientific techniques but also dependent upon the case selected. The proliferation of theories came about in part because the theories themselves have different purposes and different scopes (Meier, 2009). This means that some theories will provide better explanations than others given specific conditions. The result of this condition has been the development of research agendas that test a theory to a similar set of policy domains such as punctuated equilibrium on budgeting and disasters (Jones and Baumgartner, 2012), advocacy coalitions on energy and environment (Weible, et al. 2011), social construction on welfare and criminal justice (Schneider and Sidney, 2009), etc. This practice of strategic selection of cases has provided theoretical leverage for the development and establishment of these theories (Meier, 2009). Testing and re-testing a theory to similar cases may help in the confirmation or disconfirmation of a theory, but it does not necessarily advance a theory. This research tests the ACF on a case that it does not have prior established theoretical leverage in explanation.

Both George and Bennett (2005) and Gerring (2007) argue that the selection of deviant or outlier cases is one way to advance theories. A deviant case is one that is an

anomalous from cross-case comparison (Gerring, 2007; 105-108). A theory is advanced by selecting a deviant case and by deriving new hypotheses (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007) as well as by exploring the causal mechanisms that connect already identified variables to outcomes (George and Bennett, 2005). This research will select a deviant case that is anomalous from the types of cases the advocacy coalition framework has been applied to in the past.

### **Organization of Dissertation**

This dissertation has seven chapters including this introduction. The next chapter is an in-depth narrative of the case study. It introduces the policy issue, the actors, and central events that influenced U.S. foreign policy applied to the question of Palestine. Chapter three uses an actor specific model to identify the beliefs of President Harry Truman and his rationale for them. Chapter four, five and six apply the ACF to this case study to identify the coalitions and their relative stability over time, policy elite attention to external subsystem events, and finally if coalition membership is associated with different patterns of attention to such events. Chapter seven is a conclusion describing the contribution of this study to the theoretical literature as well as knowledge about the case study. It includes a discussion also of the limitations and future research agenda.

## CHAPTER II. FROM PALESTINE TO ISRAEL: AN AMERICAN TALE

### Introduction

Historically, there has been a persistent question of what is the proper relationship between Jews and people of other faiths (Arendt, 1978). In practice, this relationship has been one of persecution and oppression, in particular by Christians, towards Jews, a practice long-referred to as anti-Semitism. In response to anti-Semitism in Europe and in particular Russia along with the rising tide of nationalism, the Zionist movement developed in the late nineteenth century (Laqueur, 2003[1972]). The first international political meeting of Zionists occurred in Basel, Switzerland in 1897. There the first International Congress of Zionism declared their political goals as:

The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine secured by public law. [This would be achieved by:] 1. The settlement in Palestine of farmers, artisans and laborers in such a manner as serves the purpose [of creating a national home]. 2. The organization and union of the whole of Jewry in suitable local and general bodies, in accordance with the laws of their respective countries. 3. The strengthening of Jewish national feeling and national consciousness. 4. Preparatory steps to obtain governmental consent necessary to achieve the goals of Zionism.

Over the next two decades, Zionists worked to gain recognition of a national home for the Jews in Palestine through public law. Prior to World War I, their target was the Ottoman Empire which had sovereignty over the territory of Palestine. After the beginning of World War I, the Zionists attempted to persuade various European countries including the British Government to recognize their national rights in Palestine. The central negotiations between the World Zionist Organization and the British Government occurred between Chaim Weizmann and British Prime Minister Lloyd George and

several of his cabinet and staff members (for more discussion see Stein, 1961; and Segev, 2001).

At the same time these discussions were taking place between the Zionists and the British Government in London about the future of Palestine, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon was secretly corresponded with Sharif Husayn of Mecca, who was considered the representative of the powerful Hashemite family and Ottoman governor of Mecca and Medina. This correspondence took place from 1915-1916. McMahon convinced Husayn to support an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, which was an ally of the Germans and Austrian-Hungarians against the British during World War I. In return for carrying out this revolt, McMahon promised that the Ottoman territories would become an independent Arab state under Hashemite rule, including the territory of Palestine (Segev, 2001; Smith, 2001).

By the fall of 1917, the Arab revolt, led by the British soldier T.E. Lawrence and Husayn's son Faysal ibn Husayn, against the Ottomans had been highly successful in capturing Ottoman territory. Part of this success was the capture of Jerusalem by the British forces under General Edmund Allenby in December of 1917. General Allenby announced that Great Britain supported the,

complete and final liberation of all peoples formerly oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations in those countries deriving authority from the initiative and free will of those peoples themselves (Ingrams, 1972: 20).

This statement about the sovereignty of the Arab peoples over their territories was repeated in different terms by British officials on multiple occasions during the successive peace conferences after the war. The officials of the British Government



stated that their government recognized the “complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs” and that the British would work for the “freedom and independence” of the Arabs in all of the territories previously dominated by the Turks (Antonius, 1965: 433-434). Based upon statements like these and the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, the Arabs believed that the British promised Palestine to them and would be either part of a larger Arab state or have its own sovereignty under Arab authority (Smith, 2001).

While the Arabs in the Middle East received assurances from the British Government that Palestine would be under Arab authority, the British Government in London made a public statement supporting Jewish claims to Palestine. On November 2, 1917 the British Government represented by Foreign Minister James Balfour announced the Balfour Declaration in support of the Jewish claim for Palestine. It declared British support for the

establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people ... [and] it being clearly understood nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

The British sought to legitimate their authority over Palestine. This was achieved at the San Remo Conference in 1922 when the League of Nations granted them a mandate over the territory including the Balfour Declaration as part of its charter. The charter stated that the British were to administer Palestine until the people were able to achieve independence. That same year, the U.S. Government passed a resolution in support of the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate for Palestine. Thus, the British Government had promised, in some form, Palestine to both the Arabs and the Jews. It was the task of

the British High Commissioner in Palestine to establish a local government to balance these two factions.

### **British Mandate for Palestine**

The British Government established a civilian administration in Palestine in 1920 under High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, who attempted to balance the Jewish and Arab factions in Palestine. The Jews were represented by the Zionist Commission, which was formed in March 1918 and held open elections in 1920 among the Jewish community in Palestine. The Zionist Commission received recognition by the British Government in 1922 as the representative body of the Jewish community in Palestine. The Arabs were represented by the Palestinian Arab Congress, which established an executive committee to deal with the British Government. It was headed by Musa Kazim al-Husayni of the Husayni family one of the two families that dominated Arab Palestinian politics. The other family, the Nashshashibi, was a rival of the Husayni and boycotted the congress. The Husayni family also dominated the religious institutions of Arab Palestine as Hajj Amin al-Husayni became the mufti of Jerusalem in 1921 with the support of High Commissioner Samuel, even though the candidate for the Nashshashibi had received the most votes. The High Commissioner and the British Government chose to deal with the mufti and the Husayni family as the representatives of the Arabs in Palestine. The mufti became the head of the Supreme Muslim Council that was created by the British and operated the social services provided to the Arabs of Palestine.

While High Commissioner Samuel attempted to develop government institutions that included both the Zionist Commission and the Arabs, the Arabs refused to cooperate with any authoritative institution that granted the Jews equal representation (Segev,

2001). This led to two distinct sets of institutions and further solidified the divisions between the communities (Segev, 2001).

Throughout the mandate, the British faced armed resistance by Jews and Arabs (the majority indigenous population of Palestine) stemming from the delicate balancing act they attempted between the parties (Monroe, 1981; Shlaim, 2005). At the time of the Balfour Declaration, there were roughly 600,000 Arabs living in Palestine and about 60,000 Jews, of which approximately half were Zionists. The Zionists attempted to change this ratio through immigration. From 1919-1923 on average 10,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine each year. Many of these new immigrants were laborers who were idealistic and sought to develop a new Zionist society around socialist ideals in Palestine (Smith, 2001). These new immigrants proved to be the antithesis of the Arab community ideologically, religiously, and culturally. One example of the fighting between the two communities occurred on May Day 1921 when riots erupted in Tel Aviv between Jewish communists and socialists. The fighting spread into nearby Arab Jaffa leading to violent Arab attacks on Jews and subsequent Jewish reprisals. During the fighting, fourteen Arabs and forty-three Jews were killed along with dozens more on each side injured. That same year during an Arab religious celebration, Arab partisans attacked Jewish settlements during which forty-seven Jews and forty-eight Arabs were killed. The British attacked the Arab rioters from the air stopping the spread of the riots. These are just two examples of years of armed conflict that sporadically occurred among the Jews, Arabs, and British in Palestine.

During the inter-war years of the mandate, the Jewish community grew and developed various institutions. The central governing body became the Jewish Agency.

The Jewish Agency was officially created in 1929 by the International Zionist Congress and included both Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish members. It had the objective of developing the Jewish community in Palestine. While the World Zionist Organization continued to represent and conduct international diplomacy and fund raising, the Jewish Agency developed the governing institutions in Palestine and grew to represent the Jewish community in relation to the British Mandate Government.

Within the Jewish community in Palestine, the Jewish labor movement came to dominate local politics. The party was known as the General Federation of Laborers in the Land of Israel. This association, led by David Ben-Gurion, developed a Jewish economy within Palestine. By the 1930s, Ben-Gurion would become President of the Jewish Agency and the de facto Jewish political leader. This position was challenged by the Zionist Revisionists led by Vladimir Jabotinsky who advocated a more liberal economy in comparison to Ben-Gurion's labor socialist ideals. Also, Jabotinsky took a more aggressive stance towards the Arabs, advocating the invasion of various Arab lands and the use of terrorist tactics against the British. These two groups the Labor party and the Zionist Revisionists dominated Jewish politics in Palestine during the Mandate period and many of their clashes would have international ramifications among their followers.

Over the next two decades, the Jewish population intermittingly increased as more Jews immigrated to Palestine. By 1940, the total population of Palestine was about 1,528,000 with approximately 467,000 Jews and over a million Arabs (Smith, 2001). This is roughly a two to one majority for the indigenous Arab population. Throughout the British mandate, the Jews and Arabs in Palestine clashed over immigration, land purchases, and other issues (Smith, 2001). The basic problem was that the Arab leaders

demanding the British placed restrictions on the Jewish population to help maintain their dominant position as majority population and land owners. The Jews demanded the British Government support the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate by helping them establish a national home in Palestine. This led directly to the violent Arab uprising of 1936-1939.

By 1936, Arab grievances had come to a head, and a general boycott and armed revolt erupted targeting Jews, British soldiers, and bureaucrats. This revolt was led by the newly created Arab Higher Committee that included the leaders of the Arab clans and under the mufti as chairman. The committee was developed to coordinate Arab community efforts during the Arab revolt and was outlawed by the British Government in 1937. Its leadership was hunted down by British forces and arrested or forced into exile in nearby Arab states such as Syria and Iraq. This overt action led to the destruction of the Arab Palestinian elite by the British (Segev, 2001; Khalidi, 2007). The Arab revolt was a horrible catastrophe for the Arabs as from 1936-1939 there were over 5,000 killed and nearly 20,000 casualties among the Arabs (Khalidi, 2001). The main target of the revolt was the British mandate administration, so there were relatively few Jews killed during the combat with estimates ranging in the hundreds. The British were victorious in their stopping of the revolt but looked to understand its root causes and prevent future disturbances as they were on the brink of war back in Europe.

The British government created the Peel Commission to investigate the problems in Palestine and the commission formulated a new British policy. The new articulated policy was in the 1939 White Paper that drastically shifted the balance of power in Palestine towards the Arabs (Smith, 2001). It limited Jewish immigration to a monthly

quota of 1,500 persons, restricted land purchases, and Palestine would become an independent state in ten years under majority rule; based on immigration limitations, Palestine would become an Arab state.

At the same time of the Arab revolt and the change of policy in Palestine, Nazi Germany began a campaign of conquest and destruction in Europe, ultimately plunging the Western world into a Second World War. Part of this campaign sought to bring about the genocide of the Jews among other peoples. In total, approximately 12 million were murdered during the Holocaust, of which six million were Jews (Smith, 2001). This left the Jews of Europe and the Zionist movement in a desperate situation as just when they needed a refuge from Nazism in Europe; the doors of Palestine were being closed (Radosh and Radosh, 2009).

In 1942, Zionists from around the world held a conference in the United States referred to as the Biltmore Conference. At this conference, several resolutions were passed, including demands for unrestricted immigration and the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. The Biltmore Conference also marked a change in strategy by the Zionists, away from obtaining British to obtaining American support for their aims in Palestine (Stevens, 1970; Cohen, 2003). The policy arena had shifted. The British Government had established a relatively pro-Arab policy in Palestine, so now the target of lobbying efforts by Zionist and Arab leaders was the U.S. Government.

### **U.S. Government Policy and Palestine**

#### **1942 - April, 1945**

In June 1942, the Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) sought to coordinate a public statement with the British Government on Palestine. The

proposed statement included the provision that no settlement should be reached without prior consultation with both the Arabs and the Jews. This position of dual consultation drafted and supported by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt, became the basis of U.S. Government policymaking on Palestine (*Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 1945: 699-700). It was scheduled to be announced publicly in July 1943 in conjunction with the British Government. However, the American Zionist organizations learned of this proposal, and, viewing it as detrimental to their interests, immediately carried out a counter-offensive on the policy, targeting U.S. Government officials (*FRUS*, 1945: 699-700). The attack was successful; a joint American-British statement, which had been agreed upon as being in the national interest of both countries was effectively eliminated by members of the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) a branch of the World Zionist Organization (*FRUS*, 1945: 699-700).

The rationale for Zionist rejection of the proposal was that any policy that did not include unrestricted immigration and the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine could not be accepted. The ZOA would not compromise on these twin issues and did not support any attempt at compromise by the U.S. Government. This stood in opposition to the U.S. Government and in particular the Department of State NEA that wanted to support the British Government and its efforts to bring a peaceful solution to the question of Palestine.

Following this success in influencing U.S. Government policy in the summer of 1943, the ZOA, along with other American Zionists organizations such as the Christian Council on Palestine, Mizrachi Organization of America, among others, were successful in persuading members of Congress to introduce resolutions calling for unlimited

immigration of Jews into Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine in February 1944. Such a policy would not provide for compromise or negotiation with the Arabs as the proposed statement from 1943 had suggested. These resolutions were defeated in committee, but their proposals and hearings were at least in part made public. During the hearing, three coalitions emerged among the speakers, a pro-Zionist, an anti-Zionist, and a pro-Arab coalition. Speakers representing the pro-Zionist perspective included all of the Congressmen and supported the resolution of unlimited immigration and a Jewish state in Palestine. The anti-Zionists, which mostly included members of the American Council for Judaism, an organization founded in 1942 to confront Zionism and promote the belief that Judaism was a religion and not a national identity (Kolsky, 1990), supported some immigration of Jews to Palestine but not a Jewish state. The pro-Arab coalition included private business organizations representing Arab corporations and did not support Jewish immigration of a Jewish state in Palestine (Pierce, 2011).

In March 1944, the NEA again sought and obtained a private statement from President Roosevelt that no action would be taken on Palestine without prior dual consultation. However, as the previous resolutions were defeated by the actions of Secretary Stimson, it was decided that such a statement appeasing the Arabs was not needed (*FRUS*, 1945: 700). On March 9, 1944, President Roosevelt met with ZOA leaders Rabbi Stephan Wise and Rabbi Abba Silver and permitted them to make a public announcement that the President supported the Zionist position.

In response, the NEA issued a public statement that U.S. policy remained as outlined in the 1943 correspondence between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. The correspondence stated that the U.S. Government would not take a



position on Palestine without full consultation with both the Arabs and the Jews and that no action would be taken hostile to the Arab people (*FRUS*, 1945: 698). This correspondence was the basis for U.S. Government policy in private, but because of the previous cited actions of the ZOA and others was not made public. On Palestine, there was a distinct pattern under President Roosevelt of providing private assurances to the Arab states that nothing would be done about Palestine without consultation, while making public statements in support of the Zionist cause that the Zionists used to gain the greatest publicity possible (*FRUS*, 1945: 701-702). It is unclear what President Roosevelt's objectives were, but it is evident that he did not want to consider the issue of Palestine until after the war was over and until such a time sought to balance the demands of both parties (Grose, 1983).

This process of public support for the Zionist position culminated in the inclusion of calls for Jewish immigration and the creation of a Jewish homeland or state in Palestine in the Democratic and Republican Party Platforms for the 1944 general election. On October 15, 1944, President Roosevelt in a letter to Senator Robert Wagner (D – NY) supported the platform. This support by President Roosevelt went beyond any previous official American position on Palestine and raised doubts in the minds of the Arabs regarding the pledges which the President had given to them in private (*FRUS*, 1945: 700). Afterwards, there were protests and boycotts against the U.S. Government in multiple Arab countries.

The Department of State responded to the Democratic platform by having Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr. write a memo to President Roosevelt in November 1944 describing the gravity of the situation and imploring him to no longer

publicly support the Zionists. The letter had the desired effect as when the Zionists sought to re-introduce the Palestine resolutions in Congress in December; the President authorized Secretary Stettinius to tell Rabbi Wise and Congressional leaders that such action would be unwise at this time. However, the resolution was still introduced in the Senate. The President responded by having Secretary Stettinius appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and speak against the resolution in private to defeat it.

On February 14, 1945, President Roosevelt met with Saudi Arabian King Ibn Saud in Egypt aboard the USS *Murphy*. During this meeting, the President assured the King that the U.S. Government would make no hostile move against the Arab people and would not assist the Jews against the Arabs (*FRUS*, 1945: 701). In a lunch meeting on March 3 with First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt and Colonel Harold Hoskins, President Roosevelt agreed with Col. Hoskins that a Jewish state in Palestine could only be established and maintained by military force (*FRUS*, 1945: 691). Only two weeks after discussing this issue and coming to the position that a Jewish state would lead to bloodshed, Rabbi Wise issued a public statement after a private meeting with President Roosevelt that the U.S. Government supported unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state, which was again followed by Arab protests.

This back and forth between private promises to the Arabs and more public promises to the Zionists represented a long-term pattern by U.S. Government officials including the President. In public, they favored the Zionist position but such announcements would soon be followed by private statements by the Department of State assuring the Arabs that no hostile action would be taken against them and they would be consulted on any policy change. According to Paul Alling of the Department of State

NEA, this pattern represented a “lack of any clearcut policy toward Palestine on the part of the United States” (*FRUS*, 1945: 699).

This lack of a definite policy contributed to the political instability as well as violence in Palestine and in the Near East (*FRUS*, 1945: 699). The recurring indications of support of Zionist aspirations did affect U.S. standing in the region. Based upon an internal NEA review, Alling came to the conclusion on April 6, 1945, that the policy of the U.S. Government towards Palestine was that

no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country [Palestine] without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews ... and no action ... which might prove hostile to the Arab people (*FRUS*, 1945: 701).

This represented the policy position of the U.S. Government during President Roosevelt’s administration and was again repeated in various correspondences from President Roosevelt to Arab leaders April 11-12, 1945 (*FRUS*, 1945: 703-704).

In assessing the record of President Roosevelt and his administration in relation to Palestine, Marlow (1959) states that policy “was a process of equivocation which, by contrast, gives the record of British policy towards Palestine an air of almost Buchmanite honesty and straightforwardness (181-183).” Rabbi Silver had come to the conclusion in 1946 that

the United States Government was determined to take no action whatsoever and to make no representations whatsoever to the British Government either to open the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration, or to live up to the other obligations which it had assumed under the mandatory date (q.b Schechtman, 1966: 117).

In summing up the record of President Roosevelt in comparison to his successor President Truman, David Niles (an assistant to both presidents) stated that “There are

serious doubts in my mind that Israel would have come into being if Roosevelt had lived” (Steinberg, 1962: 301). President Roosevelt and his administration had a policy of balancing Arab and Zionist demands, but ultimately did not want to contradict the British Government. How policy would he continued or developed under him is unknown, but soon after his promises to Arab leaders President Roosevelt died in office, and Harry S. Truman, a little known politician from Missouri, became the new President of the United States.

### **April 1945 - April 1946**

Immediately after he became president, Truman chose to maintain the policy of dual consultation and promises of no hostile action against the Arabs established by President Roosevelt (*FRUS*, 1945: 707).

President Truman was first contacted about Palestine by Secretary of State Stettinius on April 18, 1945. In that memo, Secretary Stettinius wrote that the Zionists will come to pressure the new President to support their program of unlimited immigration and the creation of a Jewish state. The Secretary warned that while the U.S. Government sympathizes with the Displaced Persons (DPs) including the Jews who are the victims of the Holocaust, that the situation in Palestine was highly complex and involved questions that were beyond the plight of the Jews in Europe (*FRUS*, 1945: 705). In other words, while Secretary Stettinius agreed something should be done to relieve the suffering of the Jewish DPs in Europe, the Zionist proposal of unlimited immigration and a Jewish state in Palestine was not the answer, and that the two issues should not be compounded.

During the summer of 1945, the war in Europe came to an end and the magnitude of the Holocaust in Europe became clear to the American public. The Holocaust left hundreds of thousands of refugees, many of them Jews, living in former concentration and refugee camps across Europe. At the same time, President Truman began meeting with Zionist leaders such as Rabbis Wise and Silver who lobbied him to connect the issues of the Jewish DPs in Europe to British immigration policy in Palestine. On June 22, President Truman ordered Earl Harrison, a government expert on immigration and refugees, to report on what should be done to accommodate the Jewish DPs in American controlled zones in Europe. Harrison filed his report to the White House in August 1945, concluding that 100,000 Jews should immigrate to Palestine.

With this report in hand, President Truman wrote directly to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee asking that 100,000 Jewish DPs to enter Palestine immediately (*FRUS*, 1945: 737-739). This demand would be a clear change in British immigration policy which was based upon a quota system of 1,500 Jewish immigrants per month. The U.S. Government prior to this letter had not formerly advocated the British Government for any particular policy change in relation to how they administered their mandate for Palestine. President Truman argued that the legitimacy of this intrusion into Britain's sovereignty over Palestine was "Because of the natural interest of this Government in the present condition and future fate of those displaced persons in Germany" (*FRUS*, 1945: 737-738). Thus, the issues of the Jewish DPs in Europe were conflated with the question of Palestine by President Truman just as Secretary Stettinius had warned against.

Truman argued that the Jewish DPs should be allowed to immigrate to Palestine because "no single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors of

concentration camps for over a decade as is the future of immigration possibilities into Palestine” (*FRUS*, 1945: 738). For President Truman the two issues were not only connected, but Palestine was the only suitable solution to resolve this human catastrophe. The president argued that when it came to issuing these immigration certificates for the Jewish DPs that,

No claim is more meritorious than that of the groups who for so many years have known persecution and enslavement. The main solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-repatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine (*FRUS*, 1945: 738-739).

Based upon this letter, it is clear that President Truman viewed immigration into Palestine as the best and only response to the Jewish DPs. In addition, this response should overcome all other claims due to the past suffering of the Jewish people. This line of argument that the Jews deserved to at immigrate into Palestine because of the Holocaust is driving the rationale of this letter.

Prime Minister Attlee was not immediately persuaded by Truman’s rationale. Instead, the Prime Minister had other constraints including the nearly one million Arabs in Palestine opposing such immigration and the millions of Arabs and hundreds of millions of sympathetic Muslims living within the Empire at the time. Contradicting the interests of the Arabs in Palestine, who were the democratic majority in Palestine, along with past policies by the British Government about Jewish immigration could not be changed based upon a single letter of appeal by President Truman. The British Government was clearly irritated by this proposal by President Truman and it threatened relations between the two governments (*FRUS*, 1945: 747).

While President Truman was working to solve the Jewish DP issue using Palestine as a refuge the, Zionists in particular in America were displeased by this development as well as the Arabs.

Zionist leaders called at the Department a few days ago to express their concern at what appears to be a tendency to dispose of the problem of Jewish immigration to Palestine without consulting them. The Arabs, moreover, are making strong protests against what they consider to be our failure to live up to frequent promises which have been made to them during recent years that in our view they should be consulted before any decision respecting the basic situation in Palestine is made (*FRUS*, 1945: 754).

Truman's letter to Attlee had circumvented the traditional foreign policy bureaucracies of both nations as well as contradicted the established policy that the U.S. Government would engage in dual consultation before a policy change would be made. It is clear that President Truman's letter while well intentioned to assist the Jewish DPs, was contradictory to the interests of all the parties including the Zionists who wanted to be consulted before any such proposal was made.

The letter by President Truman directly interfered with the British administration of their Mandate for Palestine and also circumvented the Department of State. The Department of State and more specifically the NEA had enjoyed relative autonomy on policymaking towards Palestine. While President Roosevelt would make occasional statements in both public and private that may have contradicted the Department of State, in each case he would support the Department of State once they protested. In the case of the Harrison report and subsequent letter by President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee, the White House implemented an investigation and President Truman wrote directly to the Prime Minister of Great Britain ignoring the Department of State, the NEA, and the

British Foreign Office. The Department of State was surprised by this move and responded by seeking a single unified policy on Palestine that would be public and adhered to by all branches of the U.S. Government (*FRUS*, 1945: 746).

The Department of State proposed that 100,000 Jewish DPs should be immediately allowed to enter Palestine, but the British Government as Mandatory power already rejected this proposal (*FRUS*, 1945: 747). Therefore instead of focusing on Palestine, the Department of State NEA argued that the focus should be on improving camp conditions, helping repatriate all displaced persons, and increase immigration quotas into the United States as well as other willing countries. A future policy on Palestine should be based upon an equitable solution to the question of Palestine based upon full dual consultation with both the Arabs and the Jews following the lead of the sovereign Mandatory power the British Government (*FRUS*, 1945: 748). Based upon this proposal, the Department of State viewed the issue of Jewish DPs as separate from the question of Palestine. The two issues were separate in part as the Department of State recognized the need to assist the Jewish DPs, but also wanted to continue its support of British administration over Palestine, which included strict limitations on Jewish immigration.

This policy would keep the U.S. Government in the precarious position of balancing demands by both the Jews and Arabs. This situation was amplified for the mandatory authority. The British Government had issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917 promising the creation of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine while protecting the rights of the existing populations. However, the development and creation of such a homeland was ambiguous and the Zionists sought to create a Jewish state over Palestine along with



unlimited immigration. In contrast, the native population, the Arabs of Palestine, sought independence and the creation of an Arab state based upon democratic ideals of self-determination. Edward Wood, Earl of Halifax and British Ambassador to the U.S. described the situation.

The lack of any clear definition on this dual obligation has been the main cause of the trouble which has been experienced in Palestine during the past twenty-six years. Every effort has been made by the mandatory to devise some arrangements which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and cooperate for the welfare of the country, but all such efforts have been unavailing ... The fact has to be faced that there is no common ground between the Arabs and the Jews (*FRUS*, 1945: 772).

The British Government had failed to balance the national demands of the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine because the demands were antithetical. It had come to the conclusion in October 1945 that there was no common ground between the Arabs and the Jews for an equitable solution as proposed by the U.S. Department of State. Also, the continued attempts by the U.S. Government to propose solutions in relation to Palestine was “most embarrassing to them [the British] and is embittering relations between the two countries” (*FRUS*, 1945: 775).

By the fall of 1945, the leaders of the Arab states began to suspect that the U.S. Government policy of dual consultation did not mean agreement from the Arabs. Amir Faisal, the son of King Ibn Saud and the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, asked a representative of the Department of State whether consultation meant without prior agreement (*FRUS*, 1945: 828). He argued that currently the U.S. Government’s proposal to allow 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine was a plea by the Americans for the British Government to break its pledges to the Arabs. He reported that the British Government had informed the Saudi Arabian Government that they favored the Arab position of a

single state with limited Jewish immigration, but the Americans were pushing the British Government into a pro-Zionist position. This alarmed the Arab Governments and the “very real admiration and respect which all Arabs held for America is evaporating rapidly and may soon disappear altogether along with our many mutual interests and cooperation” (*FRUS*, 1945: 829).

Amir Faisal was not alone in worrying that consultation did not mean agreement. Hamdi Al-Pachachi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, also stated that the assurances that U.S. Government policy had not changed without prior consultation was not consistent with the demand by President Truman to allow 100,000 Jewish DPs to enter Palestine. Al-Pachachi stated the proposal would be “prejudicial to the fundamental issue in Palestine because the subject of immigration is really the basis of the problems and disturbances in Palestine” (*FRUS*, 1945: 836). The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Arab countries were told by the Department of State that their opinions would be considered in any final decisions, but Secretary of State James Byrnes stated that consultation did not mean prior agreement (*FRUS*, 1945: 838).

The Saudi Arabian Government along with many other Arabs viewed the issue of Palestine as a regional issue not a local one. They viewed the Zionist aspirations of creating a Jewish state in Palestine as a beachhead to greater expansion. The Arabs promised to go to war against such expansionism.

We Arabs would rather starve or die in battle than see our lands and people devoured by the Zionists as you would if we were giving them one of your states for a nation. Do not think we would yield to Zionism in the hope of survival or prosperity elsewhere. If it develops that the USA and British will aid the Zionists against our will and to our destruction we shall fight Zionism to the last man (*FRUS*, 1945: 829).

The Department of State viewed Palestine also in terms of a regional perspective (Wilson, 1979). This is demonstrated by the vast majority of the correspondence with Arabs about Palestine was with leaders of Arab countries outside of Palestine. The perception of Palestine as a regional issue may be due to the mission of the Department of State NEA to focus upon the entire region rather than an individual country, and the lack of representative leadership among the Palestinian Arabs at this time (Khalidi, 2007).

While the U.S. Government was attempting to appease the Arabs that a final decision on Palestine had not been made, they were also negotiating with the British Government about the future of Palestine as well as the Jewish DPs. In a compromise by the British Government Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin invited the U.S. Government to form a joint Anglo-American Committee to investigate both the future of Palestine as well as how to respond to the Jewish DP issue in Europe (*FRUS*, 1945: 771-775). There was debate between the parties about what should be the scope of this inquiry and the inclusion of both immigration of Jewish DPs and the question of Palestine connected these two issues for future policy debates (Cohen, 1988: 175-197).

The Anglo-American Committee was announced on November 13, 1945. It would include six representatives from the U.S. and six from the United Kingdom. It began the investigation on January 4, 1946 and would conclude it on April 25, 1946. These representatives were charged with four terms of reference. The first and primary term of reference connected the future of Palestine and Jewish immigration, in reference to the Jewish DPs.

1. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein (*FRUS*, 1946: 577).

Over the next three months, the committee traveled to Europe, Palestine, and the Near East interviewing individuals and in general investigating what should be the future of Palestine and what could be done to alleviate the suffering of the Jewish DPs in Europe.

#### **April 1946 – September 1946**

On April 25, 1946 the Anglo-American Committee concluded its report (*FRUS*, 1946: 585-586). It proposed that Palestine was an answer to the Jewish refugee problem but other locations should also be responsible. 100,000 immigration certificates should immediately be made available to Jewish DPs for them to enter Palestine. On the question of Palestine, the Committee recommended that neither Jew nor Arab should dominate the other. The statement was that “any attempt to establish either an independent Palestinian state or independent Palestinian states would result in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the world” (*FRUS*, 1946: 585-586). To prevent this attempt to dominate each other even through violence, the Committee recommended that the Government of Palestine should continue under the Mandate of Great Britain until a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations could be attained.

President Truman met with Jewish Agency members Stephen Wise, Nahum Goldmann, Louis Lipsky, and Abba Silver which led to a press release by the President on July 2, 1946 demanding that there should be no delay in the immigration of these Jewish DPs into Palestine (*FRUS*, 1946: 642-643). The President added that the U.S. Government would assume responsibility for the technical and financial needs of these

immigrants. President Truman did not comment on the recommendations about the future of Palestine (*FRUS*, 1946: 589).

In response, the British Government argued that the recommendations must be taken as a whole and could not be cherry picked and that the immediate allowance of 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine would cause the exact civil strife that the committee had warned against (*FRUS*, 1946: 590).

Following the debate between the U.S. and British Governments about how to implement the recommendations, another committee including American and British representatives was created that would become known for its chairpersons the Morrison-Grady Committee. By the end of July, the committee had completed its report (*FRUS*, 1946: 652-667) that called for provincial autonomy divided between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine under the authority of the British mandate. The right of the 100,000 Jewish DPs to immigrate to Palestine would be based upon the acceptance by the Jews and the Arabs of the entire proposal.

The U.S. Government asked both the Jewish Agency as representing the Zionists and the leaders of the Arab states including the Arab League to respond to the recommendations made by the Anglo-American Committee and later the Morrison-Grady Committee. This was done to fulfill the requirement for dual consultation.

The reports were not well received by the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency rejected the findings as a Jewish state was its primary goal and the proposed continuation of the British Mandate in any capacity was not acceptable. However, the Jewish Agency did support the conclusion that Palestine should admit 100,000 Jewish DPs and once this section of the report was accepted, it would then discuss other recommendations. The

Arab League, now representing the Arab states, also rejected the conclusions of the two committee reports. It viewed the findings as advisory only and not binding and argued that the Anglo-American Committee was illegitimate because some members were pro-Zionist and not objective. These two responses to the reports by the Jewish Agency and the Arab League were viewed as the required consultation needed by the U.S. Government (*FRUS*, 1946: 650).

The U.S. Government conducted an internal review to develop its own position on the Anglo-American Committee report. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were ordered to advise the President on future action in Palestine. It recommended that

no U.S. armed forces be involved in carrying out the Committee's [Inquiry's] recommendations. We recommend that in implementing the report, the guiding principles be that no action should be taken which will cause repercussions in Palestine which are beyond the capabilities of British troops to control (*FRUS*, 1946: 632).

If U.S. forces were sent to Palestine to implement the report "the Middle East could well fall into anarchy and become a breeding ground for world war" (*FRUS*, 1946: 632). If this were to happen the Middle East may no longer look to the British or America but rather seek to align itself with the U.S.S.R. This scenario would be a "very serious consideration from a military point of view [as] control of the oil in the Middle East" is essential for U.S. military strength and standard of living (*FRUS*, 1946: 632-633).

Overall, the JCS concluded that

no action be taken which would: a. Commit U.S. armed forces or b. Orient the peoples of the Middle East away from the Western Powers, as the U.S. has vital security interest in that area (*FRUS*, 1946: 633).

U.S. military did not support the proposals of the inquiry because it was unwilling to implement a policy that meant war against the Arab states.

In response to the report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Truman had the Cabinet Committee on Palestine prepare a memorandum on Palestine (*FRUS*, 1946: 644-645). It stated that the U.S. was not prepared to deploy military forces to Palestine or act as a Trustee or Co-Trustee for Palestine. In addition to the continued demand to implement the policy of admitting 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine, the President would ask Congress to allow 50,000 Jewish DPs to enter the U.S. However after meeting with members of Congress, President Truman was forced to inform the British Government that the U.S. could not accept the 50,000 Jewish DPs or provide technical or material support for the proposed 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine.

On August 12, 1946 President Truman formally rejected the Anglo-American Committee and subsequent Morrison-Grady reports (*FRUS*, 1946: 682). In a statement by the President the rationale for the rejection was that,

The opposition in this country to the plan has become so intense that it is now clear it would be impossible to rally in favor of it sufficient public opinion to enable this Government to give its effective support (*FRUS*, 1946: 682).

This supports the accusation by the Arab League that U.S. foreign policy was heavily influenced by the demands of the Zionists in America (*FRUS*, 1946: 628-631).

The Zionists in America were not only been able to influence U.S. foreign policy but in this case prevent the acceptance of a joint proposal by American and British Governments. The basis of this rejection was that a Jewish state was not proposed. President Truman in a statement to the British Government explaining the basis for this decision stated that future U.S. Government policy will be in line with Zionist demands.

In view of the critical situation in Palestine and of the desperate plight of homeless Jews in Europe I believe a search for a solution to this difficult

problem should continue. I have therefore instructed our Embassy in London to discuss with you [PM Attlee] or with appropriate members of the British Government certain suggestions which have been made to us and which, I understand, are also being made to you [footnote 43. See telegram 5972] (*FRUS*, 1946: 682).

The “certain suggestions” referenced here from Telegram 5972 refers to the demands made by Jewish Agency representative Nahum Goldmann in a telegram to the Department of State (*FRUS*, 1946: 679-682). The suggestions include the establishment of a viable Jewish state in an adequate area of Palestine, the immediate transportation of 100,000 Jewish DPs to Palestine, immediate full autonomy to be granted to the Jewish state, and that the Jewish state would have control over immigration (*FRUS*, 1946: 679-682).

After this latest round of communication between President Truman and PM Attlee the head of the Zionist Organization of America Rabbi Stephen Wise asked the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to clarify the U.S. Government position on Palestine. The Secretary of State made it clear that the Department of State was not involved in policymaking about Palestine even though it was responsible for such policy.

For the past year President Truman has had personal charge of the Palestine problem. Communications between the British Government and the United States Government have been carried out by the President and Mr. Attlee – not by Mr. Bevin [Foreign Minister] and me (*FRUS*, 1946: 686).

Not only is policy being directed by the President and not the Department of State, Secretary Byrnes added that he would not make any statement because he did not want to interfere in the President’s policymaking. “As long as the President is handling the matter I feel that I should not confer with the interested parties unless requested to do so by the President” (*FRUS*, 1946: 686). While during President Roosevelt’s administration and the



first several months of Truman's policy on Palestine was developed by the Department of State. This statement demonstrates that since the letter to PM Attlee on August 31, 1945, policymaking on Palestine has been the priority of President Truman and not the Department of State. At this time it is clear that American policy is being made by the White House with full support of Zionist demands.

The question of Palestine was a difficult issue for President Truman. While the president faced many challenges and difficult decisions during his term in office including the use of the atomic bomb against Japan in August 1945, the war in Korea in 1950, and the nationalization of American steel mills in 1952, his daughter Margaret Truman in her biography of her father wrote that the decision to recognize the state of Israel was the most difficult he faced (Truman, 1973). Truman himself referenced the difficulty of the policy issue on numerous occasions including in 1945 when he stated that "this question was causing him and [Secretary of State James] Byrnes more trouble than almost any other question which is facing the United States" (*FRUS*, 1945: 13-18).

Policy on Palestine became a priority for President Truman for various reasons that scholars disagree upon. Some argue that President Truman's focus on Palestine was a function of his sentiments towards the Jewish DPs (Schechtman, 1966; Khouri, 1968; Postal and Levy, 1973; Benson, 1997, 2008; Christison, 1997; Anderson, 2005; Berger, 2008; Warshal, 2008). This focus is supported by President Truman himself, who in his memoirs stated that his primary concern was the "basic human problem. The fate of the hundreds of thousands of Jews in Europe" (Truman, 1956: 137). President Truman's own account (1956, 1973) is supported by members of his administration. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1969) and White House Counsel Clark Clifford (1978) argued that

President Truman acted out of humanitarian concern for the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. Some extend this argument about a humanitarian rationale to President Truman's religious convictions. This position was put forward in part by Clifford (1978) and is the basis for Benson (1997). It is also supported by Berger (2008), Worsham (2008) and Benson (2008). Clifford (1978) wrote,

As a student of the Bible he believed in the historic justification for a Jewish homeland, and it was a conviction with him that the Balfour Declaration of 1917 constituted a solemn promise that fulfilled the age-old hope and dream of the Jewish people (44).

For both Clifford (1978) and Berger (2008), President Truman's knowledge and beliefs about the Bible influenced his beliefs about the question of Palestine.

Many scholars disagree with these humanitarian and religious rationales attributed to President Truman, and instead argue that domestic and international pressures were more important. Specific studies address the lobbying efforts and financial resources of Zionist organizations, the influence of Jews in the 1948 U.S. general election, and the relationships between the U.S., British, Arab and Soviet Governments (Roosevelt Jr., 1948; Westerfield, 1955; Arakie, 1973; Snetsinger, 1974; Donovan, 1977; Ganin, 1977, 1979; Wilson, 1979; Bain, 1979; Cohen, 1979; Grose, 1984; Spiegel, 1985; Kochavi, 1989; Ovendale, 1989; Evensen, 1993; Christison, 1997; Ottolenghi, 2004). These studies asserted that a purely humanitarian rationale for explaining the recognition of the State of Israel is too limited in scope. They tend to either focus upon the role of the Jewish voters and Zionist organization lobbying efforts within the U.S. or upon how Palestine was connected to an international political arena at the beginning of the Cold War.

Snetsinger (1974) argued that the decision to recognize Israel was based upon a domestic political rationale that was against the national interest. In Snetsinger's

*Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel* (1974), he concluded that,

Although since 1948 Truman has been lauded for his contribution to the creation of Israel, much of the adulation has been misplaced. The President had no commitment to the Zionist program ... Truman's Palestine policy offers an extraordinary example of foreign policy conducted in line with short-range political expediency rather than long-range national goals (140).

In addition to election objectives, Grose (1984) and Spiegel (1985) both argue that the U.S. Government policy towards Palestine was the result of an intensive lobbying effort conducted by Zionists who had close access to the president. This domestic political argument was summed up by Westerfield (1955),

Palestine is the classic case in recent years of the determination of American foreign policy by domestic political considerations ... Clearly the exigencies of American politics were the foremost factor in permitting the birth of the state of Israel (227, 238).

These scholars argue that the policy decision was due to the influence of various Zionist organizations, individual Zionists with strong ties to President Truman and members of his administration, and the perceived influence of the Jewish vote on the 1948 election. This scholarship clearly identifies a domestic political source of influence for President Truman's beliefs and rationale about Palestine.

Between these two arguments about why President Truman focused on Palestine Cohen (1990) stresses the complexity of the issue and that any policy about a future Jewish state was connected to immigration and Jewish DPs as well as an internal conflict with the Department of State. He concludes that President Truman was influenced by domestic and international political forces as well as his own humanitarian beliefs about

the need to act to assist the Jewish DPs. Whatever the reason behind his focus on Palestine, it is clear that President Truman was active and decisive in the development of U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine.

### **September 1946 – February 1947**

In Palestine, violence between the Arabs, the Zionists, and the British was escalating. Zionist terrorist organizations carried out assassinations of British soldiers. The British responded by raiding the headquarters of the Jewish Agency leading to the arrest of thousands of Zionist leaders. This did not deter the Zionist terrorist organizations, in particular the Irgun. The Irgun bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem killing 91 people on July 22. These acts of terrorism brought increased domestic pressure upon the British Government to find a resolution to the question of Palestine (Smith, 2001). With this mounting pressure upon the government, British Foreign Minister Bevin announced a conference in London to meet in September bringing together the Arab and Zionist leaders. The proposed conference was to focus upon the Morrison-Grady proposals. During the negotiations, Zionists and Arabs attendees refused to meet, forcing the British to engage in negotiations with each party separately. The representatives from the Arab states insisted on no more Jewish immigration and only an Arab state over all of Palestine. The Zionists were more open to limits on immigration and the possibility of a limited Jewish state within Palestine. The U.S. Government had made the decision to not take part in the London Conference and instead would only act as a passive observer.

This decision to act as a passive observer of the London Conference did not prevent President Truman from making public statements about Palestine. After

negotiations had been suspended by Foreign Minister Bevin in September, on October 4, President Truman made a public statement making it clear that the U.S. Government supported Zionist objectives in Palestine. On the eve of Yom Kippur, a sacred Jewish holiday, President Truman repeated publicly his rejection of the Anglo-American Committee report and that U.S. policy would support the Jewish Agency's proposals for a Jewish state in Palestine. While this position was already clear to the Department of State, the British Government, and the Jewish Agency in private, this was the public support the Zionists desired.

Afterwards, President Truman wrote a conciliatory letter to Prime Minister Attlee because the latter viewed this statement as undermining their efforts at the London Conference (*FRUS*, 1946: 704-705). President Truman attempted to remedy the situation by outlining his rationale for making the statement public. Truman wrote that the European Jews were depressed by the British Government's announcement that the London Conference was being adjourned until December 16. Furthermore their

feeling of depression and frustration was, of course, intensified by the approach of their annual Day of Atonement, when they are accustomed to give contemplation to the lot of the Jewish people ... I feel that this Government owed it to these people to leave them in no doubt ... as to its continuing interest in their future and its desire that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate their plight (*FRUS*, 1946: 707).

Truman's rationale for the content and timing of the message was to demonstrate clearly the U.S. Government's support for the Zionist cause and to counter the growing frustration among the Jewish DPs in Europe. In the letter President Truman would continue to outline his beliefs about the responsibilities of the British and American Governments to the Jewish people.

We believe, however, that one of the primary purposes of the Mandate was to foster the development of the Jewish National Home, a development which has commanded international sympathy and in which the Government of the United States has traditionally maintained a deep and abiding interest. In our view the development of the Jewish National Home has no meaning in the absence of Jewish immigration and settlement on the land as contemplated by the Mandate. We therefore feel that the implementation of the Mandate, as well as the humanitarian considered mentioned above, call for immediate and substantial immigration into Palestine (*FRUS*, 1946: 707).

Based upon the original Balfour Declaration in 1917, which the U.S. Government had supported as legislation in 1922, Truman believed that his demands for allowing 100,000 Jewish DPs to enter Palestine were consistent with the establishment of the Jewish National Home. President Truman therefore believed that the commitment to the Zionist based upon both humanitarian goals and consistent with past policies.

This statement not only got the attention of the British Government, but also that of the Saudi Arabian Government. King Ibn Saud wrote to President Truman on October 15, the precedent of President Roosevelt and prior correspondence with President Truman that the Arabs would be consulted and that the U.S. Government would not harm the Arabs. King Ibn Saud argued that the Zionist cause was expansionist and targeted the Arabs making any assistance to them a hostile act against the Arabs (*FRUS*, 1946: 708-709). President Truman responded that his statement and U.S. Government policy was based upon humanitarian grounds and the need to assist the Jewish DPs.

I feel certain that Your Majesty will readily agree that the tragic situation of the surviving victims of Nazi persecution in Europe presents a problem of such magnitude and poignancy that it cannot be ignored by people of good will or humanitarian instincts. This problem is worldwide. It seems to me that all of us have a common responsibility to working out a solution which would permit those unfortunates who must leave Europe to find new homes where they may dwell in peace and security (*FRUS*, 1946: 714).

Truman argued that these Jewish DPs seeking a peaceful home view Palestine as a haven

where they hope among people of their own faith to find refuge, to begin to lead peaceful and useful lives and to assist in the further development of the Jewish National Home (*FRUS*, 1946: 714-715).

President Truman's rationale for supporting the Zionists is based upon the humanitarian needs of the Jewish DPs and the past policy to support the Jewish National Home in Palestine. In reference to the Arabs, President Truman argued that they have already achieved independence and in Palestine should prepare for self-governance. However, at this time, the Jewish National Home is not fully developed and the U.S. Government supports the immigration of the Jews into Palestine for the purpose of completing this National Home (*FRUS*, 1946: 715).

President Truman argued that his statements in support of the Zionists were not anti-Arab and he had not changed U.S. policy about not taking any action hostile against the Arabs.

I do not consider that my urging of the admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews into Palestine or my statements with regard to the solution of the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab people (*FRUS*, 1946: 716-717).

The President and the King obviously had very different views on what constitutes a change in policy. While President Truman did not believe allowing 100,000 Jewish DPs to immigrate into Palestine or even statements in support of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine as changes in U.S. Government policy, King Ibn Saud argued to the contrary that these actions did represent a change in American policy (*FRUS*, 1946: 708-709). In regards to King Ibn Saud's argument that such a change in policy was done without consultation as required by past policies, President Truman responded that "during the

current year there have been a number of consultations with both Arabs and Jews”  
(*FRUS*, 1946: 717).

On November 2, King Ibn Saud answered President Truman’s letter. The Arabs did not callously object to humanitarian assistance by the U.S. Government to help the Jews in Europe. However, such assistance should not condemn those Arabs living in Palestine. King Ibn Sad asserted that the Zionists sought to conquer Palestine and, through immigration, may become a majority population and would be able to create a Jewish state. Such a Jewish state could then expel its Arab inhabitants and be the base for aggression against Arab states (*FRUS*, 1946: 717-718). While Truman believed that the Zionists were only completing their objectives of developing a Jewish National Homeland (*FRUS*, 1946: 714-717), King Ibn Saud saw such activity as part of a larger plan of domination and expansionism by which the Zionists will control Palestine and threaten the Arab states (*FRUS*, 1946: 717-720).

To follow up on this correspondence between President Truman and King Ibn Saud, Truman met with Amir Faisal representing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on December 13 (*FRUS*, 1946: 729-731). Faisal said that he wanted to appeal to the President’s sense of justice and fairness, stating that Zionist immigration was not fair to the Arab inhabitants and that a Jewish state would lead to war in the Middle East. President Truman focused upon the humanitarian issue of the Jewish DPs asserting that “all must join in the effort to alleviate their situation” (*FRUS*, 1946: 730). In the course of the conversation President Truman viewed himself as not only speaking for the U.S. Government but as the representative of the Jewish DPs. He identified with their plight and viewed his role as one to persuade the Arabs in accepting Jewish immigration into



Palestine. He spoke “for the oppressed who had suffered so cruelly before and during the war and who were now seeking homes” (*FRUS*, 1946: 730).

At the end of 1946, Gordon Merriam of the NEA proposed that the Department of State reevaluate its policy on Palestine (*FRUS*, 1946: 732-735). Merriam argued,

Not only is our Palestine policy of no real assistance to the Jews (whatever it may afford them in the way of moral encouragement) it keeps us constantly on the edge of embroilment with the British and Arabs (*FRUS*, 1946: 732).

Merriam outlined several major issues with current U.S. policy. First, the U.S. Government had publicly advocated the admission of 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine. However, it is clear that the U.S. Government would not force this through direct action or exert decisive pressure against the British Government. This had in part led to the rationalization by Zionist organizations of illegal immigration into Palestine that had placed increased pressure on the entire situation. Second, “Our position on a political settlement for Palestine is qualified and to some extent indefinite” (*FRUS*, 1946: 733). While U.S. Government support for a Jewish state in Palestine had gained some support from minimalist Zionists willing to compromise, it did not comply with the Biltmore program supported by the Zionist Organization of America and the Jewish Agency that all of Palestine become a Jewish state and is even further from the Revisionist Zionists who seek to include Transjordan in such a state. “Therefore, our policy is only moderately satisfactory to the Zionists” (*FRUS*, 1946: 733). Third, while U.S. Government policy has failed to be satisfactory to the Zionists it is hated by the Arabs and this may “eventually jeopardize our political and other interests in the Arab world” (*FRUS*, 1946: 733). Overall, it was clear that in the short-term current U.S. Government

policy appeared to be untenable to the NEA and to become more symbolic than substantive. In the long-term a limited Jewish state appeased few Zionists who were willing to compromise to make immediate gains, but this policy was opposed by many Zionist groups and the Arabs. In conclusion, U.S. Government policy needed to be revised.

Merriam suggested that one of the reasons for the current dysfunctional policy was the source of its development (*FRUS*, 1946: 732-733). U.S. Government policy had been incremental and reactionary in order to please Zionist demands while attempting to not make the Arabs and the British too angry (*FRUS*, 1946: 733).

The main point which it is desired to make in this memorandum is that our policy, as it stands, is one of expediency, not one of principle. Time after time we have maneuvered into acceptance of more or less specific propositions ... We ought to proceed from principle to the specific, not vice versa (*FRUS*, 1946: 733).

U.S. Government policy, Merriam argued, should be based upon a clear objective on the future of Palestine. Since current policy was reactive, it helped foster Zionist pressures for specific demands and led to an incomplete and often incoherent policy.

Merriam asserted that future U.S. Government policy on Palestine should be based on the following principles:

(1) The mandate (or trusteeship) for Palestine should be replaced as soon as possible by independence. The form which Palestinian independence takes should be decided by free agreement between interested Arabs and Jews within and without Palestine, and must conform to United Nations principles ... (2) The United States will support any political arrangement for Palestine agreed to as the result of the negotiations between Arabs and Jews and approved by the United Nations ... (3) Until the security system of the United Nations is able to provide directly or indirectly, for the general security of the Near Eastern area, and possibly by virtue and under the authority of that system when in operation, Great Britain should have control ... (4) Pending agreement between Arabs and Jews on the future of

Palestine, the existing mandate should be replaced by a trusteeship under the United Nations, administered by Great Britain (*FRUS*, 1946: 734-735).

These four principles in summation stated that Great Britain, under the direction of the United Nations, should have authority over Palestine until the Arabs and the Jews can negotiate an agreement on the future of sovereignty over Palestine. It was clear that the Department of State NEA no longer wanted outside pressure groups to dictate policy on Palestine. Rather, the objective of U.S. policy should be an independent and secure Palestine agreed upon by both parties.

Discussions about policy on Palestine were at the forefront of Department of State in 1947. Fraser Wilkins of the NEA stated, “The Palestine problem is one of the most difficult problems with which the Department is faced” (*FRUS*, 1947: 1004). This disposition was not only shared by the Department of State but also by President Truman. In a letter by President Truman to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia in January 1947 stated, “Palestine is undoubtedly one of the most difficult problems faced by the world at the present time” (*FRUS*, 1947: 1012).

On January 17, 1947 representatives from Saudi Arabia met with Secretary of State Byrnes, Under Secretary Dean Acheson and Director of the NEA Loy Henderson. In the course of the meeting, the Saudis argued that the Zionists were a threat to the peace and security of Palestine and the Near East. They accused Zionism of being an imperial endeavor that sought to dominate the Arabs of Palestine that was anti-democratic and anti-God (*FRUS*, 1947: 1007). In response to these accusations President Truman wrote directly to King Ibn Saud in defense of the Zionists (*FRUS*, 1947: 1011-1014).

President Truman described the basis for U.S. Government support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine and how the Zionists were not a threat to the Arabs (*FRUS*, 1947: 1012-1013). He stated that the U.S. Government seeks a “just and fair solution” to the question of Palestine. Such a solution would be based upon the past policy of the U.S. Government as established after World War I that Palestine would be the site of the Jewish National Home. Among Americans there was a strong feeling that the Jews deserved a national homeland and this should be established in the spiritual home of the Jews in Palestine. According to Truman, this support of the creation of a Jewish National Home for the Jews in Palestine did not prejudice U.S. Government policy against the indigenous Arab population (*FRUS*, 1947: 1012). Based upon Truman’s rationale above the U.S. Government supported a Jewish state in Palestine because of (i) past policy, (ii) the Jews deserved one, (iii) public opinion in America, and (iv) a Jewish state was not counter to the rights of Arabs in Palestine.

Truman went on to defend the Zionists and counter the previous expansionist and aggressive accusations made by the Saudis (*FRUS*, 1947: 1011-1014).

I am convinced ... that the responsible Jewish groups and leaders interested in developing the Jewish National Home in Palestine have no intention of expelling now or at a later date the indigenous inhabitants of that country or of using Palestine as a base for aggression against neighboring Arab states. No people has suffered more than the Jews during recent years from aggression and intolerance. No people stands more in need of world sympathy and support at the present time. It is therefore inconceivable that responsible Jewish groups or leaders could be contemplating acts of intolerance, and aggression against Arabs in Palestine or elsewhere (*FRUS*, 1947: 1013).

Truman clearly believed that the Jews have widely suffered and were in need of sympathy. In addition, because of this suffering, this condition makes them incapable of aggression and intolerance towards the Arabs.

In an internal department memorandum, Fraser Wilkins of the Department of State NEA in January 1947 outlined what he described as the seven factors that currently influenced U.S. policy on Palestine. They were: (i) the responsibility of Great Britain to administer Palestine as the mandatory authority, (ii) desire of Jewish DPs to emigrate to Palestine, (iii) support for a Jewish National Home in Palestine expressed in Presidential statements, Congressional resolutions, and party platforms, (iv) the Arab population of Palestine currently outnumbers the Jewish population two to one and they oppose the creation of a Jewish state or any form of Jewish domination, (v) the religious importance of Palestine to all three Abrahamic religions in particular to Christians who are distressed about the future of the Holy Land, (vi) strategic and economic importance of American oil, aviation, and telecommunications facilities in Palestine and neighboring Arab states; (vii) and the question of Palestine has been an irritant to Anglo-American relations and prejudicial to Arab-American relations which is weakening the Anglo-American position in the Near East and is allowing Soviet penetration into the region (*FRUS*, 1947: 1004-1005). These issues are both endogenous and exogenous to the question of Palestine but all were identified as influencing the development of U.S. foreign policy on Palestine. The fact that the Department of State was still considering all of these as influences on foreign policy demonstrates that it viewed the policy as still developing and more fluid in comparison to President Truman.

## February 1947 – November 1947

On February 14, 1947, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin announced that British attempts to bring a negotiated solution between the Arabs and the Zionists in Palestine had failed (*FRUS*, 1947: 1047-1048). Therefore, Great Britain was submitting the question of Palestine to the United Nations (UN). This submission would be without recommendations and in the short-term before the UN could come to a solution the status quo of British authority including a quota of 1,500 Jewish immigrants per month into Palestine would continue.

In response to this announcement by Foreign Minister Bevin, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote that the collapse of the London Conference and the submission of the question of Palestine to the UN brought an “end of the period begun in 1945 of trying to find a solution by inquiry and negotiation” (*FRUS*, 1947: 1048). From August 1945 to February 1947, the U.S. and the British Governments had studied the issues and attempted to bring an end to the question of Palestine through negotiation. But now, Acheson claimed the issue had moved beyond the authority of the two states and now it would be decided by the UN. Acheson argued that the U.S. Government and in particular the Department of State should take a leadership role on this issue. If the Department of State did not quickly develop a policy and position he feared Congress may do so with disastrous results (*FRUS*, 1947: 1048-1049). Acheson argued that at the UN the British Government would not take the lead on the issue and this would allow an opportunity for the Soviets. To prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the Near East and Palestine, the U.S. Government needs to take a leadership position in the UN. At the UN, proposals will be made for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. The

Department of State needed to discuss and develop a policy on Palestine relative to partition “which we have favored thus far” (*FRUS*, 1947: 1049). This support for partition reflected the continued U.S. Government support for a Jewish National Home in Palestine and demonstrated that the interpretation of such a National Home was not symbolic but in the form of a state for the Jews. However, Acheson warned that public support for partition at the UN

despite its domestic advantages for us that policy carries too great a weight of international difficulty to put across. One thing which we should avoid is to get committed at an early stage in any discussion with the British to a plan which will leak and cause repercussions in this country (*FRUS*, 1947: 1049).

Based upon this assessment by Acheson, U.S. Government support for partition of Palestine may not be in the best interests of the U.S. internationally, but it may be in the best interest of the administration domestically. This dual issue of domestic pressures for a policy that may not be tenable internationally was the tight rope the Department of State and White House had to walk in the coming months.

Now that the issue had been moved onto the UN and the London Conference had collapsed, Foreign Minister Bevin attacked President Truman and the U.S. Government’s intervention in a speech on February 25 at the House of Commons. Bevin argued that the 1,500 per month quota in Jewish immigration into Palestine may have been increased but “the bitterness of the feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate entry of 100,000 immigrants” (*FRUS*, 1947: 1056). The pressure placed upon the British Government by President Truman’s request based upon the Harrison report,

set the whole thing back ... This document was issued and I must say it really destroyed the good feeling which the Colonial Secretary and I were endeavoring to produce in the Arab states (*FRUS*, 1947: 1056).

The main issue was that the U.S. Government did not accept the authority of the British Government as mandatory authority and instead sought to intervene on behalf of the Zionists (*FRUS*, 1947: 1056-1057). Truman's Yom Kippur statement in October 1946 ruined ongoing negotiations between the parties. Bevin had begged Secretary of State Byrnes to prevent the statement

but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey ... I really must point out that in international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections (*FRUS*, 1947: 1057).

Based upon this speech, it is clear that Bevin blamed the U.S. Government and more accurately President Truman for the failure to solve the question of Palestine. The pressure placed upon the British Government combined with the public announcements in support of the Zionists by the President undermined the British attempts to bring about a negotiated solution. From the perspective of the British Government, the U.S. Government had sacrificed peace and security in Palestine for domestic gains.

In May 1947, the UN formed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to investigate policy alternatives for the future of Palestine. UNSCOP's membership included Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. The Committee spent several weeks conducting interviews and hearings on the issue in multiple locations including Palestine. However, the Arabs did not view the UN's involvement as legitimate and thus did not cooperate with the investigation. During the five weeks of testimony in Palestine



heard by UNSCOP, not a single Arab representative gave a statement. During the hearings, a ship carrying Holocaust survivors from Germany, the *Exodus*, attempted to break the British blockade initiated to stop illegal Jewish immigration. The British used force to turn the ship back to Germany, creating a sensationalized media story and bringing increased public attention to the issues of Palestine and the Jewish DPs who were still languishing in camps in Europe.

During the interview process multiple representatives of the Jewish Agency gave testimony to UNSCOP. Moshe Shertok presented the Jewish Agency case to UNSCOP on June 19. While Shertok in public laid “claim to all Palestine on historical basis,” in private to the committee he stated that the Jewish Agency would accept partition as a settlement (*FRUS*, 1947: 1111). This acceptance of partition by the Jewish Agency was similar to a statement by the head of the Jewish Agency David Ben-Gurion made to the Jewish Agency that the Zionists would accept a smaller portion of Palestine as part of a compromise, but this would only be in the short-term as the Zionists planned expansion (*FRUS*, 1947: 1111). Therefore, to UNSCOP the Jewish Agency was proposing that it would accept limited partition of a Jewish State, but internal conversations among the Jewish Agency were being conducted that such a move would only be short-term as expansion was the ultimate goal.

Ben-Gurion testified before UNSCOP on July 7 and had the opportunity to clarify these goals (*FRUS*, 1947: 117-1118). Ben-Gurion did not accept partition but instead argued for “establishing Palestine as a Jewish state” (*FRUS*, 1947: 1118). The rationale for why Palestine should be recognized as a Jewish state was that the,

[p]romises made to the Arabs had been fulfilled ... an Arab minority in Palestine would remain safe in national association with their race ... a Jewish minority in an Arab state, even with the most ideal paper guarantee, would mean the final extinction of hope for the entire Jewish people for national equality and independence (*FRUS*, 1947: 1118).

Ben-Gurion argued that the Arabs already had been given their nation-states such as in Syria and Iraq, and now Palestine should be recognized as a Jewish state. Also, a Jewish minority would not be safe within an Arab state. The terms of accepting a limited state within Palestine as suggested by Shertok in previous testimony were not accepted by Ben-Gurion.

As noted above, the five weeks of testimony and investigation in Palestine, UNSCOP officials never met with any Arab representatives. The boycott by the Arab Higher Committee, the leadership within Palestine, was successful and the Arabs never recognized the legitimacy of UNSCOP.

The Department of State held internal discussions on what its position on Palestine should be prior to the UNSCOP report. At the discussions Warren Austin, U.S. Representative to the UN, proposed that,

The objective should be an independent Palestinian state which would be admitted as a Member of the United Nations. This would not be a state based on racial or religious factors. It would be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state (*FRUS*, 1947: 1087).

In addition, immigration should be open to the absorptive capacity of the country, independence should be gained by no later than ten years with Palestine being a UN Trusteeship in the short-term, and international institutions should help provide economic development to the country. The basis of this proposal is the single-state solution whereby Jewish immigration would not be limited. This would be a compromise between

Arab demands preventing a Jewish state and Zionist demands to allow the Jews to immigrate to Palestine. One rationale Austin provided for this proposal was that it was supported by the USSR, and it might be supported by the Arab states. Relative to the Zionists, Austin believed the proposal would be accepted by the “more reasonable and better-balanced” Jewish populations in the U.S. and abroad (*FRUS*, 1947: 1088).

This proposal by Warren Austin, Department of State representative to the UN, was supported and echoed by Loy Henderson of the NEA. Henderson recommended that

Palestine should become neither an Arab state nor a Jewish state but a single independent Palestine state in which all its people, of whatever religion or blood, may dwell together in concord. In particular, Palestine should continue to provide a Jewish National Home in its spiritual and cultural aspects, as well as a home for the Arabs and all others who live there (*FRUS*, 1947: 1097).

Henderson also recommended, as did Austin, that Palestine should be a UN Trusteeship in the short-term in preparation for independence. Henderson argued that a Jewish National Home does not mean a Jewish state (*FRUS*, 1947: 1099). He argues such national home would be symbolic and protected under Palestine law but not a sovereign state. In addition, Henderson proposes that immigration should be permitted but limited.

These proposals by Department of State’s Austin and Henderson break from the prior position argued by President Truman (*FRUS*, 1947: 1011-1014). President Truman did believe that a Jewish state should be created and supported this policy. However, the Department of State NEA proposed a single state solution with continuous but limited immigration. The Department of State NEA viewed that such a compromise of policy would be accepted by the Zionists and the Arabs resulting in a peaceful solution. This was the Department of State NEA’s position before the UNSCOP report was made.

Prior to the release of the UNSCOP report, the Department of State NEA warned that any report would not likely be accepted by the Arabs and the Jews. If both parties did not accept the plan, the British Government already announced that it would not support any resolution. In addition to this warning the Department of State NEA believed that,

It is probable that groups of American Zionists supported by members of Congress and other prominent Americans will do their utmost before the General Assembly meets and during the course of the debates to influence the American Government to take a public position with regard to the Palestine problem which would be agreeable to the Zionists. This pressure will become more and more intense from now on (*FRUS*, 1947: 1121).

The Department of State NEA predicted that domestic pressure that was apparent in earlier debates about Palestine would increase once UNSCOP made its recommendations to the General Assembly. The Department of State was clearly worried about the influence of the American Zionists on the position of the U.S. Government on Palestine.

On August 31, 1947 UNSCOP concluded its report and the recommendations were made to the UN General Assembly on September 3. The report contained two plans; one supported by a majority of representatives and the second a minority report. The majority report proposed that Palestine should be partitioned into Arab and Jewish states and Jerusalem should be placed under international authority. The Arab and Jewish states would become independent following a transitional period of two years whereby the British Government would continue to provide administration of Palestine under UN authority. During that time Palestine would admit 150,000 Jewish immigrants into the Jewish state section. The two states would be under an economic union and would collaborate on other matters of mutual interest (*FRUS*, 1947: 1143). However, this report was not unanimous and the minority report supported the single state solution whereby

Palestine would be under the trusteeship of the General Assembly for three years until independence could be attained (*FRUS*, 1947: 1143).

The Secretary General submitted on September 12 that an *ad hoc* political committee be created where each member of the General Assembly would be able to have representation in order to discuss and make recommendations about Palestine. The committee was voted in favor by the General Assembly on September 23 and included representatives from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R as well as the Arab states and the Jewish Agency. It met over the course of the next three months to debate the future of Palestine based upon the findings of the UNSCOP investigation and the majority and minority reports (*FRUS*, 1947: 1146).

On September 15, Secretary of State George Marshall met with the Department of State officials to discuss the U.S. Government position on the UNSCOP majority report (*FRUS*, 1947: 1147-1151). This position would be the basis of U.S. Government policy during the debates both in the ad hoc working group and at the General Assembly. Secretary Marshall argued that acceptance of the report would mean a violent Arab reaction and possible rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. In addition, if the report was passed by the General Assembly with the required 2/3 voting in favor of the plan, the U.S. Government would be obligated to take part in implementation of the report (*FRUS*, 1947: 1148-1149). According to Secretary Marshall, all of the Arabs would oppose such action and approximately 20% of the Zionists would also oppose the report's recommendations of partition. The Department of State assumed that the Soviets will not support the report because it would provide them an opportunity to ally themselves with the Arabs. Due to these considerations it was decided that the U.S. Government should

not openly support the majority report at this time, but continue discussions within the government to devise a long-term position.

Henderson of the NEA and Austin representing the UN officials made ominous warnings about what supporting the majority report would mean for U.S. interests (*FRUS*, 1947: 1149-1150). Henderson argued that it was already known that the British would not implement the report due to Arab opposition. This meant that in order for partition to succeed, the U.S. Government would have to send military personnel either directly or under the authority of the UN to Palestine. Austin supported this position and stated that “such a small state would have to defend itself with bayonets forever as Arabs would never willingly accept a Jewish state in their heart” (*FRUS*, 1947: 1150). Thus, Department of State officials did not support the majority plan because it could not be implemented without the use of U.S. armed forces.

On September 17, Secretary of State Marshall presented the case of the U.S. Government before the General Assembly (*FRUS*, 1947: 1151). Secretary Marshall stated that the U.S. Government,

gives great weight not only to the recommendations which have met with the unanimous approval of the Special Committee, but also to those which have been approved by the majority Committee (*FRUS*, 1947: 1151).

While not openly advocating for the majority report, Secretary Marshall went beyond what was originally discussed on September 15 in approving the majority report. This was now the U.S. Government’s public position in the General Assembly.

Director of the NEA Henderson was clearly upset by this statement and the support Secretary Marshall made public in favor of the majority report. On September 22,

Henderson wrote a memorandum to Secretary Marshall outlining the basis for why the U.S. Government should not support the majority plan for partition. Henderson argued,

it is my duty briefly to point out some of the considerations which cause the overwhelming majority of non-Jewish Americans who are intimately acquainted with the situation in the Near East to believe that it would not be in the national interests of the United States for it to advocate any kind of a plan at this time for the partitioning of Palestine or for the setting up of a Jewish state in Palestine (*FRUS*, 1947: 1154).

For Henderson, support of the majority report would undermine U.S. relations with the Arabs and threaten peace and security in the Middle East including U.S. access to desired resources including oil. This also might lead to the Arab states aligning themselves with the Soviets and expedite the spread of communism in the Middle East. Support of a Jewish state would make those Arab leaders that were allies of the U.S. vulnerable to internal as well as external hostility and may strengthen fanatical extremists among the Arab countries. The U.S. Government would be asked to implement such a plan and all previous studies except for the 1937 Peel Commission found that to implement partition was not possible. “The UNSCOP Majority Plan is not only unworkable; if adopted, it would guarantee that the Palestine problem would be permanent and still more complicated in the future” (*FRUS*, 1947: 1156). It is clear that according to Henderson, the majority plan was not a solution but will cause greater and future strife in Palestine and the region.

Henderson’s objection to the majority report was not supported by Secretary Marshall or the U.S. delegates to the UN. In a meeting a week later, the U.S. delegates to the UN discussed their position on the majority report and it was decided that the U.S. Government would support partition. The U.S. position would be to embrace the majority

report after amendments were produced during committee meetings to make the plan workable, with the core tenet being that the U.S. Government did support partition and large-scale immigration (*FRUS*, 1947: 1162-1163). The U.S. Government was not alone in its support for the majority report. Creech Jones representative of the British Government to the UN stated that the British did support the majority plan; however, if it was not accepted by the Arabs and the Jews, then the British Government would not be able to implement it (*FRUS*, 1947: 1164). The British shared the sentiments of many Department of State officials that while in principle partition could be supported in practice it may not be possible to implement it without Arab support.

In a meeting with British Government officials, Secretary Marshall assured them that Palestine would only be considered at the “highest levels”, “meaning by implication which I did not explain, that we would treat the matter as an international affair and not permit local political pressures to determine our actions” (*FRUS*, 1947: 1164). It is evident that Secretary Marshall was aware of the dual domestic and international pressures placed on U.S. Government policy on Palestine. The British Government had previously accused the American Government of pandering to local politics (*FRUS*, 1947: 1056-1057) and Secretary Marshall assured them that would not be the case now at the UN.

Throughout the process the Arab States and representatives from Palestine opposed the majority plan. Their opposition went beyond only the majority report, but also included the minority report which would allow the creation of a single federal state where the Jewish minority would have protected rights and limited immigration.



This position slightly shifted when the representatives of the Arab states at the UN proposed on October 21 that they would consider a modified version of the minority plan of a single state under a UN trusteeship (*FRUS*, 1947: 1192-1194). Nuri Pasha, Iraqi representative to the UN, met with Amir Faisal, representative from Saudi Arabia, and agreed that the Arab states should pursue the original 1946 Anglo-American Committee report in conjunction with the Morrison-Grady report that had proposed for a single state with autonomy for the Jewish minority via a cantonal system. The Saudis and Iraqis supported this plan now and wanted to assess the opinion of Secretary Marshall and the U.S. Government on this proposal (*FRUS*, 1947: 1192-1194). The Arabs had rejected this proposal in previous discussions, in particular those throughout 1946. While the other parties, including the U.S. Government, were debating whether to support and how to implement the UNSCOP majority report, the Arab states were debating and proposing support for the 1946 committee reports. The findings of this report were no longer an option available as once the issue was under the authority of the UN, these previous reports were no longer the basis of discussions.

In the final weeks of October and early November, the infighting within the Department of State about whether or not to support partition became fierce (*FRUS*, 1947:1195-1242). While the UN delegation supported the majority plan, the NEA argued that it would be impossible to implement without sending U.S. armed forces and would hurt long-term American interests in the Middle East. Ultimately, Secretary Marshall had already decided to support the majority plan. His rationale for this was that the UNSCOP majority report was from a UN committee and the authority and principles of the UN should be supported.

The UNSCOP majority report with some amendments was on its way to be voted upon by the General Assembly. As this became evident, the Arabs and the Zionists sought to lobby members of the General Assembly to their positions, *i.e* the Arabs sought to defeat the majority plan while the Zionists sought to gain its ratification. During this process, several member countries changed their vote from opposition to support or abstained from voting. President Truman made it clear to the UN delegates that while the U.S. Government did support the majority plan, it would not actively seek to persuade any other country to vote in favor. However, several members of the government including Congressman and Senators and American members of Zionist organizations did attempt to influence the voting of these countries. The Department of State was aware of these attempts but did not act to prevent them.

Latin American states while not under pressure of US Government regarding Palestine are subject to considerable persuasion by national chapters of highly organized and well financed Jewish Agency [JA]. These states, while yielding to JA pressure, may be inclined sometimes to claim that the pressure comes from the US Government rather than the JA (*FRUS*, 1947: 1148).

The Jewish Agency was not only seeking to persuade member states in the General Assembly, it was already making preparations to announce and set up a Jewish state within the UNSCOP boundaries regardless of the General Assembly vote (*FRUS*, 1947: 1254-1255). The Jewish Agency was well aware that a vote either in favor or opposed to the majority report would lead to civil war in Palestine. In addition, any proclamation of an independent Jewish state would lead to war with the Arab states. To counter this development, the Jewish Agency brokered a deal with Trans-Jordan's King Abdullah to divide Palestine. The Jewish Agency would be able to keep the territory

recognized by the UNSCOP majority report, while the territory that was granted to the Arab state would be given to Trans-Jordan (*FRUS*, 1947:1254-1255). In an interview on November 18, King Abdullah denied the negotiated agreement (*FRUS*, 1947: 1268-1269).

During the final debates in the *ad hoc* committee the U.S. delegation was fighting for the Negev desert to be included in the proposed Arab state. The belief was that this territory was populated by Arab Bedouins and it may help gain Arab support for the majority plan. However, this was to be an amendment as the Negev was proposed to be a part of the Jewish state in the original majority plan. Former World Zionist Organization President Chaim Weizmann was aware of these developments and called upon President Truman to investigate the matter on his behalf (*FRUS*, 1947: 1271). After a meeting with Weizmann, President Truman called US UN delegate General Hilldring to inquire the status of Negev in the *ad hoc* committee. General Hilldring told President Truman that he was not happy with the Department of State proposals to include the Negev in the proposed Arab state, and President Truman responded that nothing should be done to upset the apple-cart. General Hilldring reported that the President stated,

he personally agreed with Weizmann's views and although he apparently did not issue any direct instruction, he made it plain that he wished the Delegation to go along with the majority report on the Negeb case (*FRUS*, 1947: 1271).

Robert Lovett of the Department of State directly contacted President Truman about the phone call to General Hilldring. President Truman told Lovett that he did not intend to change the Department's instructions on the Negev, but did not want the U.S. to be in the minority opposition on the issue (*FRUS*, 1947: 1271-1272). This proceeding on

November 19 about the Negev demonstrates a larger pattern of Zionist pressure upon the President. In this case, direct instructions were not given by the President but he did notify UN representative General Hilldring that he would prefer the U.S. delegates not pursue an anti-Zionist position on the Negev.

For the upcoming vote in the General Assembly, President Truman ordered the UN delegates to vote in support of the majority plan and that U.S. troops would not be used to implement such as plan unless under direct order by the Security Council (*FRUS*, 1947: 1283-1284). This position by President Truman was consistent with his military advisors in the JCS. The President also ordered that the U.S. delegates to not place pressure or attempt to persuade any members of the General Assembly to vote in favor of the majority plan.

We were willing to vote for that report ourselves because it was a majority report but we were in no sense of the word to coerce other Delegations to follow our lead (*FRUS*, 1947: 1284).

In a meeting between Foreign Minister Bevin and Secretary of State Marshall in London prior to the UN General Assembly vote, Bevin outlined the rationale for the British withdrawal of troops from Palestine and why the British Government's attempts to create a peace and secure Palestine failed (*FRUS*, 1947: 1287-1289). Bevin argued that the British Government could not be committed to any military action against the Arabs because of its relations with the Muslim states within the Empire, in particular India and Pakistan. Bevin again blamed domestic pressure in the United States by Zionist groups for the British failure to resolve the issue and why he was forced to submit it to the UN. He argued that the Balfour Declaration thirty years ago was an unfortunate error and that

it did not commit the British to establishing a Jewish state (*FRUS*, 1947: 1288). Secretary Marshall responded by stating,

I made no answer to his various statements other than to say that I had sympathy for the British in their difficulties in Palestine and under the pressure of the American Jew (*FRUS*, 1947: 1288).

Bevin blamed the American Zionists as the reason for the conflict in Palestine and Secretary Marshall did not support this conclusion but recognized that it had validity.

On November 29, the majority plan for the partition of Palestine gained the needed 2/3 vote by the General Assembly. The U.S. and the Soviet Governments among others voted in favor of the plan. The Arab states walked out in protest, while the Zionists celebrated a victory. By the next day full scale civil war broke out in Palestine. A Jewish or Arab state was not declared, but it was clear that the U.S. policy was now in support for the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. This advocating for a Jewish state in Palestine against the interests of the Arabs represented a major change in U.S. policy from the beginning in 1945 when it sought a middle road of dual consultation, minimal involvement in the issue, and an agreement to take no hostile action against the Arabs.

Over the next six months, the policy debate about how to implement the partition vote by the UN General Assembly continued among the policy elites of the U.S. Government. During that time, civil war broke out between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine with various atrocities and reprisals committed by both sides. These attacks spread fear among the Arabs of Palestine and along with the belief that the Arab states would win in a war against the Zionists, led to hundreds of thousands of Arabs to become refugees (Morris, 2008). The Zionists prepared to announce an independent Jewish state

in Palestine based upon the UN General Assembly vote. President Truman supported this action and on May 15, 1948 granted *de jure* recognition to the new Jewish state of Israel.

## CHAPTER III. PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN'S BELIEFS AND RATIONALE FOR RECOGNIZING THE STATE OF ISRAEL

### Introduction

The Governments of the United States and Israel have shared a close and supportive relationship since the establishment of the Jewish state. At a recent speech on March 4, 2012, U.S. President Barak Obama told the American Israel Public Affairs Committee that “Israel’s security is sacrosanct. It is non-negotiable. That belief has guided my actions as President” (Obama, 2012). This unalloyed position by the U.S. Government of supporting Israel’s security has influenced U.S. foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as towards the entire region of the Middle East. The roots of this relationship date back to the formation of Israel in May 1948. President Obama in providing the rationale for this relationship in the same speech stated,

President Truman ... said, ‘I had faith in Israel before it was established. I believe it has a glorious future before it - as not just another sovereign nation, but as an embodiment of the great ideals of our civilization.’ For over six decades, the American people have kept that faith. Yes, we are bound to Israel (Obama, 2012).

President Obama uses President Harry Truman’s faith in Israel as the “embodiment of the great ideals of our civilization” as the rationale for the establishment and continuation of the relationship between Israel and the United States. To understand this relationship, we must understand the roots of what happened at the beginning and why the U.S. Government and President Truman supported the United Nations (UN) General Assembly voting in favor of the partitioning of the British Mandate for Palestine and the recognition of a Jewish state in Palestine. One way to examine this is by focusing upon

what President Truman meant by his “faith” in Israel and what was the rationale behind it.

### **Actor Specific Model of Foreign Policy**

The U.S. President possesses various structural and functional capabilities that allow him to dominate foreign policy making (McCormick, 2010). Because of the unique position of the President in the U.S. Government, a compelling analysis of foreign policy cannot treat the President as exogenous to the process (Hermann and Kegley, 1994). Therefore, the study of the role of the president and his influence on foreign policy has led to a great amount of research with particular attention to his beliefs and attitudes (De Rivera, 1968; George, 1969; Hermann, 1970, 1978; Holsti, 1977; Jervis, 1976). In addition to these more general studies of the President as foreign policy decision-maker, scholars have also focused upon specific policies or programs to examine the beliefs of Presidents and argue their motives behind various decisions (Barber, 1972; Khong, 1992; Stewart, 1977). President Harry S. Truman’s decision to recognize the state of Israel is one such policy that has received such treatment (Cohen, 1982).

One of the most monumental policies of the twentieth century that continues to affect us today was the decision to recognize the state of Israel by President Truman (Cohen, 1990). Dozens of studies have been conducted examining this policy and make various arguments about President Truman’s role in the process as well as his beliefs and motives in the recognition of the state of Israel. Cohen (1982) argues that most of these studies can be divided into two camps. Those that argue the recognition of the state of Israel was based upon humanitarian concerns (e.g. Acheson, 1969; Clifford, 1978), while



others argue it was based upon political considerations (e.g. Wilson, 1979). These past studies provide detailed descriptions and arguments about President Truman's beliefs in relation to the recognition of Israel, but have not used replicable research methods to come to their conclusions. This study attempts to provide detailed and replicable mixed methods to examine President Truman's public and private statements about the recognition of Israel during the policy debate. This study identifies President Truman's beliefs and examines the rationale he put forward at the time for such beliefs.

Studies of individual policymakers include cognitive and motivational constraints that affect decision-making outcomes. These constraints include limits on an individual's capacity to receive, process, and assimilate information; inability to identify all of the alternatives; fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of each alternative; and an inability to order preferences on a single scale (March and Simon 1958; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Kahneman 2011). In other words, individuals are not pure rational calculators, but rather possess belief systems that effect decision-making and therefore public policy.

The study of policy elite beliefs builds upon Converse's (1964) research that found little consistency between foreign policy attitudes and a liberal-conservative dichotomy. Instead Converse (1964) argued that relative to foreign policy, beliefs and attitudes derive from more "superordinate values or postures" (211). This argument has been supported by subsequent research using surveys, questionnaires, and/or content analysis that has found consistency between foreign policy preferences and more general beliefs and attitudes among citizens and policy elites (Verba et al., 1967; Marcus et al., 1974; Jervis, 1976; Bardes and Oldendick, 1978; Maggiotto and Wittkeopf, 1981;

Wittkopf, 1981; Conover and Feldman, 1984; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985). These scholars have found support that super-ordinate values are utilized in the structuring of belief systems for organizing policy preferences in foreign policy. This finding combined with the authority of the President in foreign policymaking, makes the President's beliefs a key variable in understanding policy outcomes.

The decision to recognize the state of Israel by President Truman was not an easy one. While the president faced many challenges and difficult decisions during his term in office including the use of the atomic bomb against Japan in August 1945, the war in Korea in 1950, and the nationalization of American steel mills in 1952, his daughter Margaret Truman in her biography of her father wrote that the decision to recognize the state of Israel was the most difficult he faced (Truman, 1973). During the policy debate about the question of Palestine Truman in 1945 stated that "this question was causing him and [Secretary of State James] Byrnes more trouble than almost any other question which is facing the United States" (*FRUS*, 1945: 13-18).

The recognition of the State of Israel in May 1948 was viewed by many Jews as a life-and-death issue (Cohen, 1990). The horrors of the Holocaust and the struggle for survival among the Jewish refugees, referred to at the time as Jewish Displaced Persons or Jewish DPs, dramatically moved both policymakers and the public around the world and in the United States (Laqueur, 1972). President Truman took a particular interest in the issue and involved himself directly in the fate of the Jewish DPs after he succeeded President Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1945. President Truman had such concern for the Jewish DPs that Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that by September

1945, “it was clear that the President himself was directing policy on Palestine”  
(Acheson, 1969: 169).

President Truman was the individual who dominated U.S. policy on the question of Palestine. The question of Palestine refers to the determination of the future sovereignty over the British Mandate of Palestine. The British Government had attempted to balance the demands by both the Arabs of Palestine, as the majority indigenous population, and the Zionists, who had been promised that Palestine would become the Jewish National Home in the Balfour declaration of 1917. The dominant issue was the determination of who should have sovereignty over the territory but a secondary issue was Jewish immigration into the territory. The British Government placed restrictions upon Jewish immigration in 1939, in part to suffice Arab demands that Palestine remain a majority Arab territory. These restrictions occurred at the same time of the beginning of the genocide of the Jews in Europe by Nazi Germany. In the aftermath of the murder of over six million Jews, an additional one million remained in Europe, many of whom were refugees who wanted to immigrate to Palestine. However, the British sought to prevent their immigration to maintain peace and security in Palestine and in the Middle East amongst the Arabs who opposed Jewish immigration (Kochavi, 1989). This tension among the issues of sovereignty and immigration characterized the policy debate about the question of Palestine.

The scope of this study is from April 1945 – November 1947. April 1945 is when President Truman became President of the United States and it is as president that his beliefs and rationale will be analyzed. Most studies examining the decision by President Truman to recognize the state of Israel study the period up until *de facto* recognition was

given to the Jewish state by the U.S. Government on May 15, 1948. However, this study concludes with analysis of statements by President Truman up to the November 29, 1947 UN General Assembly vote in favor of partitioning Palestine into an Arab and Jewish states. The rationale is that after the UN General Assembly vote the policy position was made that the U.S. Government would support the partition of Palestine and therefore the creation of a Jewish state. The UN vote qualitatively changed the policy debate to one about whether or not and how to implement the partition policy rather than focusing on issues of immigration and sovereignty. The latter policy debate and subsequent decision are the focus of this study. Examination of the debate after the UN vote to partition is outside the scope of this study because it focuses on the agenda setting and eventual policy selection of the policy debate rather than implementation.

### **President Truman and the Question of Palestine**

Cohen (1982) identifies two schools of thought on this issue that come to distinct conclusions that have been polemic and partisan. Cohen (1982) designated these as the “White House” and the “State Department” schools of thought. The basic difference between the two was that the White House School argued that President Truman supported the Zionist cause due to a humanitarian concern for the Jewish DPs and at times based upon his religious ethos. Counter to this argument, the State Department School contended that President Truman acted not out of humanitarian interests, but because of political interests with particular attention to the role of Jewish voters in America.

The members of the White House School focus primarily upon President Truman’s sentiments toward the Jewish DPs (Schechtman, 1966; Khouri, 1968; Postal

and Levy, 1973; Benson, 1997, 2008; Christison, 1997; Anderson, 2005; Berger, 2008; Warshal, 2008). This focus is supported by President Truman himself, who in his memoirs stated that his primary concern was the “basic human problem. The fate of the hundreds of thousands of Jews in Europe” (Truman, 1956: 137). President Truman continued,

The fate of the Jewish victims of Hitlerism was a matter of deep personal concern to me. I have always been disturbed by the tragedy of people who have been made victims of intolerance and fanaticism because of their race, color, or religion (1956: 132).

President Truman’s own account (1956, 1973) is supported by members of his administration. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1969) and White House Counsel Clark Clifford (1978) argued that President Truman acted out of humanitarian concern for the Jewish victims of the Holocaust rather than for political considerations. President Truman’s most renowned biographer, David McCullough, agreed with the statement that President Truman, in the long-run, acted out of moral, ethical and historical principles in recognizing Israel (Benson, 1997). For these scholars, President Truman’s humanitarian considerations were the rationale for his beliefs about the question of Palestine.

Some extend this argument about a humanitarian rationale to President Truman’s religious convictions. This position was put forward in part by Clifford (1978) and is the basis for Benson (1997). It is also supported by Berger (2008), Worsham (2008) and Benson (2008). Clifford (1978) wrote,

As a student of the Bible he believed in the historic justification for a Jewish homeland, and it was a conviction with him that the Balfour Declaration of 1917 constituted a solemn promise that fulfilled the age-old hope and dream of the Jewish people (44).

This sentiment is echoed by Berger (2008):

I think it is significant to note that Truman was an avid reader who claimed to have “read the Bible through many times.” And his profound personal convictions, not infrequently at odds with diplomatic and political considerations, favored the admission of Jewish refugees to America on humanitarian grounds (4).

For both Clifford (1978) and Berger (2008), President Truman’s knowledge and beliefs about the Bible influenced his beliefs about the question of Palestine.

Benson (1997) went the further and argued that President Truman was driven by religious beliefs to recognize the State of Israel. Benson (1997) asserted that no previous work before his has scrutinized the “president’s personal beliefs, his religious background ... as important primary influences upon his presidential decisions regarding Palestine” (p. X). While his personal beliefs had been examined, Benson (1997) paid particular attention to President Truman’s religious background, concluding that,

Truman’s conception of ‘right’ was influenced by his own beliefs, his own value system, his own set of moral absolutes, all of which were heavily influenced by his religious background and its prodigious emphasis on biblical teachings (Benson, 1997: p. X).

Benson (1997) went beyond the argument that religion influenced President Truman’s beliefs when he stated, that the

decision to grant recognition to the nascent Jewish state was based primarily on humanitarian, moral, and sentimental grounds, many of which were an outgrowth of the president’s religious upbringing and his familiarity with the Bible (IX).

For Benson (1997), President Truman’s decision to recognize the State of Israel was humanitarian and a direct result of his religious beliefs. This position is even supported by the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. According to the library website,

Truman decided to recognize Israel to provide for a Jewish homeland. The decision was largely personal, stemming from his understanding of the Bible and from his interpretation of historical texts (Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, January 24, 2008).

The rationale that President Truman recognized the state of Israel for personal humanitarian reasons at least in part based upon his religious ethos is the message the library and museum presents.

Many scholars disagree with these humanitarian and religious rationales attributed to President Truman, and instead argue that domestic and international pressures were more important. Specific studies address the lobbying efforts and financial resources of Zionist organizations, the influence of Jews in the 1948 U.S. general election, and the relationships between the U.S., British, Arab and Soviet Governments (Roosevelt Jr., 1948; Westerfield, 1955; Arakie, 1973; Snetsinger, 1974; Donovan, 1977; Ganin, 1977, 1979; Wilson, 1979; Bain, 1979; Cohen, 1979; Grose, 1984; Spiegel, 1985; Kochavi, 1989; Ovendale, 1989; Evensen, 1993; Arnow, 1994; Christison, 1997; Ottolenghi, 2004). These studies asserted that a purely humanitarian rationale for explaining the recognition of the State of Israel is too limited in scope. They tend to either focus upon the role of the Jewish voters and Zionist organization lobbying efforts within the U.S. or upon how Palestine was connected to an international political arena at the beginning of the Cold War.

Snetsinger (1974) argued that the decision to recognize Israel was based upon a domestic political rationale that was against the national interest. In Snetsinger's *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel* (1974), he concluded that,

Although since 1948 Truman has been lauded for his contribution to the creation of Israel, much of the adulation has been misplaced. The

President had no commitment to the Zionist program ... Truman's Palestine policy offers an extraordinary example of foreign policy conducted in line with short-range political expediency rather than long-range national goals (140).

In addition to election objectives, Grose (1984) and Spiegel (1985) both argue that the U.S. Government policy towards Palestine was the result of an intensive lobbying effort conducted by Zionists who had close access to the president. This domestic political argument was summed up by Westerfield (1955),

Palestine is the classic case in recent years of the determination of American foreign policy by domestic political considerations ... Clearly the exigencies of American politics were the foremost factor in permitting the birth of the state of Israel (227, 238).

This Department of State School of research held that the policy decision was due to the influence of various Zionist organizations, individual Zionists with strong ties to President Truman and members of his administration, and the perceived influence of the Jewish vote on the 1948 election. This scholarship clearly identifies a domestic political source of influence for President Truman's beliefs and rationale about Palestine.

A complimentary line of scholarship argues that international forces in particular the Cold War and broader interests in the Middle East played a crucial factor in shaping President Truman's beliefs and rationale (McCoy, 1982; Rosenberg, 1982; Ottolenghi, 2004; Lansford, 2008). These authors identify a broader scope of interests beyond domestic ones that includes American relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries (Lansford, 2008), conflict with Great Britain about Jewish immigration into Palestine (McCoy, 1982), as well as the increasing conflict with the Soviet Union (Rosenberg, 1982; Ottolenghi, 2004).



Evensen (1993) connects these international and domestic political considerations when describing President Truman's rationale to recognize the state of Israel. He argues that Truman was motivated by both public opinion domestically and the linkages between Palestine and international issues such as the Soviet Union and the role of the United Nations (1993). This finding is similar to that of Rosenberg (1982) who studying President Truman's beliefs found that the three primary beliefs applied to the question of Palestine were "Soviet Penetration of the Middle East", "Protection of Viability of the United Nations", and "Protection of Office of the Presidency" (234). When considering what motivated President Truman both domestic and international political sources were in play.

Standing between these two schools of scholarship about President Truman and the decision to recognize Israel is Cohen (1990). While others may capitulate that politics did play a role in the humanitarian mission of President Truman (e.g. Clifford, 1978), Cohen (1990) gives both President Truman's humanitarian beliefs and his political considerations at the time equal merit for influencing his beliefs and rationale. Cohen (1990) stresses the complexity of the issue and that any policy about a future Jewish state was connected to immigration and Jewish DPs as well as an internal conflict with the Department of State. He concludes that President Truman was influenced by domestic and international political forces as well as his own humanitarian beliefs about the need to act to assist the Jewish DPs.

There is a clear distinction in the arguments between these two schools of thought about what was President Truman's rationale for recognizing the State of Israel. One focuses upon the humanitarian, and in part religious, rationale for his beliefs about the

question of Palestine while the other advocates a more political and expedient point-of-view.

**Research Question I.** What did President Truman “believe” in relation to the recognition of the question of Palestine? And, what was his rationale for these beliefs?

### **Research Design and Data**

The data came from two sources. The first was collected from U.S. Government archives collected and stored by the U.S. Department of State known as the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS). The FRUS is the official archive of documents pertaining to U.S. Government foreign policy. They include,

all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State’s responsibilities, together with the appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies (FRUS, 1948 Preface, III-IV).

It has been used in multiple past studies of this policy issue (Ganin, 1979; Owendale, 1989; Cohen, 1990; Benson, 1997; and Radosh and Radosh, 2009).

These archives include memorandum, telegraphs, conversations, reports, public statements, and diary entries by various individuals and organizations. The majority of these documents were intended for private consumption being classified as Secret or Top Secret. The Director of the Historical Office of the Department of State has compiled and edited these documents by geographic region. In this case, the archives are identified as “Palestine 1945”, “Palestine 1946”, and “Palestine 1947”. These years were selected to represent the period of time including the beginning of President Truman’s administration in 1945, to the decision to partition Palestine by the United Nations (UN) on November 29, 1947. The period of time after the UN General Assembly vote is not

included as the policy debate dramatically changed to how to implement the partition resolution rather than what policy should be accepted, as well as the outbreak of civil war in Palestine between Arabs and Jews. Therefore, the case study concludes with the policy selection by the UN to support the partition of Palestine.

In addition to this source of documents an archive of President Truman's statements and papers was also included. These statements come from *The American Presidency Project (APP)* [online] established by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters at the University of California Santa Barbara and can be accessed at [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/harry\\_s\\_truman.php](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/harry_s_truman.php). This archive includes public statements, public and private correspondence, executive orders, and press conferences. There are hundreds of statements and each one was searched for the key terms "Palestine" or "Jew" in order to identify the relevant documents. Thirty-one such statements were identified for this time period included the key terms.

Once the population of documents was identified, the unit of analysis was selected. The unit of analysis selected was the individual statement by President Truman. The statements range from a couple of sentences to four pages in length. The length of the statement is not used in the analysis in order to standardize each unit of analysis. In total, there were 70 individual statements without any duplications identified (39 from the FRUS, and 31 from APP).

There were six steps in the analysis to determine President Truman's beliefs and rationale. First, a codebook was developed to identify President's Truman's beliefs about the question of Palestine. Second, each statement was coded using content analysis from a codebook. The codebook can be found below in Table III.2 along with the categories

pertaining to each code. Third, a factor analysis was run to identify the beliefs that were strongly held. Four beliefs were identified as being relatively strongly held by President Truman. These beliefs can be found in bold in Table III.2. Fourth, a political sample of seven statements made by President Truman was selected (Miles and Huberman, 1994). These were selected based upon the criteria that they best represented his beliefs and rationale, range across the entire case study, include both private and public statements, and include statements targeted at the members of the British Government, the King of Saudi Arabia, a Zionist organization, and the American public. A list of these seven statements can be found in Table III.1. Fifth, a domain analysis was then conducted to understand the semantic relationship between these identified beliefs and the rationale behind these beliefs. Sixth, a taxonomy analysis was then conducted using the findings from the domain analysis and can be found in Figures III.1 and III.2.

**Table III.1. Political Sample of Statements 7/70.**

Document Number	Document Source	Document Type	Document Date	Document Title
5	FRUS, 1945: 737-739	Telegram	8/31/1945	President Truman to British Prime Minister Attlee
26	FRUS, 1946: 588-589	Telegram	4/30/1946	President Truman to British Foreign Minister Bevin
42	FRUS, 1946: 644-645	Memo	7/9/1946	President Truman to Cabinet Committee
50	FRUS, 1946: 682	Telegram	8/12/1946	President Truman to British Prime Minister Attlee
55	APP	Public Statement	10/4/1946	President Truman Yom Kippur Statement
59	APP	Letter	10/25/1946	President Truman to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia
61	FRUS, 1947: 1057-1058	Statement	2/26/1947	President Truman addresses American Public

### **Analysis**

#### **Content and Factor Analysis**

The codebook includes six general beliefs that are operationalized using 19 belief components. The specific beliefs are the (i) “nature of human beings” (ii) “orientation on basic value priorities” (beliefs 1-7), (iii) “identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern” (beliefs 8-9), (iv) “overall seriousness of the problem” (beliefs 10-11), (v) “basic causes of the problem” (beliefs 12-14), and (vi) “policy preferences” (beliefs 15-19). Individual belief systems are hierarchically structured with those that are more general constraining the specific (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).

Applied to public policy Sabatier (1993) has developed a hierarchical structure for identifying these beliefs.

The most fundamental and general are “deep core” beliefs that consist of normative and ontological axioms that shape perceptions of the nature of human beings, norms of social justice, and the ordering of primary values (e.g., liberty and equality, or social stability and change). These are general, applicable across various policy issues, and resilient to change. In this case the belief (i) the nature of man is identified and operationalized as the belief component “people should intervene on earth to carry out God’s plan”. This belief is in reference to the arguments made by some policy actors that the return of the Jews to Palestine was favored or opposed based upon interpretation of the Bible and deals with the deep core belief of free will versus fatalism.

The more policy specific or “policy core” beliefs refer to normative policy positions. Some of these beliefs may include perceptions of orientation on basic value priorities (belief components 2-7); identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern (belief components 8-9); overall seriousness of the problem (belief components 10-11); and basic causes of the problem (belief components 12-14) (adapted from Sabatier, 1998). These beliefs are difficult to change, apply to the broader policy issue, and act as mental heuristics that may filter information about the policy issue (Gillovich 1993; Gillovich, Griffin and Kahneman 2002).

The most specific type of belief is secondary or instrumental beliefs. These include the preferences necessary for carrying out the policy core beliefs. Secondary beliefs may be specific policy preferences (belief components 15-19) and are highly

susceptible change. Changes in these may be carried out in reaction to threats against relatively more abstract deeper beliefs.

At each of these levels, identified in the advocacy coalition literature as deep core, policy core, and secondary beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) various belief statements were developed to identify what President Truman believed in relation to the question of Palestine. The components were developed from a preliminary reading of the primary sources as well as secondary sources that analyzed the policy debate at the time. These same beliefs and belief components have been applied to different policy on the same policy issue in the past (Pierce, 2011).

To determine either support or disagreement with each belief component content analysis was conducted. Every statement was coded using all 19 belief components. Within a statement if President Truman supported the component was +1 was coded for agreement, 0 for neutral, -1 for disagreement, or a 9 for not discussed. This resulted in a 19X70 matrix of belief components per statements.

Once the coding was completed, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted. A random sampling of seven statements from the population of 70 was taken and coded by the external inter-coder. This random sample represents 10 percent of the population and is the prescribed amount needed to determine inter-coder reliability when using a randomized sample (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). Cohen's Kappa (1960) was used to measure inter-coder reliability of the beliefs because it is more reliable than percentage agreement and has been called "the measure of choice" by researchers (Dewey, 1983). According to Fleiss (1971), a Cohen's Kappa measurement of agreement at or above 0.40 is "fair" or "fair to good". All 19 of the belief components were at or

above Cohen's Kappa of 0.40. Therefore, they are all trusted as reliable measures of the beliefs of these statements.

A factor analysis using a varimax rotation was used to determine what was strongly believed by President Truman among these 19 belief components. When all of the 19 belief components were examined together, five belief components were identified as having a factor output of  $\geq [0.7]$ . A second factor analysis was ran again using varimax rotation of these five identified variables but this time only four belief components 7, 8, 10 and 15 remained  $\geq [0.7]$ . The four beliefs (7, 8, 10, and 15) are in bold in Table III.2 and are the focus of the qualitative section of this study as they are identified as President Truman's beliefs. The Cronbach's alpha for these four belief components was 0.873.



**Table III.2. Factor Analysis of Belief Components.**

Policy Beliefs	Belief Components	Factor Analysis	Second Factor Analysis
Nature of human beings (deep core)	1. People should intervene on earth to carry out God's plan	0	
Orientation on basic value priorities (policy core)	2. The Jews are a nation	.166	
	3. The Arabs of Palestine are a nation	-.046	
	4. The current majority population of a political community should have sovereignty	-.344	
	5. The U.S. should seek to maintain security in the Middle East	.072	
	6. The U.S. should seek to maintain security in Palestine	.195	
	<b>7. The U.S. should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people</b>	<b>.777</b>	<b>.838</b>
Identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern (policy core)	<b>8. The welfare of the Jews is important</b>	<b>.764</b>	<b>.836</b>
	9. The welfare of the Arabs of Palestine is important	.087	
Overall seriousness of the problem (policy core)	<b>10. The U.S. should use symbolic or political resources to solve the problems in Palestine</b>	<b>.677</b>	<b>.740</b>
	11. The U.S. should use material resources to solve the problems in Palestine	.602	.586
Basic causes of the problem (policy core)	12. The Jews should be blamed for the problems in Palestine	-.149	
	13. The Arabs should be blamed for the problems in Palestine	-.062	
	14. The British should be blamed for the problems in Palestine	.144	
Policy Preferences (secondary beliefs)	<b>15. Jewish immigration to Palestine should be prevented</b>	<b>-.872</b>	<b>-.893</b>
	16. Jewish immigration to Palestine should be limited	.675	.565
	17. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited	.041	
	18. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from only the Jews	-.067	
	19. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from only the Arabs	-.281	

Strong beliefs or  $\geq [0.7]$  are in bold. Coding of statements was (+1) for agreement, (-1) for disagreement, and (0) for neutral or not discussed.

One belief of note that was not identified as strong is the deep core belief “People should intervene on earth to carry out God's plan”. This belief was never referenced by President Truman at any time. At no time did President Truman ever refer to scripture or any other religious terminology among these 70 statements in reference to Palestine except for referring to it as a “Holy Land” and the “Holy Places”. This finding challenges the arguments made by Benson (1997) and others that President Truman’s religious beliefs highly influenced his policy preferences about the question of Palestine.

The beliefs that are identified as being held by President Truman are in bold in Table III.2 and include: (i) “The U.S. should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people,” (ii) “The welfare of the Jews is important,” (iii) “The U.S. should use symbolic or political resources to solve the problems in Palestine,” and (iv) “Jewish immigration into Palestine should be prevented.” The first three refer to orientation on basic value priorities, identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern, and overall seriousness of the problem. These are policy core beliefs. They will be merged into the single belief statement “the U.S. should use symbolic or political resources in order to promote the welfare and security of the Jewish people” for purposes of the qualitative study. In contrast, the fourth belief is in reference to a specific policy preference about Jewish immigration and is a secondary belief. The rationale for his policy preference will be examined separately from the composite policy core belief.

### **Domain and Taxonomy Analysis**

To understand why President Truman held these beliefs, a domain and taxonomic analysis were applied. Domain analysis assumes that meaning and communication is conducted through symbols, where a symbol is “any object or event that refers to

something” (Spradley, 1979: 95). Domain analysis is the study of symbols including the symbol itself, one or more referents, and the relationship between the symbol and the referent (Spradley, 1979). In this case, the symbols are the beliefs that were identified using the content and factor analysis. The two symbols identified are the composite policy core belief, “U.S. should use symbolic or political resources in order to promote the welfare and security for the Jewish people,” and the secondary belief of “Opposition to the prevention of Jewish immigration to Palestine”. According to Spradley (1979), the basis of domain analysis is examining text using semantic relationships. The semantic relationship selected for this analysis is “Rationale; X is a reason for doing Y”. Y is the cover term and X is the included term. In this case, “Y” is the belief and “X” are the rationale that President Truman provides for explaining the belief.


A spreadsheet was created for the two cover terms or beliefs. Then, a political sample was conducted to identify the statements that were of political importance (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The seven identified documents were analyzed for included terms or those that provided the rationale for the beliefs. For the first belief, the “U.S. should use symbolic or political resources in order to promote the welfare and security of the Jewish people” there were 23 included terms identified from six of the seven documents. For the second belief, “Opposition to the prevention of Jewish immigration to Palestine” there were 37 included terms identified from all seven documents. All of the included terms fit the semantic relationship of rationale in relation to the cover term.

After this domain analysis was concluded, a taxonomy of the results was conducted in order to better understand the relationships between each set of included terms. The taxonomy reveals that domains have different levels among the included

terms and presents them in a diagram (Spradley, 1979). These different levels can be measured both in terms of depth or how many levels as well as how many included terms are used. This provides a basis for how well a speaker understands a topic and what is of greatest concern within a specific issue. The taxonomy for the belief “U.S. should use symbolic or political resources in order to promote the welfare and security for the Jewish people” can be found below in Figure III.1.

### **President Truman’s Rationale about the Problem**

For the 23 included terms identified in the domain analysis, three categories of included terms were recognized as the primary rationale provided by President Truman. The three categories of included terms are “Domestic Politics”, “Humanitarian”, and “International Politics”. Each of these categories was derived from the included terms that identified in the corresponding documents found in parenthesis next to the term. For example, the category “Domestic Politics” was found in statements 5, 50, and 55. The middle column of the figure is populated by the included terms. These are the specific rationales provided by President Truman within the seven statements in relation to the belief. There were three included terms identified for each of the three categories. In the cases of “common responsibility” and “Jewish DPs” President Truman went into great detail identifying multiple levels or categories among these included terms. The components of these included terms are in the far right column of the figure and are considered categories or types of included terms. For example among the Jewish DPs there are many different specific references including “persecuted Jews” and “homeless Jews in Europe”. This demonstrates the levels and overall depth of understanding President Truman expressed.



**Figure III.1. Taxonomy of President Truman’s rationale for why the U.S. should use symbolic or political resources to promote Jewish welfare and security.<sup>3</sup>**

*Domestic Politics.* President Truman identified multiple salient included terms within domestic politics for why he held the belief about the U.S. using symbolic or political resources to promote Jewish welfare and security. Congressional and political party support, public opinion, and the natural interest of the government were all cited. Elections were not cited as a rationale for this belief. This lack of reference to elections

<sup>3</sup> Statement number provided in parentheses. Information about statements can be found in Table III.2.

challenges the arguments of Snetsinger (1974) and others about the Jewish vote being a primary driver for Truman's beliefs and policy preferences.

In his first letter on August 31, 1945 to Prime Minister Clement Attlee (statement 5) about the issue of immigration and the Jewish Displaced Persons in Europe to Palestine, President Truman said that the basis for U.S. Government involvement in the issue was the "natural interest" of the U.S. Government (FRUS, 1945: 737-739). The specification of this natural interest was not developed.

In addition to this "natural interest", President Truman also cited public opinion. This is probably a function of the campaigns by the Jewish Agency and other Zionist organizations in America to persuade President Truman of the immediacy of the problem of Jewish DPs. President Truman (1956) recalled in his memoirs that he received more messages at the White House about Palestine and Jewish DPs than any other issue. According to public opinion polls in November 1945, a majority of Americans (58%) did not support or have an opinion on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (Gilboa, 1987: 16). However, this position would change by October 1947, just prior to the U.N. General Assembly vote, when another public opinion poll found that only 35% of Americans either opposed or did not have an opinion on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (Gilboa, 1987: 18). President Truman was correct in his assessment that the American people did support something to be done to protect the welfare and security of the Jewish people.

It was not just the general public who were concerned about these issues. Political party leaders and Congressmen often made public statements and signed petitions about this issue. The American Congress firmly placed pressure upon the

Truman Administration to act in favor of the Jews in relation to Palestine (Cohen, 1990). The welfare and security of the Jewish people was an issue of interest for the American public as well as politicians. While the President did cite these domestic political sources as part of his rationale, they were only in 3/7 statements and there was a distinct lack of depth to domestic politics.

***Humanitarian.*** When President Truman discussed why he supported the promotion of the welfare and security for the Jewish people, he often discussed the Jewish DPs. This issue was raised in 6/7 statements used in the sample. President Truman stated that the,

The plight of the victims who had survived the mad genocide of Hitler's Germany was a challenge to Western civilization, and as President I undertook to do something about it (Truman, 1956: 132).

He clearly believed that the Jewish DPs were a problem that the world faced. He cited this common responsibility when corresponding with Saudi Arabian King Ibn Saud in statement 59 arguing that all parties have a common responsibility to help these people (FRUS, 1946: 714-717).

The Jewish DPs were used as a rationale for President Truman in supporting Jewish welfare and security. President Truman went into great detail describing the Jewish DPs. Among the Jewish DPs, President Truman referenced “persecuted Jews” (statement 5), “unfortunate persons” (statement 26), “plight of the homeless Jews in Europe” (statement 50), “displaced persons in Europe” (statement 55) and “survivors” (statement 59). From the text, it is clear that President Truman focused upon the suffering of the Jews who were living in concentration camps across Europe. President Truman paid particular attention to them as survivors. Overall, the rationale was that

they were victims and that the U.S. Government should act to promote their welfare and security.


***International Politics.*** President Truman argued that the problems of Jewish welfare and security were connected to international politics. More specifically, he argued that the problem of the Jewish DPs had to be overcome before there could be peace in Europe. In addition, the fighting in Palestine between Jews and Arabs along with economic and political development could be overcome by first solving the issues of Jewish welfare and security.

Overall, President Truman did want to promote the welfare and security of the Jewish people for multiple reasons. Focusing upon only one category of cover term does not provide the whole story. Helping the Jewish DPs was clearly important to President Truman but other issues including those that were more political in nature influenced his interest in this issue.

### **President Truman's Rationale about a Policy Preference**

There were many proposed solutions for how Jewish welfare and security could be promoted but the main two were immigration into and sovereignty over Palestine. President Truman did not hold strong or consistent beliefs about sovereignty over Palestine over the period of April 1945 – November 1947. However, one belief that President Truman strongly held was his opposition to preventing Jewish immigration into Palestine. The rationale for this belief provided by President Truman using a taxonomy can be found below in Figure III.2.





**Figure III.2. Taxonomy of President Truman’s rationale for Opposing the Prevention of Jewish immigration into Palestine.<sup>4</sup>**

<sup>4</sup> Statement number provided in parentheses. Information about statements can be found in Table 2.

The same three categories of included terms were identified as in Figure III.1. These are “Domestic Politics”, “Humanitarian”, and “International Politics”. Each of these had multiple included terms and those in turn had multiple components.

***Domestic Politics.*** When providing a rationale for his opposition to preventing Jewish immigration into Palestine President Truman provided political reasons. He often cited public opinion as the basis for his support of Jewish immigration into Palestine (statements 5, 50, 55, and 59). The “American people, as a whole, firmly believe” that Jewish immigration into Palestine will resolve the Jewish Displaced Persons crisis (FRUS, 1945: 737). Public opinion support may have been a result of the efforts of the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency acted to publicize the problems faced by the Jewish DPs and advocated that the only solution was their immigration into Palestine. President Truman supported this position and in correspondence with Prime Minister Attlee asked him to accept the Jewish Agency’s proposals and arguments about immigration (FRUS, 1946: 682). In addition, the Cabinet Committee President Truman created to help provide advice on Palestine advocated for the immigration of Jews into Palestine. Having the support of cabinet members provided political assistance to President Truman and reinforced his belief about immigration.

***Humanitarian.*** President Truman cited humanitarian reasons to support Jewish immigration into Palestine. In fact, in a majority of the statements analyzed (5/7), humanitarian issues were used as the rationale for his opposition to this belief. The main reason he argued for the immigration of Jews to Palestine was that the Jewish DPs were suffering in Europe and they needed a refuge. Palestine was the identified refuge and they should be free to immigrate to help end their suffering and assist their condition. At

one point President Truman wrote to Prime Minister Attlee and argued that “No claim [for immigration] is more meritorious than that of the groups who for so many years have known persecution and enslavement” (FRUS, 1945: 738). For President Truman, it was in part due to the suffering of the surviving Jewish DPs that they should be given their wish to immigrate to Palestine.

President Truman also viewed allowing Jewish immigration as a just and fair solution to Palestine as a whole (statement 61). Unlike the British who viewed increased Jewish immigration as causing conflict between the Jews and Arabs (Kochavi, 1989). Overall, he also used the rationale that allowing Jewish immigration was reasonable and based upon goodwill among all people (statement 55).

***International Politics.*** International politics in particular past established policies and reports were identified by President Truman as a rationale for why he opposed the prevention of Jewish immigration into Palestine. These past policies included the U.S. support for the development of the Jewish National Home dating back to 1922 that was adopted after the British Balfour Declaration of 1917. President Truman’s interpretation of the development of the National Jewish Home included the allowance of Jews to immigrate into Palestine. President Truman also argued that his statements, in this case falling under past policy, about Jewish immigration into Palestine were not contradictory and were consistent over time.

From 1945 - November 1947, there were multiple reports conducted by the American and British Governments to examine Palestine as well as the Jewish Displaced Persons in Europe. There were three main reports the U.S. Government was involved in that examined these issues. The first was the Harrison Report completed in August 1945

that connected the Jewish DPs with immigration to Palestine and had been commissioned by President Truman. President Truman was said to have been deeply moved by the Harrison report (Clifford, 1978: 26). The second came out of the negotiations reacting to the demands President Truman made upon the British Government following the Harrison Report. The Anglo-American Inquiry was created in the winter of 1945 and carried out a study from January 1946-April 1946 examining both Palestine and the Jewish DPs. Its recommendations were made in very general terms and debates began immediately about how to implement the recommendations (Cohen, 1979). As a result of the debate about how to implement the recommendations between the U.S. and British Governments a second committee with different personnel from both countries was created. It was referred to as the Morrison-Grady committee and it produced in July 1946 the Morrison-Grady report. This report recommended how to best implement the Anglo-American Inquiry. All three reports recommended that 100,000 Jewish Displaced Persons be allowed immediately to immigrate into Palestine. President Truman cited these findings in multiple statements as the rationale for his supporting Jewish immigration into Palestine.

In addition to these established policies and reports, President Truman attempted to persuade Saudi Arabian King Ibn Saud on multiple occasions that Jewish immigration into Palestine was not negative for Arabs. He argued that the Jews who were already in Palestine were developing the economy and raising the standard of living for everyone who lived in Palestine including the Arabs. This was the rationale that Jewish immigration into Palestine was beneficial not only for those who were immigrating, but the entire population of Palestine would benefit. King Ibn Saud argued that Jewish

immigration was hostile act against the Arabs. Previously, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had promised King Ibn Saud on multiple occasions that the U.S. Government would not take a policy position that was hostile towards the Arabs. President Truman repeated this promise in correspondence to King Ibn Saud in April 1945. Later, President Truman argued that he was not breaking this promise as allowing Jewish immigration into Palestine was not a hostile act towards the Arabs. But the King Ibn Saud clearly viewed such action as hostile against the Arabs of Palestine as well as the broader Middle East (FRUS, 1946: 708-709).

When examining the rationale for President Truman's belief to oppose the prevention of Jewish immigration into Palestine, it is clear that there were diverse reasons. He argued that what he was proposing was based upon the findings of multiple U.S. Government reports, past policy, and was supported by public opinion. What he believed did not depart from what others already had established or currently believed about Jewish immigration into Palestine. In addition, Jewish immigration into Palestine was a humanitarian cause that helped resolve the problem of the Jewish DPs in Europe as well as assisting the Arabs in Palestine. Politics in particular public opinion and the position of the Jewish Agency were important to President Truman. The Jewish Agency had worked diligently to gain public support to allow Jewish immigration into Palestine (Cohen, 1990) and President Truman often cited both as the reason why he wanted to allow Jews to immigrate into Palestine. These past policies and reports along with public opinion provided President Truman support for his humanitarian concerns about the Jewish DPs.

## Conclusion

The taxonomy analysis for the two beliefs had multiple similarities. First, President Truman focused upon protecting and saving the Jewish DPs by allowing them to enter Palestine. He identified this as a problem and sought to resolve it through immigration. The humanitarian rationale identified in both analyses supports the arguments of Acheson (1969) and Clifford (1978) among others that President Truman's primary motivation was humanitarian.

The taxonomy analysis also identified domestic and international political reasons for these beliefs. Politics, both domestic and international, played a part in influencing his rationale for supporting the promotion of Jewish welfare and security as well as promoting Jewish immigration into Palestine. President Truman did not want to act against the preferences of Congress and public opinion. In a letter to Prime Minister Attlee, President Truman wrote,

In accordance with the principle I have consistently tried to follow, of having maximum degree of unity within the country and between the parties on major elements of American foreign policy, I could not give my support to this plan (FRUS, 1946: 682).

President Truman strongly believed that the condition of Jewish welfare and security in Europe was a problem and that the immigration of this population to Palestine was a solution. There was no single reason why President Truman believed this and when stating his beliefs and proposing action, he often cited various sources. Overall, humanitarian concerns about the Jewish DPs were paramount to drawing his attention to the issue and driving him to action. This position was supported from various sources including Congress and public opinion. When developing a plan to respond to this

problem President Truman advocated the abrogation of the 1939 British White Paper that limited Jewish immigration and the immediate allowance of 100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine, which was the finding of the Harrison Report in 1945 and endorsed by the Anglo-American Inquiry of 1946. President Truman used public opinion and past established policies and reports, all political sources, to promote the humanitarian rationale of supporting Jewish immigration into Palestine.

There are multiple limitations to the findings of this research. This research examined all 70 statements identified from the FRUS and APP of President Truman that referred to the question of Palestine. These statements occurred over a period of over two years and this was not controlled for. A major limitation is that we cannot know what President Truman really believed (Larson, 1988). Beliefs are difficult to identify and measure in any study and in the case of historical data this problem is compounded by not being able to interview the subject. However, by using beliefs that have been identified in previous replicated studies that were operationalized specifically for this case and were corroborated by an inter-coder there is internal validity to these findings. The use of domain and taxonomic analysis to understand why President Truman held these beliefs provides significant analytical leverage compared to previous accounts attempting to understand this issue.

In the final analysis, it is clear that President Truman held multiple beliefs for complex reasons about the question of Palestine. Explanations that simplify this process miss the complexity of the policy process and the interactions between his beliefs about the problem and his policy preferences. Cohen (1990) argues that Truman's beliefs and rationale were a mixture of humanitarian and political reasons and this analysis supports

this argument. Future research about President Truman and the recognition of the State of Israel should take into account both the humanitarian as well as the political factors that provided his rationale about the question of Palestine. Humanitarian considerations clearly were the basis for his understanding of the problem, but politics directly influenced and provided the support he needed to come to a position on Jewish immigration.



## CHAPTER IV. COALITION POLARITY AND DEFECTION IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, 1945 – 1947

### Introduction

The formation and maintenance of coalitions that compete to shape the formation, adoption, and implementation of public policies is an enduring field of politics (e.g. Riker, 1962; Hecllo, 1978; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993). The relative stability of these coalitions and the polarity between them over time has been found to influence the outcomes of policymaking in modern developed countries (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Ingold, 2011).

Past research on coalitions in the policy process has found mixed results in regard to the stability of coalitions, in particular when they are faced with external events or crises (Weible et al., 2009). Studies have found relative long-term stability among coalitions in the policy domains of health care (Marmor, 1970), energy (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993), banking (Worsham, 1997), civil rights (Hula, 1999), and the environment (Sabatier and Brasher, 1993; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004). On the other hand, studies have also found that coalitions may lack long-term stability and face defection in policy domains such as agriculture (Browne, 1988), health care (Heinz et al., 1993), energy (Heinz et al., 1993), and the environment (Ackerman and Hassler, 1981). While these studies of coalition stability have different outcomes, they all focused on domestic policy subsystems. This study differs from these past studies of coalition stability by analyzing a foreign policy subsystem. Using a deviant case for applying the ACF is one way to further develop the theory (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007).

Traditional foreign policy analysis has remained outside the scope of theories of the policy process as it tends to be the domain of international relations (Litfin, 2000). However, international relations approaches have been found limited in explaining the policy process due to their focus on societal and institutional forces mitigating the role of ideas or beliefs (Goldstein, 1988). While institutional constraints are relevant to the policymaking process, the focus of this study will be upon the belief systems of policy elites. Therefore, a policy process theory that focuses on the role of beliefs as bringing together policy actors may be relevant to the foreign policy process (Friman, 1993).

Past studies focusing on whether coalitions influence foreign policy tend to focus on epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), ethnicity (Smith, 2000; Ambrosio, 2002; Rubenzer, 2008), business and labor organizations (Lipset, 1986), or religious affiliation (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007) as the rationale behind the formation and stability of such coalitions. Rather than focusing on one of these categories of coalitions, this chapter applies the assumption from the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) that coalition formation and maintenance are based upon policy core beliefs (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993).

One foreign policy case where coalitions existed and competed for several decades through the policy process is the U.S. government's decision to recognize the state of Israel in 1948. The recognition of the state of Israel on May 15, 1948, was one of the most significant moments of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It ended the debate by U.S. policymakers concerning the issue of sovereignty in the British Mandate for Palestine.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The British Mandate that was established by the 1922 San Remo conference not including Transjordan. The borders of this territory consisted of the Mediterranean Sea to the west, the River Jordan to the east, the Sinai Peninsula to the south, and Syria to the north.

The counter argument to the recognition of a Jewish state in Palestine was that Palestine should become a single nation-state including Arabs and Jews albeit with an Arab majority. The decision to recognize a Jewish state as sovereign over part of British Mandate Palestine in 1948 dramatically changed the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and the Middle East writ large and has since seriously influenced future policy alternatives available to the U.S. Government.

Understanding the political context at the time of the creation of Israel is a worthy exercise across two fronts. Substantively, the creation of Israel as a single sovereign state in British Mandate Palestine continues to affect world politics. Since its creation, the U.S. has had a unique relationship with Israel and that relationship has been in part molded by the U.S. Government policies under the Truman administration in relation to the Jewish population of Palestine.

Today, Walt and Mearsheimer (2007) argue that U.S. policy towards the Middle East in general and more specifically the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is dominated by a loose coalition of pro-Israel interest groups who steer U.S. policy consistently towards support for Israel even at the cost of American national interests. One example of this influence is the issue of recognizing a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Support for a Palestinian state has taken decades in part because of the influence held by the “Israel Lobby” upon the U.S. Government (Walt and Mearsheimer, 2007). In fact, Stephen Walt (2009) argues that “[t]he mainstream "consensus" behind this solution is in fact a relatively recent creation”. As the U.S. Government begins to support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, previous policy processes will influence the current policy debate (Pierson, 2004).

Therefore, there is a need to study the origins of the policy process that led to the recognition of Israel by the U.S. government as past policies have been found influential in the creation of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East (May, 1973; Hemmer, 2000).

Second, in the context of public policy, research on the complex and dynamic process of policymaking with a focus on the role advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) remains an area that needs greater research. An advocacy coalition consists of

people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system – that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; 25).

In other words, an advocacy coalition is defined by two concepts (i) shared policy core beliefs of individuals who are (ii) engaged in coordinated activity. Such coalitions have been found to be critical in the agenda setting, selection and implementation of public policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The purpose of this study is to investigate the stability and polarity of advocacy coalitions involved in the process of U.S. Government foreign policy and the creation of Israel.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, it discusses the relevant literature on coalitions in the domestic and foreign policy process and in the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). Second, it presents the case study of the agenda setting and policy selection by the U.S. towards Palestine from 1945 to 1947. The analysis of this case study is examined based on the research questions of identifying the members of these coalitions and their policy core beliefs. It asks, do their policy core beliefs change over time, and subsequently, does coalition membership change over time? The data and

methods of the research design are discussed followed by the analysis. The results of the analysis establishing the coalitions based upon policy core beliefs and their relative change over time are then presented. This chapter concludes with a summary of the findings, a discussion of the limitations of the research, and lessons learned about applying the ACF over time.

### **Advocacy Coalition Framework**

The ACF is the primary theoretical guide for this analysis (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007).<sup>6</sup> It was developed to explain competition among coalitions of policy elites seeking to influence public policy so that it better reflects their belief systems. These beliefs are typically resistant to change and as they act as the glue of advocacy coalitions, this tends to lead to stability between the coalitions (Sabatier, 1998), but defection by policy elites from one coalition to another may occur. To help understand the tendencies for defection and stability among allies over time, the three components of the ACF this research summarizes are: policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions and belief systems.

The first step in any application of the ACF starts with the policy subsystem. A policy subsystem includes a variety of public and private organizations seeking to influence policymaking about a specific problem or issue in that domain. These actors share common belief systems applied to the policy issue and may coordinate their activities to create distinct advocacy coalitions. The emphasis when identifying a policy subsystem should be placed upon the policy problem or issue and those who seek to influence public policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). The issue defining the policy

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<sup>6</sup> The ACF incorporates a logic and assumptions derived from decades of research for details see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999), Sabatier and Weible (2007), and Weible et al. (2009).

subsystem in this research will be the question of Palestine. The question of Palestine refers to the determination of a political entity sovereign over the geographic region known as the British Mandate for Palestine. The focus of this study will only be on the development of U.S. foreign policy applied to this region.

This subsystem is nested within other vertical and horizontal subsystems (Sabatier, 1998). Vertically, the subsystem is nested within the broader international system of politics that was undergoing tumultuous changes at the end of World War II including the creation of the United Nations (UN) and the beginning of the Cold War centered around the conflict between the American and Soviet Governments. This subsystem also exists within the broader spectrum of U.S. Government defense and foreign policy. Therefore, actors from these other subsystems may spillover and overlap becoming involved in the subsystem of interest (Howlett and Ramesh, 2002). Policy elites from these other subsystems will be included within this study as per their engagement on the question of Palestine.

The ACF aggregates policy elites operating in a policy subsystem into advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988). This study identifies coalition members based upon their belief systems similar to Zafonte and Sabatier (2004). According to Sabatier and Weible (2007), operationalizing two or three policy core beliefs is sufficient to identify at least two advocacy coalitions. Coordination is a second defining component for identifying advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999), but it is beyond the purview of this chapter due to data collection constraints. However, in past studies of the ACF actors clustered into coalitions based upon their belief systems have been found to have a high-level of coordination (Weible, 2005). To emphasize that coordination is not established

through data analysis, this research will refer to these coalitions as belief coalitions instead of advocacy coalitions similar to Zafonte and Sabatier (2004) and Pierce (2011).

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argued that policy elites possess a three-tiered model of beliefs. These belief systems are hierarchical in their abstractness in relation to the policy issue and their transformative nature. The most abstract and least transformative beliefs are deep core beliefs that span multiple subsystems. In comparison, policy core beliefs are relatively more transformative and applied to the policy issue and span the subsystem. Individuals are motivated to convert these deep and policy core beliefs into policies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The secondary aspects of the beliefs are the most tangible and transformative and apply to sub-components of the subsystem.

The assumption that policies are best understood as the translation of beliefs is central to this study. Such belief systems are not purely rational as individuals are characterized as being boundedly rational (Simon, 1985). The development of these beliefs is the result of socialization, making them relatively stable over time (Festinger, 1957). As actors receive external stimuli, they will filter out information that is counter to their existing belief systems (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). Therefore, people who have different belief systems, which the ACF aggregates into different advocacy coalitions, will interpret the same information differently. This will lead to a suspicion of the motives and objectives of opponent coalitions. Once coalitions are formed around these belief systems, hostility between coalitions is exacerbated because of the tendency for members to remember losses more than gains (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988). This results in an increase in the short-term costs of defection to an opposing coalition and

enhances the benefits of long-term solidarity to one's current advocacy coalition.

Therefore,

***Hypothesis I.*** On major controversies within a policy subsystem, when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of coalition members as allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999).

This hypothesis has been tested by a handful of studies of the ACF including Jenkins-Smith et al. (1991), Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair (1993), Zafonte and Sabatier (2004). These studies found that advocacy coalition structure was stable over time. Past research has tested this hypothesis in relatively similar contexts of policy subsystems that dealt with domestic environmental or energy issues, with high conflict, and high technical complexity. This research will use similar methods but a different context of policy subsystem in order to test the external validity of the hypothesis to a foreign, historical, and relatively normative policy issue.

### **Case Study**

This research analyzes the development of U.S. Government foreign policy in relation to the question of sovereignty over Palestine. The issue of the question of Palestine was the determination of whether the Jews or the Arabs of Palestine should have sovereignty over the British Mandate for Palestine. Palestine was a mandate territory under the British Empire from 1922-1948. During this time period, the British Government attempted to balance both Jewish and Arab demands to gain sovereignty over the territory. The U.S. Government became involved in the issue from the very beginning in 1922. Since then, coalitions seeking to influence U.S. policymaking on the question of Palestine formed representing the Zionist argument that Palestine should be a



Jewish state and the Arab response that Palestine should be an Arab state (Pierce, 2011). This research focuses on the time period between January 1, 1945 and November 29, 1947. It will be divided into five distinct and unequal time periods because, over time, the policy debate shifted due to new policy proposals and studies conducted by various governmental entities on this issue. Therefore to control for this variation, analysis will be divided into the five different time periods described below.

***Time Period 1 from January 1 – August 31, 1945.*** At the beginning of 1945 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was re-elected, the war in Europe was coming to an end, and other global issues were gaining attention among policy actors in the Department of State and White House. One of these issues was the dual and contrary claims for Jewish and Arab sovereignty in Palestine. During Roosevelt's Administrations the U.S. Government adhered to a relative hands-off policy, allowing the British Government to administer Palestine with little interference. President Roosevelt would make supportive statements to both Jewish and Arab claims for sovereignty and established a policy of dual consultation. This policy held that no major changes to U.S. policy would be made without consulting both parties. The Department of State and more specifically the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) had responsibility for making policy on Palestine.

In April 1945, President Roosevelt unexpectedly died and then, Vice-President Harry S. Truman succeeded him. Due to the immediacy of wartime exigencies, Palestine was not an issue high on the new President's agenda. Truman sought to maintain Roosevelt's established policy of dual consultation and continued the practice of the NEA administering policy on Palestine.

During the summer of 1945, the war in Europe came to an end and the magnitude of the Holocaust in Europe became clear to the American public. The Holocaust left hundreds of thousands of displaced persons (DPs), many of them Jews, living in former concentration and refugee camps across Europe. At the same time, President Truman began meeting with Zionist coalition leaders who lobbied him to connect the issues of the Jewish DPs in Europe to British restrictions on immigration policy in Palestine. President Truman ordered Earl Harrison, a government expert on immigration and refugees, to report on what should be done to accommodate the Jewish DPs in American controlled zones in Europe. Harrison filed his report to the White House in August 1945, concluding that 100,000 Jews should be allowed to immigrate to Palestine.

***Time Period 2 from August 31, 1945 – April 25, 1946.*** Upon receiving the Harrison Report, President Truman wrote directly to newly elected British Prime Minister (PM) Attlee asking him to allow the prescribed 100,000 Jewish DPs to enter Palestine. President Truman did not consult the Department of State or the NEA before making this decision. The British Government responded by inviting the U.S. Government to form a joint Anglo-American Inquiry to investigate both the future of Palestine as well as how to respond to the Jewish DP issue in Europe. On April 25, 1946 the Inquiry published its report.

***Time Period 3 from April 30 – July 30, 1946.*** During this time period, the Anglo-American Inquiry report is debated between the U.S. and British Governments. The report recommended that 100,000 Jewish DPs be allowed to immigrate into Palestine, but did not recommend the partitioning of Palestine or the creation of a Jewish state. Instead it prescribed the creation of a single federal state where neither Jew nor Arab should

dominate the other. To analyze how these recommendations should be implemented, a joint Anglo-American committee was formed. The Morrison-Grady Committee released a report in the summer of 1946 that supported the previous inquiry's findings. Both the Arabs and the Zionists rejected this plan, and the American and British governments soon followed in their rejection.

***Time Period 4 from July 31, 1946 – April 2, 1947.*** In one last effort to bring both the Zionists and the Arabs together on the question of Palestine, the British Government convened a conference in London and invited both parties to negotiate. The U.S. Government, after the failure of the Anglo-American Inquiry, decided to serve only as an observer. By the beginning of 1947, the London Conference was a failure as the Zionists and Arabs would not meet with each other. Instead, the British Government negotiated with each party separately, but could not get either side to compromise on the issue of sovereignty. In April 1947, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin announced that the issue of Palestine was no longer Great Britain's responsibility and it would be formally recommended to the UN.

***Time Period 5 from April 3 – November 29, 1947.*** In May 1947, the UN formed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to investigate policy alternatives for the future of Palestine. UNSCOP spent several weeks conducting interviews and hearings on the issue in multiple locations including Palestine. However, the Arabs did not view the UN's involvement as legitimate and did not cooperate with the investigation. In September, UNSCOP submitted its majority report to the UN. The report prescribed the partitioning of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states along with the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Arabs rejected the partition plan and sought to

influence the U.S., Great Britain, and the Soviet Union along with its allies to vote against the plan in the General Assembly. The Zionists, while not supporting all parts of the plan, viewed it as a start to a Jewish state and lobbied General Assembly members to vote in favor of it.

On November 29, the partition plan was passed by the General Assembly with the support of the U.S. and Soviet Governments among others. The Arab states walked out in protest, while the Zionists celebrated a victory. By the next day full scale civil war broke out in Palestine. A Jewish or Arab state was not declared, but it was clear that the U.S. policy was now in support for the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. This represented a major change in U.S. policy from the beginning in 1945 when it sought a middle road of dual consultation and minimal involvement in the issue.

### **Research Design and Data**

The data were collected from U.S. Government archives, collected and stored by the U.S. Department of State, known as the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS). The FRUS is the official archive of documents pertaining to U.S. Government foreign policy. They include, “all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State’s responsibilities, together with the appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies” (FRUS, 1948 Preface, III-IV). The FRUS archive has been used in multiple past studies concerning this policy issue (Ganin, 1979; Owendale, 1989; Cohen, 1990; Benson, 1997; and Radosh and Radosh, 2009).

These archives include memorandum, telegraphs, conversations, reports, public statements, and diary entries by various individuals and organizations. The majority of

these documents were intended for private consumption being classified as Secret or Top Secret. The Director of the Historical Office of the Department of State has compiled and edited these documents by geographic region. In this case, the archives are identified as “Palestine 1945”, “Palestine 1946”, and “Palestine 1947”. These years were selected to represent the period of time including the end of World War II and the beginning of the Truman presidential administration in 1945, to the decision to partition Palestine by the United Nations on November 29, 1947.

The focus of the FRUS is upon the “Department of State’s responsibilities”. Therefore, the majority of documents include the Department of State as either the speaker and/or audience of each statement. The data also include statements from foreign governments, international organizations (such as the United Nations), the White House, other agencies and branches of the U.S. Government, Zionist organizations (such as the Jewish Agency), and Palestinian Arab organizations (such as the Arab Higher Committee).

The unit of analysis selected for this analysis was the individual statement. The individual statement has been used in the past in ACF studies examining coalition formation and stability over time by many scholars (e.g. Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993; Sabatier and Brasher, 1993; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004). The archives are a collection of statements that dated, entitled, and usually identified by speaker. When the statements do not officially attribute a speaker, one is assigned by the coder. Each statement is assigned only a single speaker. Each speaker is identified based upon his/her individual name, organizational affiliation as identified by the document, official position, and nationality. For purposes of this research the organizational affiliation is

used to identify a statement. The statements range from a single sentence to approximately 18 pages in length. The length of the statement is not used in the analysis in order to standardize each unit of analysis. In total, there were 505 statements identified.

The organization affiliation of each statement is used to aggregate the individual statements. In other words, statements are attributed to organizations such as the “British Government” or the “Jewish Agency”. While many of these statements occurred at the agency level of an organization, such as the Foreign Minister and King of Saudi Arabia, these were aggregated into representing the Government of Saudi Arabia. While it is recognized that the individuals may possess different beliefs, in order to simplify and better represent the homogeneity of belief systems within organizations, the statements were aggregated into the broadest organization affiliation possible, often at the government level. However, because some scholars including Grose (1983) and Cohen (1990) have argued that there was disagreement within the U.S. Government on the issue of Palestine, in particular between the Department of State and White House, the organization affiliations among those members of the U.S. Government were not aggregated and instead the differentiated agency affiliation in this case the “Department of State NEA” and “White House”, was maintained.

There were four steps in the analysis to test the hypothesis about coalition structure and defection. First, the statements are coded using content analysis from a codebook. The codebook can be found below in Table IV.1 along with a discussion of the codes. Second, these resulting data are analyzed using Manhattan distances to determine the relative distances between organizations of their expressed beliefs. Third, these

distances are then analyzed using a Tabu search cluster analysis to determine coalition membership. The Tabu search cluster analysis provides data on what organizations fit into what coalitions as well as the mean Manhattan distance between and among these coalitions based upon expressed beliefs. This form of analysis to identify and analyze advocacy coalition structure builds on the methods and findings of Weible (2005), Weible and Sabatier (2005), Henry et al. (2010), and Pierce (2011).

The statements that did not have any expressed beliefs were removed as missing data. The statements that only provided two or fewer expressed beliefs were also removed. This was done in order to prevent a Type II measurement error. After these two types of statements were removed from the analysis there were 388 total statements in the sample.

These statements were then divided into five different time periods. Time Period 1 from January 1 – August 31, 1945 included 55 statements. Time Period 2 from September 1, 1945 – April 25, 1946 included 86 statements. Time Period 3 from April 26 – July 30, 1946 included 60 statements. Time Period 4 from July 31, 1946 – April 2, 1947 included 77 statements. Time Period 5 from April 3 – November 29, 1947 included 110 statements. Individuals or organizations providing multiple statements were coded as a new statement and were not combined.

**Table IV.1. Policy Elite Beliefs and Belief Components Adapted from Sabatier (1998).**

Policy Core and Deep Core Beliefs	Belief Components
Nature of Man	1. People should intervene on earth to carry out God's plan
Orientation on basic value priorities	2. The Jews are a nation
	3. The Arabs of Palestine are a nation
	4. The current majority population of a political community should have sovereignty
	5. The U.S. should seek to maintain security in the Middle East
	6. The U.S. should seek to maintain security in Palestine
	7. The U.S. should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people
Identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern	8. The welfare of the Jews is important
	9. The welfare of the Arabs of Palestine is important
Overall seriousness of the problem	10. The U.S. should use symbolic or political resources to solve the problems in Palestine
	11. The U.S. should use material resources to solve the problems in Palestine
Basic causes of the problem	12. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be prevented
	13. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be limited
	14. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited
	15. The Jews should be blamed for the problems in Palestine
	16. The Arabs should be blamed for the problems in Palestine
	17. The British should be blamed for the problems in Palestine
Proper distribution of authority	18. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from the Jews
	19. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from the Arabs

The codebook includes 19 belief components that operationalize deep and policy core beliefs as identified by Sabatier (1998), and replicated the codebook that was used in a similar study of U.S. Congressional hearings held on the question of Palestine in 1922 and 1944 by Pierce (2011). The components were developed from a preliminary reading of the primary sources as well as secondary sources that analyzed the policy debate at the



time. According to Sabatier and Weible (2007), identifying only two or three policy core beliefs is sufficient for identifying at least two advocacy coalitions. This study identifies five policy core beliefs and one deep core belief: nature of man (belief 1); orientation on basic value priorities (beliefs 2-7); identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern (beliefs 8 and 9); the relative seriousness of the problem (beliefs 10 and 11); basic causes of the problem (beliefs 12 – 17); and the outcome desired or the proper distribution of authority (beliefs 18-19). Content analysis of the testimony was conducted for each belief component. Each testimony was coded as +1 for agreement, 0 for neutral, -1 for disagreement, or a 9 for not discussed. This resulted in five total matrixes a 19X55 matrix of beliefs and organizations for Time Period 1, a 19X86 matrix of beliefs and organizations for Time Period 2, a 19X60 matrix of beliefs and organizations for Time Period 3, a 19X77 matrix of beliefs and organizations for Time Period 4, and a 19X110 matrix of beliefs and organizations for Time Period 5.

Once the coding was completed, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted. A random sampling of 49 statements from the population of 388 statements was taken and coded by the inter-coder. This random sample represents 12.6 percent of the population above the suggested 10 percent of the population that is needed to determine inter-coder reliability when using a randomized sample (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). Cohen's Kappa (1960) was used to measure inter-coder reliability of the beliefs because it is more reliable than percentage agreement and has been called "the measure of choice" by researchers (Dewey, 1983). According to Fleiss (1971), a Cohen's Kappa measurement of agreement at or above 0.40 is "fair" or "fair to good". All 19 of the belief components were at or above Cohen's Kappa of 0.40.

To determine coalition membership, all five of the matrices based upon the coding were transformed using Manhattan distances. Manhattan distance was calculated by the  $\sum [p_i - j_i]$ , where “i” ranges from 1 to 19 for each belief component and where p and j represent any two organizations. This created five organization-by-organization matrices that were 55X55 for Time Period 1, 86X86 for Time Period 2, 60X60 for Time Period 3, 77X77 for Time Period 4, and 110X110 for Time Period 5. At this stage, the distance measure in each cell of the matrices represented the aggregate agreement across the 19 belief components between any two statements that are identified as an organization. The maximum Manhattan distance between any two organizations is (38), the median distance is (19), and the minimum distance is (0). For example, if two organizations had disagreement on all 19 beliefs the Manhattan distance would be 38 in comparison if they had agreement on all 19 beliefs the Manhattan distance would be 0.

Tabu search cluster analysis was then conducted to place each organization into clusters (Borgatti et al., 2002; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). These clusters were used to identify an organization’s coalition membership (see Weible, 2005; Weible and Sabatier, 2005; and Henry et al. 2010). Using iterative simulations, Tabu search cluster analysis minimizes within cluster distances among organizations by partitioning and then rearranging the matrices such that organizations with relatively lower distances are placed in the same cluster, while those with relatively higher distances are placed in a different cluster. Tabu search cluster analysis is used because it provides a relative goodness of fit ( $R^2$ ) that can be utilized to discern the optimal number of clusters (Borgatti, et al., 2002; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005).

The number of clusters varies by time period from two to four. These clusters were identified as the coalitions based upon their expressed beliefs. Each was then given a title based upon their beliefs either in support or opposition of a Jewish State or an Arab State in Palestine. Based upon this rationale the main coalitions identified were the Arab, Anglo-American and Zionist coalitions. A fourth coalition, the Defense coalition, emerges in Time Period 5.

### Analysis

#### Stability Among and Polarity Between Coalitions

To analyze coalition stability, the mean Manhattan distances among and between the coalitions were used. The findings can be found below in Table IV.2.

**Table IV.2. Inter and Intra Mean Manhattan Distances for Coalitions all Time Periods.**

Time Period	Coalition	Coalition				R <sup>2</sup>
		Arab	Anglo-American	Zionist	Defense	
Time 1	Arab (n=15)	4.9	12.5	20.1	-	0.474
	Anglo-American (n=35)		7	12.3	-	
	Zionist (n=5)			7.4	-	
	Defense (n=0)	-	-	-	-	
Time 2	Arab (n=20)	6	12.4	22.4	-	0.446
	Anglo-American (n=62)		7	14.9	-	
	Zionist (n=3)			4	-	
	Defense (n=0)	-	-	-	-	
Time 3	Arab (n=12)	7.2	15.7	-	-	0.464
	Anglo-American (n=48)		8.6	-	-	
	Zionist (n=0)	-	-	-	-	
	Defense (n=0)	-	-	-	-	
Time 4	Arab (n= 13)	8.4	16.4	-	-	0.537
	Anglo-American (n= 64)		8.5	-	-	
	Zionist (n=0)	-	-	-	-	
	Defense (n=0)	-	-	-	-	
Time 5	Arab (n= 15)	9	13.5	19	12.4	0.364
	Anglo-American (n= 75)		7.7	12.1	11.3	
	Zionist (n= 5)			9.4	15.3	
	Defense (n= 14)				7.1	

For Time Period 1 the  $R^2$  is 0.474.<sup>7</sup> The analysis identified 15 statements as belonging to the Arab coalition, 35 statements for the Anglo-American coalition, and five statements for the Zionist coalition. The distances within the coalitions can be found on the diagonal with 4.8 units within the Arab, 7 units within the Anglo-American, and 7.4 units within the Zionist. This means that within each coalition there was disagreement on about two to three expressed beliefs. The distance from the Arab to the Anglo-American coalition was 12.5 units. This is similar to the distance from the Zionist to the Anglo-American coalition of 12.3 units. It is evident that the Anglo-American coalition held a centrist position in comparison to the Arab and Zionist coalitions. When examining the distance between the Arab and Zionist coalitions, they had a distance of 20.1 units. This means that of the 19 expressed beliefs, the Zionists and Arabs disagreed on a majority of them.

For Time Period 2 the  $R^2$  is 0.446.<sup>8</sup> The analysis identified 20 statements as belonging to the Arab coalition, 62 for the Anglo-American coalition, and three for the Zionist coalition. The distances within the coalitions are on the diagonal. The distances are 6 units for the Arab coalition, 7 units for the Anglo-American coalition, and 4 units for the Zionist coalition. Similar to the previous time period, the distance among the coalitions is relatively stable with disagreement on about two or three expressed beliefs. The distance between the Arab and the Anglo-American coalitions (12.4 units) along with the distance between the Anglo-American and Zionist coalitions (14.9 units) was relatively stable compared to Time Period 1. There was a slight increase in the distance

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<sup>7</sup> The  $R^2$  for two coalitions was 0.352 and for four coalitions was 0.471. This meant that three coalitions had relatively the highest  $R^2$  with the fewest number of coalitions and that best matched the context of the case.

<sup>8</sup> The  $R^2$  for two coalitions was 0.331 and for four coalitions was 0.446. This meant that three coalitions had relatively the highest  $R^2$  with the fewest number of coalitions that best matched the context of the case.

between the Anglo-American and Zionist coalitions from disagreement on about six to seven beliefs. Overall, the Anglo-American coalition remained centrist between the two extremist coalitions. The distance between the Arab and Zionist coalitions slightly increased from 20.1 units in Time Period 1 to 22.4 units in Time Period 2.

For Time Period 3, only two coalitions were identified. This is a distinct change from the previous time periods as the Zionist coalition merged with the more centrist Anglo-American coalition. This merging is discussed further below when examining the coalition membership. The  $R^2$  is 0.464.<sup>9</sup> The analysis identified 12 statements as belonging to the Arab coalition and 48 for the Anglo-American coalition. The distances within the coalitions are on the diagonal and are 7.2 units for the Arab coalition and 8.6 units for the Anglo-American coalition. This again represented a slight increase in the distance among coalition members with disagreement occurring on approximately four beliefs for both coalitions. The distance between the Arab and the Anglo-American coalitions was 15.7 units. This is an increase from 12.4 units in Time Period 2. This increase in disagreement can be explained by the inclusion of the Zionist coalition within the Anglo-American. While this is an increase it is still less than earlier extreme between the Arabs and the Zionists.

For Time Period 4, the  $R^2$  is 0.537.<sup>10</sup> The analysis identified 13 statements as belonging to the Arab coalition and 64 for the Anglo-American coalition. The distances within the coalitions is on the diagonal and are 8.4 units for the Arab coalition and 8.5

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<sup>9</sup> The  $R^2$  for three coalitions was 0.472. This meant that three coalitions had relatively the highest  $R^2$  with the fewest number of coalitions that best matched the context of the case. When three coalitions were run only a single organization was identified.

<sup>10</sup> The  $R^2$  for three coalitions was 0.534. This meant that three coalitions had relatively the highest  $R^2$  with the fewest number of coalitions that best matched the context of the case. When three coalitions were run only a single organization was identified.

units for the Anglo-American coalition. The internal distance among the Anglo-American coalition was relatively stable with a slight decrease to 8.5 units and this can be explained by the continued inclusion from members of the previous Zionist coalition. The Arab coalition again increased slightly in its level of disagreement to greater than four expressed beliefs. The distance between the Arab and the Anglo-American coalitions is 16.4 units, relatively stable from the previous distance in the previous time period of 15.7 units.

For Time Period 5 the coalitions change dramatically. First, the Zionist coalition re-emerges as a separate cluster from the Anglo-American coalition. Second, there is a fourth coalition identified as the Defense coalition. The  $R^2$  is 0.364.<sup>11</sup> The analysis identified 15 statements as belonging to the Arab coalition, 75 for the Anglo-American coalition, five for the Zionist coalition, and 14 for the new Defense coalition. The distances within the coalitions is on the diagonal and are 9 units for the Arab coalition, 7.7 units for the Anglo-American coalition, 9.4 units for the Zionist coalition, and 7.1 units for the Defense coalition. The internal distance among the Arab coalition again had a slight increase from the previous time period from 8.4 units to 9 units. The coalition is clearly increasing in its level of internal disagreement over how to resolve the Palestine question. The Anglo-American coalition slightly decreased from 8.5 units to 7.7 units. The Zionist coalition had an internal distance of 9.4 units. This level of disagreement of almost five expressed beliefs for only five members demonstrates that even once the

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<sup>11</sup> The  $R^2$  for three coalitions was 0.334 and for five coalitions was 0.436. While the five coalitions had relatively the highest  $R^2$  with the fewest number of coalitions it was not the best match the context of the case. When five coalitions were run multiple members of the existing Arab coalition were removed. The inclusion of these members in the same coalition better represents the distance within the Arab coalition rather than the creation of another cluster.

coalition re-emerged, there remained a great amount of disagreement among its members about the question of Palestine. The Defense coalition had an internal distance of 7.1 units. All of these internal distances are less than the external distances, providing validity that these are separate clusters.

The distance between the Arab and Anglo-American coalition is 13.5 units. This distance is a decrease from 16.4 units and similar to the first two time periods when the Anglo-American coalition was not aligned with the Zionists. This demonstrates a return to a more centrist position and closer alignment to the Arabs in comparison to the previous two time periods. The distance between the Anglo-American and Zionist coalition is 12.1 units. This distance is similar to the first two time periods when the Zionist coalition existed as a separate entity. These distances indicate that the Anglo-American coalition returned to a centrist position between the two extreme coalitions. The distance between the Arab and Zionist coalitions is 19 units. This is the median level of disagreement and the closest that the two coalitions ever were as distinct entities. This is a slight decrease from the first two time periods, but the distance between the coalitions remains the most extreme relative to the other coalitions. The Defense coalition is slightly closer to the Arab coalition (12.4 units) than the Anglo-American coalition (13.5 units). The Defense coalition represented an alternative path of protecting the status quo and not resolving the issue through limited immigration and partition as supported by the Anglo-American coalition in Time Period 5. This explains their distance from the Anglo-American coalition of 11.3 units.

Over time, several trends emerged. First, the hypothesis that the lineup of coalition members as allies and opponents tends to be relatively stable over time is

supported when examining the Arab and Zionist coalitions. In Time Period 1, the two coalitions had a mean Manhattan distance of 20.1 units and only slightly decreased by Time Period 5 to 19 units. However, this finding should be mitigated by the fact that the Zionist coalition merged in Time Periods 3 and 4 with the Anglo-American coalition and was less than the median distance away from the Arab coalition. The distances between the Anglo-American coalition and the Arab and Zionists coalitions were relatively stable when Time Period 1 and 5 are compared. But, this finding should also be tempered by the issue that the Zionist coalition again was connected with the Anglo-American coalition for Time Periods 3 and 4.

Second, when examining internal distances, two patterns emerged. The internal distances of the Arab coalition continued to increase over time. The internal distance among Arab coalition members almost doubled from Time Period 1, 4.9 units, to Time Period 5, 9 units. In comparison the Anglo-American coalition was relatively stable over time as there was only a slight increase from Time Period 1 (7 units) to Time Period 5 (7.7 units). On the other hand, when the Zionists were a part of the Anglo-American coalition, there was an increase in the internal distance. In the case of the Zionist coalition there was no pattern of internal distance. The distance increased from Time Period 1 (7.4 units) to Time Period 5 (9.4 units) but during Time Period 2, it had decreased and did not even exist during Time Periods 3 and 4. It is clear that the internal dynamics of this coalition were dynamic throughout this policy process.


To compliment the analysis of the structure of these coalitions, coalition membership will also be analyzed, based upon the hypothesis that adversarial coalitions



should be relatively stable over time and there should not be defection from the two extreme coalitions (Arab and Zionist) among members.

### Coalition Membership


Figure IV.1 presents in a bar graph the results of the coalition membership for Time Period 1 based on the Tabu search cluster analysis. The 55 statements were separated into three coalitions based upon their expressed beliefs. The Arab coalition had 15 statements, the Anglo-American coalition had 35 statements, and the Zionist coalition had 5 statements.



**Figure IV.1. Coalition Membership for Time Period 1.**

The Arab coalition membership is comprised of government representatives from Arab Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well as members of the public from these countries. Members of the Iraqi and Syrian public differ from statements from those governments and may not be representative of specific

organizations but include the media and rioters. Also, included is a single statement from the Department of State NEA. The Anglo-American coalition's membership is comprised of the Department of State and the Department of State NEA, the White House, and the British Government along with multiple members from the governments of Arab states. The Zionist coalition includes members from the Jewish Agency, Zionist Organization of America and one from the White House.



**Figure IV.2. Coalition Membership for Time Period 2.**

For Time Period 2, most of the Arab coalition statements still come from the governments of Arab Middle East states, their publics. A couple of notable changes were that the Department of State NEA no longer is included or the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine. The latter was the political body representing the Arabs of Palestine and their exclusion demonstrates that when it came to the issue of Palestine, U.S. foreign policy was more engaged with the Arab states rather than the Arab Palestinian people directly.

The Arab League also emerges as an actor whose membership includes representatives from all of the Arab states. Among the Anglo-American coalition, there were no absences from the first time period but there were multiple additions. The Department of War, U.S. Congress and Trans-Jordanian Government all emerged as members of the Anglo-American coalition. The inclusion of the Department of War and the U.S. Congress demonstrates the breadth of the subsystem as these two institutions became involved in U.S. foreign policy. The Government of Trans-Jordanian was not a member of the Arab coalition but the Anglo-American coalition. This is not an outlier as members of the Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and Syrian Governments also belonged to the Anglo-American coalition, but the Trans-Jordanian Government does have a more neutral stance in comparison to other Arab states on the question of Palestine. For the Zionist coalition, statements only came from the Jewish Agency, which also had statements among the Anglo-American coalition.






Figure IV.3. Coalition Membership for Time Period 3.

Time Period 3 has a change in its relative composition of coalition members. The Zionist coalition no longer exists and all of the statements that may be attributed to it from organizations such as the Jewish Agency now are found in the Anglo-American coalition. This does not mean that the Zionist perspective was not represented, as there were three statements from the Jewish Agency. However, the perspective may have been under-represented due to the source of the data. The Arab coalition was relatively stable with the same members from the governments of Arab states, the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine, but no representation of any Arab public. In addition, there is the inclusion of the USSR for the first time. The Soviet Government made its first public statements about the question of Palestine at this time and was clearly in favor of the Arab position of creating an Arab state. Similar to the Arab coalition, there is little change in the composition of the Anglo-American coalition.



**Figure IV.4. Coalition Membership for Time Period 4.**

In Time Period 4, there remain only two coalitions. The Zionist coalition has not re-emerged but there is an increase in the number of statements from the Jewish Agency and more diversity as there are statements from the Zionist Organization of America and the World Zionist Congress all of which are identified as belonging to the Anglo-American coalition. So while it may be the case for Time Period 3 that the Zionist perspective was relatively under represented, for this time period there were more statements by members of these three Zionist organizations than from the entire Arab coalition. The Arab coalition went through some changes as Arab state governments used the Arab League and its delegates at the London Conference to present their message rather than making direct statements. The Saudi Arabian Government continued to be active working directly with the Department of State in an effort to resolve this issue. The USSR was again a part of the Arab coalition and this time there was a statement in support by the British Government. The core members of the Anglo-American coalition remain as the Department of State, Department of State NEA, White House, and British Government continue to support a neutral stance. However, this position is now co-inhabited by the representatives of Zionist organizations.



**Figure IV.5. Coalition Membership for Time Period 5.**

Time Period 5 had the greatest amount of change in relation to any other time period. There are four coalitions including the re-emergence of the Zionist coalition and the emergence of a new coalition identified as the Defense coalition. The Arab coalition had members from the governments of Arab states re-emerge and again the inclusion of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine. Moreover, there were also statements by the Department of State NEA and the USSR in support of the Arab position. Among the Anglo-American coalition, the core members are again represented but with some exceptions. Statements from the Department of State NEA, Department of State, White House, and British Government all are attributed to other coalitions as well. The majority of the statements by the USSR are now within the Anglo-American coalition. This defection was important as the Arabs perceived that the Soviets supported their cause but, with a change in policy, the USSR and its satellites supported the UN resolution for the

partition of Palestine no longer allowed the Arabs to play the superpowers off of each other. The Jewish Agency and the Zionist Organization of America still had a majority of their statements attributed to the Anglo-American coalition even after the re-emergence of the Zionist coalition. This is a clear demonstration of the differences between those who sought compromise and those who wanted a maximalist position among the broader Zionist movement. Among the Zionist coalition were members of the Jewish Agency and the Jewish public in Palestine. The newly emerging coalition is the Defense coalition. Its membership was comprised of members of the Anglo-American coalition along with the Arab coalition. It includes the government of Saudi Arabia, Department of State NEA, Department of State, White House, the British Government, and the Trans-Jordanian Government. Members of the coalition did not support the partition of Palestine because they believed it could not be implemented. This differed from the Anglo-American coalition that supported the resolution.

### **Conclusion**

The examination of the membership of the coalitions over time leads to the following findings. First, among the Arab coalition, there was the defection by the USSR. The USSR was a member of this coalition in Time Periods 3 and 4 but was a member of the Anglo-American coalition in Time Period 5. This change came about when the issue was being discussed in committee at the UN and the USSR decided to support the majority UNSCOP plan for partitioning Palestine into a Jewish and Arab states. The British Government was a member of the Anglo-American coalition for Time Periods 1-4 but by Time Period 5, a majority of members joined the new Defense coalition. This shift was a result of the British Government working to find a resolution to the issue that was

acceptable both to the Arabs and the Zionists in Time Periods 1-4, but by the time the issue was at the UN, the British did not want to enforce or execute any policy decided upon by the UN that did not have the support of both the Arabs and the Zionists.

Therefore, while the Anglo-American coalition supported the UNSCOP majority plan for partition, the Defense coalition, and in particular the British Government, rejected this based upon the argument that it could not be implemented peacefully.

Second, the research not only found defection between coalitions, but also found that they merged for a short time period. The Zionist coalition merged and became a part of the Anglo-American coalition that shifted the latter further away in distance based upon expressed beliefs from the Arab coalition. The reason for this merging was that in Time Period 3, the Anglo-American coalition had proposed to accept the Anglo-American Inquiry's findings along with those of the Harrison-Grady report. These reports had two basic findings, that Jewish immigration should be increased including the allowance of 100,000 Jewish DPs immediately into Palestine, and that Palestine should become a federal state where neither Jew nor Arab dominates the other in a single federation. While the Zionists rejected this last recommendation, they fully supported the first on immigration. This led the Zionists to work with members of the Anglo-American coalition in attempting to implement only this part of the policy with the belief that over time, increased immigration of Jews into Palestine could allow the Jews to become a majority population and put them in a better position for demanding their own state based upon democratic ideals. On the other hand, the Arab coalition rejected both issues of immigration and a federal state. They demanded that Jewish immigration be prevented and that Palestine gain independence as an Arab state. They were entrenched in their



belief patterns and did not seek a compromise with the Anglo-American coalition as the Zionists had done.

It was during Time Period 4 that the British Government convened the London Conference as one last attempt for a peaceful solution to the question of Palestine. While representatives of both the Arab and Zionist coalition attended, the Arab representatives would not compromise. They continued to demand that no Jewish state be permitted and that an Arab state should be recognized as soon as possible. This was in contrast to the Zionist coalition that worked with members of the Anglo-American coalition on issues of immigration, and in private discussions with the British Government accepted partition. Therefore, their beliefs more closely resembled those of the Anglo-American coalition that did not want either the Jews or the Arabs to dominate Palestine. It is clear that the Zionists cooperated and negotiated with the Anglo-American coalition to gain on the issues of immigration and on a Jewish State. In contrast, the Arab coalition remained steadfast and did not compromise on these issues.

When examining the membership of these coalitions several policy elites appear in every time period in each coalition. While actors from nested subsystems may participate at times, for example the Department of War or Defense, there are a core group of policy elites that are the most active on this issue. For the Arab coalition, this was the Saudi Arabian Government. In the Anglo-American coalition, the core members are the Department of State, Department of State NEA, White House, and the British Government. And in the Zionist coalition, the Jewish Agency was represented in every time period. There were many other members of these coalitions, but over time these organizations repeatedly represented these coalitions.

As the data did not aggregate all the statements from one organization into a single position but rather used the statement as the unit of analysis, this led to an interesting finding that members of the same organization may represent or at least share the beliefs of other coalitions. While this was never the case between the polarized coalitions of the Arabs and the Zionists, several members of these organizations were counted among the Anglo-American coalition. Also, at times members of the Anglo-American coalition were also found to represent or at least share the beliefs of the Arab and Zionist coalitions. When examining the Department of State NEA, two statements, one in Time Period 1 and another in Time Period 5, belonged to the Arab coalition. In addition, the Department of State had a statement in Time Period 5 that was aligned with the Arab coalition. While it is clear there was some cooperation on the issue between the Arab state governments and the Department of State, it was more likely for Arab state governments to share the beliefs of the Anglo-American coalition than for the Department of State, including the NEA, to share the beliefs of the Arab coalition. Also, when examining the statements made by the White House, one in Time Period 1 and another in Time Period 5, may represent or at least share the beliefs of the Zionist coalition. While it is clear that President Truman and the White House did make several public statements in support of the Zionist cause, when examining the data, the White House was relatively neutral and closer in its expressed beliefs to the Department of State than to the Zionists. This can be explained as several of the public statements made by the White House in support for the Zionists were made during Time Periods 3 and 4 when the Zionist and Anglo-American coalitions had merged. So, while the White House may have beliefs that were shared with Zionist groups, this was the case for all members

of the Anglo-American coalition including the Department of State and the British Government.

When examining the mean Manhattan distances between the coalitions as calculated by the Tabu search cluster analysis the two extreme coalitions of the Arabs and the Zionists were stable when comparing Time Periods 1 and 5. When comparing the changes in the distance between the Anglo-American coalition and the Arab and Zionist coalitions for Time Periods 1 and 5 these distances were also relatively stable. Therefore, when analyzing only a comparison between Time Periods 1 and 5, the hypothesis was upheld that the lineup of coalition members as allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so was confirmed. However as discussed in more detail above, when examining the changes during Time Periods 2-4 this is not the case. The distance between the Zionist and Anglo-American coalition was not stable as the two merged shifting the Anglo-American coalition closer to the former Zionist position and further away from the Arab coalition. Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected in this case because of the shifting between two and three coalitions.

In general, this research found that when coalitions engage in contention over policy core beliefs, those beliefs are polarized and will be stable over time. This stability between polarized coalitions may not be the case if there is a more centrist third coalition. Over time, this centrist coalition may become closer to one of the more extreme coalitions or may even come to share many of the same policy beliefs merging the two into a single coalition. The role of third party coalitions, in particular those that possess more centrist policy core beliefs on an issue, should be further studied. These findings may also provide evidence of the existence of “sub coalitions” as identified by Weible

and Sabatier (2005). According to Weible and Sabatier (2005), coalitions may form combining multiple sub coalitions, in this case the Zionists and the Anglo-American coalition, around some policy core beliefs in opposition to a common opponent, the Arab coalition, but may not necessarily share other policy core or secondary beliefs. This possibility of sub coalitions should be further researched.

This research suffers from multiple limitations stemming from the data. The FRUS archive was the sole source of the belief and coalition membership data and several policy elites including the Arab states may have been disproportionately represented in comparison to other policy elites such as the Jewish Agency. However, any other archive selected, such as Zionist organizational archives or British Government archives, would suffer from a similar bias. Also, this archive may not proportionately capture the policy elites but it does represent each of those that were active in the subsystem.

There were multiple benefits of using this data source. As the purpose of the study was to understand U.S. foreign policy, the Department of State is the agency responsible for such policy development. This places it in a privileged role for collecting information and connecting with all of the policy elites seeking to influence U.S. policy on the question of Palestine. Also, as a majority of these statements were classified memoranda and telegraphs the speakers could discuss their beliefs without public repercussions. Therefore, such statements may not have as much public influence and may better represent the true beliefs of the speaker in comparison to those in the public record at the time. The study also has limitations that only three years of data was used. No data were collected prior to 1945 or after the UN General Assembly resolution was passed.

However, the focus on the period from 1945-47 does capture the relative short-term developments that occurred in the policy process.

In the final analysis, this research is not a complete answer to what happened between the coalitions or why the Zionists were victorious in gaining support for the creation of a Jewish State. What it does provide is the identity of the policy elites engaged in this policy subsystem, their expressed beliefs, the membership of the coalitions operating in the policy subsystem, and their relative structure over time.

## CHAPTER V. POLICY ELITE ATTENTION TO EXTERNAL EVENTS: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, 1945-1947

### Introduction

Public policy making is a dynamic process that at times experiences shocks or external events that influence the attention of policy elites. Such events may be the impetus for major policy change. However, major policy change is a relatively rare occurrence in comparison to more incremental policy changes. One reason why policy change that is not incremental is unlikely is because public policy tends to be rooted within subsystems that maintain a state of policy equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). These subsystems are populated by policy elites who possess a specialized knowledge and are active in influencing policy around certain issues (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). To bring about a major policy change, events external to the subsystem need to occur in order to bring attention to new issues or solutions among policy elites. These events have been identified by a wide spectrum of policy scholars as a condition for non-incremental policy changes (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Ostrom, 2005).

While many policy scholars argue that external events are connected to major policy change, others have found that that policy change may not occur or may bring about only minor changes in public policy (Carvalho, 2001; Burnett and Davis, 2002). This has led some, such as Birkland (1998) and Nohrstedt (2008), to argue that connections between external events and policy change are much more complicated than a simple causal-response relationship. Three basic reasons why external events have various outcomes on public policy are that (i) events vary in type (Sabatier and Jenkins-

Smith, 1993), (ii) vary over time (Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010) and (iii) policy elite attention to events varies (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). These differences in external events and their subsequent effects upon public policy need to be further studied (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Legro, 2000; Nohrstedt, 2005; Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010).

Past studies of the relationship between external events and policy change have tended to focus upon one external event, such as 9/11 (May et al., 2009), or multiple similar external events, such as the nuclear power plant disasters at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island (Nohrstedt, 2010). However, what happens when multiple overlapping external events are occurring at relatively the same time? Is policy elite attention to each of these events equal? Or, is there a type of external event that policy elites pay more attention to?

One approach to the study of external events that connects them to major policy change and differentiates between event types is the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The most studied hypothesis within the framework is that such external events are a necessary condition for major policy change (Weible et al., 2009). The framework divides these external events into relatively stable parameters and external system events. The basic difference between these two categories is that the former are less likely to experience change over time while the latter are more dynamic (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Past studies have tended to ignore the relatively stable parameters as an impetus for policy change and have focused upon the external system events (Mawhinney, 1993; Kubler, 2001; Nohrstedt, 2005, 2008). However, there are a few notable exceptions of studies that have found relatively stable parameters as being important for understanding changes in subsystems

(Andersson, 1999; Chen, 2000). This study brings both relatively stable parameters and external system events into comparison on the same policy issue when analyzing policy elite attention.

### **Advocacy Coalition Framework**

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) serves as the primary guide for this analysis (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). The framework focuses on competition among coalitions of policy elites seeking to influence public affairs. These coalitions compete within a policy subsystem that may be affected by external events such as elections and changes in public opinion. Such events may enhance or constrain the resources and/or beliefs of these coalitions and may provide the opportunity for major policy change (Sabatier and Weible 2007). There are two main components of the ACF that will be identified and defined for this study (i) the policy subsystem, (ii) and the relatively stable parameters as well as the external system events.

A policy subsystem includes a variety of public and private organizations that are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue, and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). A policy subsystem may not be bound to a single geographic unit as studies applying the ACF to international treaties, trade agreements, crises, and health issues have found that policy subsystems can have an international dimension (Pierce, 2011; Farquharson, 2003; Richardson, 1996). Therefore, the emphasis when identifying a policy subsystem should be placed upon the policy problem or issue and those who seek to influence policy (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). The issue defining the policy subsystem in the current analysis will be the question of the political body sovereign over the geographic region known as Palestine



and the creation of the Jewish state from 1945 to 1947. The actors studied will be policy elites and organizations attempting to influence U.S. policy on the question of Palestine.

The second component of the framework is the relatively stable parameters and the external system events. The basic difference between the two categories is stability over time. External system events are more dynamic and may change at a high frequency or cyclically, perhaps by decade. In contrast, relatively stable parameters are less likely to change and, arguably, more difficult to change (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Therefore, there are two defining components for identifying relatively stable parameters compared to external system events: (i) durability of the events and (ii) the process of the event occurring over a decade or more.

Sabatier (1998) provides a list of relatively stable parameters as well as external system event types. The relatively stable parameters are (i) basic attributes of the problem area, (ii) basic distribution of natural resources, (iii) fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure, and (iv) basic constitutional structure. The external system events are (i) changes in socio-economic conditions, (ii) changes in public opinion, (iii) changes in systemic governing coalition, (iv) policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. Based upon an examination of the secondary literature on this issue three relatively stable parameters have been identified and six external system events. A further discussion of these nine events and why were they identified can be found in the methods section of this chapter.

These nine different types of events are hypothesized by the ACF to be necessary for significant policy change. “[P]erturbations provide an opportunity for major policy change, but such change will not occur unless that opportunity is skillfully exploited by

proponents of change” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 148). This condition of necessity but not sufficiency for change explain why external events are sometimes (Dudley and Richardson, 1999; Kubler, 2001), but not always, followed by major policy changes in policy (Carvalho, 2001; Burnett and Davis, 2002). Existing studies have examined the role of the coalitions in manipulating and exploiting such external events to bring about policy change (e.g., Albright, 2011). Not studied are the diverse patterns of policy elite attention toward different events over time. Only once we can identify which type of events policy elites pay the most attention to, relatively stable parameters or external system events, can we then examine which ones are being exploited to bring about policy change.

Based upon the distinction between the two types of external events to the policy subsystem it is hypothesized that:

***Hypothesis II.*** When changes are occurring at both levels of relatively stable parameters and external system events, policy elites will pay the same amount of attention to both sets of events.

### **Case Study**

This research analyzes the development of U.S. Government foreign policy in relation to the question of sovereignty over Palestine. The issue of the question of Palestine was the determination of whether the Jews or the Arabs of Palestine should have sovereignty over or within part of Palestine. Palestine was a mandate territory under the British Empire from 1922-1948. During that time period, the British Government attempted to balance both Jewish and Arab attempts to gain sovereignty over the territory. The U.S. Government became involved in the issue from the beginning in 1922.

Since then, coalitions seeking to influence U.S. policymaking on the question of Palestine formed representing the Zionist<sup>12</sup> belief that Palestine should be a Jewish state, and the Arab belief that Palestine should be an Arab state (Pierce, 2011). This research will focus on the time period between January 1, 1945 and November 29, 1947. It will be divided into five distinct and unequal time periods because over time the policy debate shifted due to new policy proposals and studies conducted by various governmental entities on this issue. In addition, the effects of external events may vary over time (Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010). Therefore, to control for this variation analysis will be conducted on both the entire time period as a whole and it divided into the five different time periods described below.

***Time Period 1 from January 1 – August 31, 1945.*** At the beginning of 1945 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been re-elected, the war in Europe was coming to an end, and other global issues were gaining attention among policy elites. During President Roosevelt's Administration the U.S. Government established a relative hands-off policy towards Palestine allowing the British Government to administer it with little interference. President Roosevelt would make supportive statements to both Jewish and Arab arguments for sovereignty and established a policy of dual consultation. This policy stated that no major changes to U.S. policy would be made without consulting both parties. The Department of State and more specifically the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) had responsibility for making policy on Palestine.

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<sup>12</sup> Zionism is the belief that the Jews need to establish their own state in order to combat against anti-Semitism. One may be a Zionist and not necessarily Jewish, and one may be Jewish and not a Zionist. It is a belief about the normative answer to the question concerning the relationship between Jews and people of other faiths.

In April 1945, President Roosevelt unexpectedly died and then, Vice-President Harry S. Truman succeeded him. Due to wartime events, Palestine was not an issue high on the new President's agenda. Therefore, at the time President Truman decided to maintain the policy of dual consultation with Arab and Zionist representatives and continued the practice of NEA autonomy to administer policy towards Palestine.

During the summer of 1945, the war in Europe came to an end and the magnitude of the Holocaust in Europe became clear to the American public. The Holocaust left hundreds of thousands of displaced persons (DPs), many of them Jews, living in former concentration camps across Europe. At this time, President Truman began meeting with Zionist coalition leaders who attempted to persuade him to connect the issues of the Jewish DPs in Europe to British limits on Jewish immigration into Palestine. President Truman ordered Earl Harrison, a government expert on immigration and refugees, to report on what should be done to accommodate the Jewish DPs in American controlled zones in Europe. Harrison filed his report with the White House in August 1945. He concluded that 100,000 Jews should immediately be allowed to immigrate into Palestine.

***Time Period 2 from August 31, 1945 – April 25, 1946.*** Upon receiving the Harrison Report, President Truman wrote directly to newly elected British Prime Minister (PM) Clement Attlee asking him to allow the prescribed 100,000 Jewish DPs to enter Palestine. President Truman did not consult the Department of State or the NEA and thus began two lines of policymaking from the United States Government; one from the Department of State anchored by the NEA and the second from the White House. The British Government was in a difficult position facing this demand from the U.S. President as Great Britain needed U.S. financial support to fund post-war reconstruction as well as

diplomatic and military support to confront the growing threat of invasion by the Soviet Union in Europe. British diplomats were also attempting to save a dying empire that included Palestine and most of the Muslim world. To this end, the British Colonial and Foreign Ministries argued for the continuation of the 1939 White Paper to pacify the Arabs, as well as Muslims throughout the empire. The 1939 White Paper had established strict limitations of 1,500 Jewish immigrants a month into Palestine and established the eventual creation of an independent state with an Arab majority over Palestine.

In a compromise, the British Government invited the U.S. Government to form a joint Anglo-American Inquiry to investigate the future of Palestine as well as how to respond to the Jewish DP issue in Europe. There was debate between the parties about what should be the scope of the inquiry and the inclusion of Jewish DPs in Europe and the question of Palestine connected these two issues within the policy debate. On April 25, 1946 the Inquiry published its report.

***Time Period 3 from April 30 – July 30, 1946.*** During this time period the Anglo-American Inquiry report was debated between the U.S. and British Governments. The report recommended that 100,000 Jewish DPs be allowed to immigrate into Palestine, but did not recommend the partitioning of Palestine or the creation of a Jewish state. Instead it prescribed the creation of a single federal state where neither Jew nor Arab should dominate Palestine.

In order to analyze how these recommendations should be implemented, a new committee was formed including both British and American officials known as the Morrison-Grady Committee. The Morrison-Grady Committee report was released in the summer of 1946. It recommended that 100,000 Jewish immigrants be allowed into

Palestine, and that a single federation be created sharing power between Jews and Arabs. Both the Arabs and the Zionists rejected this plan, and the American and British governments soon did too. Also during the summer of 1946, violence worsened in Palestine between the three parties, highlighted by the Zionist Revisionist group, the Irgun, bombing the King David Hotel in Jerusalem killing more than ninety people.

***Time Period 4 from July 31, 1946 – April 2, 1947.*** In one last effort to bring both the Zionists and the Arabs together on the question of Palestine the British Government convened a conference in London. The U.S. Government, after the failure of the Anglo-American Inquiry, decided to only serve as an observer and would not play an active role. However, this did not stop President Truman from making public statements about the issue.

On the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippor, October 4, 1946, a month before fall mid-term elections in the U.S., President Truman made a speech in support of the creation of a Jewish state. The statement contradicted President Roosevelt's policy of dual consultation and NEA autonomy. President Truman did not notify the British Government, the Departments of State or Defense of his comments prior to the speech. NEA Director Loy Henderson, Secretary of State George Marshall, and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal all opposed the declaration and President Truman's surprise announcement. The British Government was outraged and viewed it as an attempt to undermine the London conference. The leaders of the Arab states reacted by making hostile statements and threats about the future of relations with America if a Jewish state was created.

By the beginning of 1947 the London Conference was a failure. The Zionists and Arabs would not meet with each other. The British representatives were forced to negotiate with each party separately, and could not get either party to compromise on the issue of sovereignty. In April 1947, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin announced that the issue of Palestine was no longer Great Britain's responsibility and it would be formally recommended to the newly created United Nations (UN) for a final resolution.

***Time Period 5 from April 3 – November 29, 1947.*** In May 1947, the UN formed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to investigate policy alternatives. UNSCOP spent several weeks conducting interviews and hearings on the issue in multiple locations including Palestine. However, Arab representatives in Palestine did not view the UN's involvement as legitimate and did not cooperate with the investigation. During the five weeks of testimony in Palestine heard by UNSCOP not a single Arab gave a statement. During the hearings, a ship carrying Holocaust survivors from Germany, the *Exodus*, attempted to break the British blockade initiated to stop illegal immigration into Palestine. The British used force to turn the ship back to Germany. This created a sensationalized story about British restrictions on Jewish immigration and brought increased public attention to the issues of Palestine and the Jewish DPs in Europe.

In September, UNSCOP submitted its majority report, which prescribed the partitioning of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states along with the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Jewish state would be granted full autonomy over immigration into its territory. The U.S. Government did not immediately publicly support the partition plan. The Arabs rejected the partition plan and sought to influence the U.S., Great Britain, and

the Soviet Union to vote against the plan in the UN General Assembly. The Zionists, while not supporting all parts of the plan, viewed it as a start to a Jewish state and lobbied UN General Assembly members to vote in favor of it.

On November 29, the partition plan was passed by the UN General Assembly with the support of the U.S. and Soviet Governments among others. Representatives of the Arab states walked out in protest, while the Zionists celebrated a victory. By the next day full scale civil war broke out in Palestine. A Jewish or Arab state was not declared, but it was clear that U.S. Government policy was now in support for the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. This represented a major change in U.S. policy from the beginning in 1945 when it sought to accommodate both Arab and Zionist aspirations through dual consultation and minimal involvement in the issue.

### **Research Design and Data**

The source of data for this research is the Department of State archives known as the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS). Multiple past studies of this policy have used this archive (Ganin, 1979; Ovendale, 1989; Cohen, 1990; Benson, 1997; and Radosh and Radosh, 2009). The FRUS is the official archive of documents pertaining to U.S. Government foreign policy. They include, “all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State’s responsibilities, together with the appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies” (FRUS 1948; Preface, III-IV). These archives include memorandum, telegraphs, conversations, reports, public statements, and diary entries by various individuals and organizations. The majority of these documents were intended for private consumption being classified as Secret or Top



Secret. The Director of the Historical Office of the Department of State has compiled and edited these documents by geographic region. In this case, the documents are identified as “Palestine 1945”, “Palestine 1946”, and “Palestine 1947”. These years were selected to represent the period of time including the end of World War II and the beginning of the Truman presidential administration in 1945, to the decision to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states by the United Nations on November 29, 1947.

The focus of the FRUS is upon the “Department of State’s responsibilities”. Therefore, the majority of documents include the Department of State as either the speaker and/or audience of each statement. The data also include statements from foreign governments, international organizations such as the United Nations, the White House, other agencies and branches of the U.S. Government, Zionist organizations such as the Jewish Agency, and Palestinian Arab organizations such as the Arab Higher Committee.

To analyze these documents, first each document was identified as a single statement for the unit of analysis. An individual statement is a predetermined unit of analysis as designated by the FRUS. It includes a title, date and time, a speaker and location. These statements vary in length from a single page to over 15 pages in length. The mean was 2.5 pages long. For the time period identified from January 1, 1945 – November 29, 1947 there were 505 individual statements identified. This was the population of the study. In order to prevent against a Type 1 error those statements that had equal to or less than two belief components were removed. After these statements were removed there were 388 statements remaining that were analyzed for this chapter. Per time period they ranged from 55 statements in Time Period 1 to 110 statements in Time Period 5 with a mean of about 78 statements per time period.

These statements were then analyzed to identify if certain events were referenced by policy elites. (Elaborate a bit) The analysis includes various qualitative methods including content analysis, key words in context, and word count. The use of such methods for analyzing the ACF is prescribed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and applied by various authors including Nohrstedt (2008, 2010).

Content analysis is a systematic method for analyzing texts in a standardized manner that allows researchers to make inferences (Krippendorff 1980, 2004). The identification of the codes is based upon theoretical relevance to the ACF, past studies identifying various events arguably associated with policy change, and their validity based upon the data. Based upon these conditions nine codes were identified. They are: (i) the Holocaust, (ii) Displaced Persons, (iii) U.S. Elections, (iv) U.S. Public Opinion, (v) Oil, (vi) the Cold War against the Soviet Union, (vii) Jewish Immigration into Palestine, (viii) the conflict between Jews and the Arabs of Palestine, and (ix) the conflict between Jews and other Arab states. These codes can be found in Table V.1 below. The first six codes have all been identified as external system events while the last three are relatively stable parameters. The basis for this distinction is the difference in (i) durability of the events and (ii) the process of the event occurring over a decade or more.

**Table V.1. External Events Coding Rubric.**

Code	ACF event type	ACF theoretical stability	Secondary literature
Holocaust	Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems	External System Events	Radosh and Radosh (2009)
Displaced Persons	Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems	External System Events	Benson (2008)
Oil	Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems	External System Events	Grose (1983)
Soviet Union	Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems	External System Events	Ottolenghi (2004)
Election	Changes in systemic governing coalition	External System Events	Snetsinger (1974)
Public Opinion	Changes in Public Opinion	External System Events	Wilson (1979)
Immigration	Basic attributes of the problem area	Relatively Stable Parameters	Segev (2001)
Jewish/Arabs of Palestine conflict	Basic attributes of the problem area	Relatively Stable Parameters	Morris (2008)
Jewish/Arabs of other states conflict	Basic attributes of the problem area	Relatively Stable Parameters	Morris (2008)

The first code is the “Holocaust” identified by Radosh and Radosh (2009) who argued that it affected U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine. Holocaust represents statements referring to the events carried out by the Nazis to systematically exterminate all of the Jews. It is identified as a policy decision from another subsystem in this case, Nazis persecution of minorities in Europe. It is an external system event because it was not durable as the policy decision was made by Nazi Germany and ended with its defeat in the spring of 1945. Nazi ideology had a long history of anti-Semitism, but the carrying out of the extermination of the Jews was an evolving policy that came about once the war

began (Segev, 2000). While its affects are still felt today, the actual policy was put in place in 1939 (resettlement) with extermination beginning in 1941 and ending in 1945; meaning that the policy was in place for less than a decade. An example of a statement that would be recorded as referring to the Holocaust is, “Palestine alone cannot provide the emigration needs of all Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution” (FRUS, 1946; 653).

The second code of the “Displaced Persons” identified by Benson (2008) represents statements referring to the Jewish refugees caused by the attempted extermination of the Jews by the Nazis. It is identified as a policy decision from another subsystem in this case the aftermath of Nazis persecution of Jews in Europe. It has been identified as an external system event because it was not durable or lasting over a decade or more as it was a relatively short-term problem that hundreds of thousands faced after the end of World War II that was settled by 1950 (Segev, 2000). An example of a statement that would be recorded as referring to the Displaced Persons is, “We felt, however, that the matter of the transfer of the displaced Jews was so urgent that it could not await the outcome of negotiations” (FRUS, 1946: 708).

The third code is “Oil” as identified by Grose (1983) as an event that affected U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine. “Oil” represents statements referring to U.S. government and business interests in relation to the natural resource possessed by Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. It is identified as a policy decision from another subsystem because it focuses on relations either with other Arab states about energy or economic issues rather than those directly concerning the question of Palestine. It has been identified as an external system event. During the time period from 1945-47 the policy

making around oil in the Middle East was relatively dynamic (Anderson, 1981). The large oil reserve discoveries in Saudi Arabia began in the late 1930s but the large-scale development of the natural resource by the Arabian American Oil Company did not occur until 1950 (Anderson, 1981). An example of a statement that would be recorded as referring to oil is, a “very serious consideration from a military point of view is control of the oil of the Middle East” (FRUS, 1946: 632-33).

The fourth code is the “Soviet Union” as identified by Ottolenghi (2004). It represents statements referring to the growing tension and eventual development of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. Statements tended to refer to warnings of growing Soviet or communist influence or penetration into Palestine. It is identified as a policy decision from another subsystem because it relates to broader global defense and foreign relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It has been identified as an external system event. While the Cold War with the Soviet Union lasted well into the 1980s, during the period of 1945-47 U.S. policy making in relation to the Soviet Union was dynamic and did not grow into the Cold War until after the end of World War II (Gaddis, 2005). An example of a statement that would be recorded as referring to the Soviet Union is, “That Britain again should let Arabs down was not surprising per se although surprisingly shortsighted in sigh Soviet pressures in Middle East” (FRUS, 1946: 599).

The fifth code is “Election”. It refers to elections in the U.S. with particular attention to the 1948 U.S. general election identified by Snetsinger (1974) among others as the basis for U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine. “Election” does not include events related to elections in other countries. It is identified as changes in the systemic

governing coalition because it refers to the electoral political attempt to change the governing coalition in America. It has been identified as an external system event. Elections are dynamic and occur frequently as mid-term and local elections were held in the U.S. in November 1946 and a general election was scheduled for November 1948. An example of a statement that would be recorded as referring to the election is, “Hitherto, American statements on Zionism had been explained away as having been made with an eye to elections” (FRUS, 1946: 594).

The sixth code is “Public Opinion”. It is identified by Wilson (1979) and represents American public opinion. This does not refer to public opinion in other countries such as Arab public opinion, but it does include American Jewish public opinion and world or global public opinion, as Americans are not excluded from either of these groups. It has been identified as an external system event because it is public opinion. While Jewish public opinion on the question of Palestine was arguably not dynamic and long-lasting, American and more broadly global public opinion was. In a poll conducted in 1945 in the U.S. 42% of respondents supported the creation of a Jewish state but 41% did not have an opinion or know about the issue (Gilboa, 1987). By October 1947 the situation had changed with 65% of respondents in the U.S. supporting the establishment of a Jewish state and only 25% not knowing about the issue (Gilboa, 1987). Public opinion about the question of Palestine was dynamic during this period. An example of a statement that would be recorded as referring to public opinion is, “Jewish public opinion in the United States, and the Zionist movement all over the world, would have to regard such a step as a reversal of the policy of the United States Government” (FRUS, 1946: 668).

The seventh code “Immigration” refers to Jewish immigration into Palestine as identified by Segev (2001) among many others as influencing U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine. “Immigration” represents statements referring to the actual or proposed immigration of Jews into Palestine. It is identified as a relatively stable parameter and is a basic attribute of the problem area because U.S. foreign policy took into consideration resource allocation, land use, relations with Arabs, and sovereignty based upon democratic ideals of majority rule when formulating policy towards Palestine. All of these issues were dependent upon how many Jews immigrated into Palestine. Jewish immigration into Palestine was dynamic and fought over since the creation of the British Mandate for Palestine in 1922. Palestine was populated at an average ratio of approximately three Arabs for every Jew from 1945 to 1948 with a total population of nearly two million. The British attempted to limit Jewish immigration into Palestine because of Arabs feared that they were taking their jobs and land. The Arabs had boycotted, rioted, and revolted against the British during the 1920s and 1930s in order to make the British establish regulations on Jewish immigration. In addition, the Jewish Agency the de facto Jewish government in Palestine openly advocated that Jews should immigrate to Palestine so that one day Jews would become the majority and declare a democracy giving them the authority in Palestine (Segev, 2001). The issue of Jewish immigration quotas was widely debated throughout the 1930s and 1940s in particular after the passing of the 1939 White Paper (Smith, 2001). While the rate of Jewish immigration did fluctuate prior to the quota system and illegal immigration continued after 1939, the policy positions in support of unlimited immigration by the Zionists and the prevention of immigration by the Arabs were relatively stable since 1922 (Pierce,

2011). An example of a statement that would be recorded as referring to immigration is, “Arab delegates asked British to stop all Jewish immigration in interim period between now and UN decision” (FRUS, 1947: 1047).

The eighth code of conflict between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine is identified by Morris (2008) as influencing U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine. “Jewish/Arabs of Palestine conflict” represents statements referring to the attacks, killings, murders, casualties, battles, and terrorism carried out by either the Jews or the Arabs of Palestine against each other. It is identified as a basic attribute of the problem area as the two parties violently fought each other over resources, political power, and survival. While the relative veracity of the conflict was dynamic the basic positions and violence between the two parties was relatively stable. The civil war between the two sides dated back to the first influx of Zionist immigration into Palestine in the 1900s and 1910s and continued throughout the British Mandate (Smith, 2001). An example of a statement that would be recorded as referring to the civil war is, “Jewish terrorism is as rampant as ever” (FRUS, 1947: 1116).

The ninth is the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs of other states identified by Morris (2008) among others affected U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine. “Jewish/Arabs of other states conflict” represents statements referring to the threats and actual conflict between the Jews living in Palestine and Arab forces from outside of Palestine. It is identified as a basic attribute of the problem area as the Arabs of other states such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq sought to prevent the creation of a Jewish state. This policy sought to change the resources, political power, and continuation of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine. While the actual war between Israel and the Arab states did not



begin until May 15, 1948, threats of the pending conflict along with statements of peace were discussed throughout the policy debate. The Arab position outside of Palestine towards the creation of a Jewish state was relatively stable dating back to the policies of the Ottoman Turks before World War I. While there was some discussion of compromise between the parties, publicly the Arab states held long-standing animosity towards the Zionist settlement in Palestine (Smith, 2001). An example of a statement that would be recorded as referring to the war between Jews and Arabs is, “The King [Ibn Saud] said that it was possible that in the first phases of the Jewish-Arab conflict the Arabs might meet with initial reverses” (FRUS, 1947: 1296).

Each of these nine codes represents different external events to the identified subsystem of U.S. foreign policy in recognizing a sovereign body in or over Palestine. As described above the Holocaust, Displaced Persons, Oil, the Soviet Union, Election, and Public Opinion have all been identified as external system events because they were relatively dynamic and developed over less than a decade or more at the time of the study from 1945-47. In comparison, the codes of Immigration, Palestinian-Jewish Conflict, and Arab-Jewish Conflict were relatively less dynamic and dated back to more than a decade beginning at least with the British Mandate for Palestine in 1922.

Every individual statement was read and content analysis was conducted to identify if a statement contained a particular code. Each identified code was then analyzed using key words in context (KWIC). KWIC is a form of analysis that examines how people use words in a context by comparing those words that appear before and after identified key words (Fielding and Lee, 1998). This analysis is conducted to determine if the code is relevant and should be included. For example, whether or not public opinion


referred to public opinion in the United States compared to public opinion in Arab states. If the code was both present and appeared in the relevant context, a value of “1” was recorded. In contrast, if the code was not present or if it did not appear in the context established a value of “0” was recorded. As the unit of analysis is each statement and not each code the frequency of the codes per statement is not recorded. A statement may possess all, none, or a range of the codes nine codes.

Once all nine codes in the 388 statements have been identified a word count or code count was conducted. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), word counts should be applied for identifying patterns, verifying hypothesis, and maintaining analytic integrity. The codes were then summed for each time period in order to identify patterns of increased or decreased frequency per time period. An outside observer using a randomized sample of 49 statements analyzed the documents and text by hand had and over an 80% agreement on all nine codes. According to Lombard (2002), inter-coder reliability may be achieved when using a random sample of at least 10% of the population with a level of agreement of at least 80%.

### **Analysis**

#### **Attention to External Events vs. Relatively Stable Parameters**

Figure V.1 demonstrates policy elite attention to all of the codes in the whole population divided into (i) relatively stable parameters and (ii) external system events. The codes varied greatly in their frequency of policy elite attention. Examining all of the codes together over the entire time periods in the case study, the range is from 59.02% for Immigration to 2.06% for Election.



**Figure V.1. Policy Elite Attention by Percentage to All External Events.**

Figure V.1 demonstrates that except for the external system event of Displaced Persons (33.76%), all three relatively stable parameters: Palestinian-Jewish Conflict (29.12%), Arab-Jewish Conflict (33.76%), and Immigration (59.02%) have a greater frequency of policy elite attention than do the external system events.

This finding means that the null hypothesis of, “when changes are occurring at both levels of relatively stable parameters and external system events, policy elites will pay the same amount of attention to both sets of events” can be rejected. Overall, policy elite attention was relatively higher for relatively stable parameters rather than for external system events.

Relatively stable parameters may have greater attention from policy elites because they were less dynamic. The problems of immigration and the conflict between the Jews

and the Arabs of Palestine as well as other Arab states were continuous throughout the study. The intensity and tactics of the parties changed, in particular the use of terrorist attacks and illegal immigration by the Zionists, but the nature of the conflict was relatively stable. On the other hand, the issues such as elections and public opinion were relatively more dynamic.

The relatively stable parameters had also been around for decades and the policy elites involved had time to develop opinions and proposed solutions for these issues. In contrast, the relative extent of the Holocaust and Displaced Persons did not become apparent until the beginning of the case study in 1945. This meant that policy elites may have been still developing opinions and viewpoints about these problems. Also, Oil and the Soviet Union acted more as threats to the future of this and other subsystems, rather than direct problems or solutions. Policy elites were forecasting when considering the connections between U.S. foreign policy on Palestine and these two codes. Overall, greater policy elite attention to relatively stable parameters compared to external system events may be due to the logic of the ACF that policy elites by definition are those who are active and have knowledge about the issue. The longer an issue has been studied, such as immigration, the more knowledge and attention over time policy elites will have paid to such an issue compared to those that are more dynamic.

### **Interconnections between External Events and Relatively Stable Parameters**

It is clear from the analysis above that relatively stable parameters may gain greater policy elite attention than external system events, but are the two connected? Is there a correlation among these different categories of events? Is there a correlation

across the categories? To answer these research questions a descriptive statistics and a bivariate correlation were conducted and can be found in Table V.2 below.

**Table V.2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations for Policy Elite Attention to All Event Variables (N = 388).**

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Holocaust	0.13	0.34	1	.490**	-0	.109*	-0.05	-0.056	.258**	0.067	.109*
2. Jewish DPs	0.34	0.47		1	0.088	.182**	-0.02	-.144**	.473**	0.055	0.034
3. Election	0.02	0.14			1	.122**	0.058	-0.002	.121*	0.011	-0.013
4. Public Opinion	0.11	0.31				1	0.045	0.06	.177**	0.06	.117*
5. Oil	0.04	0.21					1	.331**	0.076	.167**	.140**
6. USSR	0.13	0.34						1	-0.024	.165**	.177**
7. Immigration	0.59	0.49							1	.141**	.130*
8. Arab-Jewish Conflict	0.34	0.47								1	.298**
9. Palestinian-Jewish Conflict	0.29	0.46									1

\* p < .05; \*\* p < .001.

The results from Table V.2 indicate that the relatively stable parameters of Immigration, Arab-Jewish Conflict and Palestinian-Jewish Conflict are positively and significantly correlated with each other. Similarly, many of the external system events are correlated with each other. For example, Holocaust, Displaced Persons, and Public Opinion each are significantly positively correlated. Another positive correlation among external system events exists between the Soviet Union and Oil. The issues of the growing concerns of Soviet Union influence in Palestine along with those over access to oil were prominent among many in the Departments of State and Defense.


Overall, while there are many positive correlations among external system events such events there are also positively significantly correlated to relatively stable parameters. Immigration is positively significantly correlated to all other events besides

Oil and the Soviet Union. The connection between Immigration, the Holocaust, and Displaced Persons was frequent within policy elite discussions.

### Longitudinal Attention to External Events and Relatively Stable Parameters

In the final analysis, while the word count descriptive statistics may demonstrate that relatively stable parameters may have greater attention by policy elites than external system events, there is a clear connection between the two categories.

The elite attention to these two types of external events was not stable over time. In fact, there were multiple dramatic changes in the frequency of policy elite attention as the policy debate progressed from Time Period 1 to Time Period 5.




**Figure V.2. Policy Elite Attention to External System Events Over All Time Periods.**

Figure V.2 shows policy elite attention to external system events over time. While Displaced Persons were at 9.09% in Time Period 1, it increased to 48.84% in Time Period 2 where it remained relatively stable until Time Period 5 when it fell back to 16.36%. This bell shaped curve demonstrates the change in policy elite attention to the issue of Displaced Persons.

Two connected events that one would expect to increase as elections occurred in Time Period 3 and were expected to occur within one year of Time Period 5 would be Elections and Public Opinion. However, Elections never rose above 5% in any time period and Public Opinion peaked during Time Period 4 at 24.68% and began to decrease by Time Period 5 to 10.90%. This seemingly would contradict the arguments of Snetsinger (1974) that elections and public opinion were the most critical basis for the policy change by the U.S. Government.

The Soviet Union reached its highest total in Time Period 5 at 26.36% when the venue changed to the UN. In fact, in Time Period 5 this was the only external system event to have a dramatic increase in frequency. This may need further research into the role that changing of venues has upon elite attention.



**Figure V.3. Policy Elite Attention to Relatively Stable Parameters Over All Time Periods.**

While the relatively stable parameters of immigration, Palestinian/Jewish Conflict, and Arab/Jewish Conflict were consistent issues the policy elite attention to

these issues varied over time. Attention to Immigration in particular changed from 50.90% in Time Period 1 to rise to 69.77% in Time Period 2 and 76.57% in Time Period 3 when it was being discussed by the Anglo-American Inquiry and the Morrison-Grady Commission. During these two committee reports Immigration was viewed as a central and interconnected concept with the overall question of Palestine. By Time Period 4 at 6.88% and Time Period 5 at 38.18% Immigration had clearly declined in policy elite attention. One explanation is that during these time periods the U.S. became less involved in the issue and the policy debate shifted to a greater focus upon sovereignty. Policy elite attention to the Palestinian/Jewish and Arab/Jewish Conflict also varied but not as dramatically. While attention to the Arab/Jewish Conflict slightly decreased over time from 49.09% in Time Period 1 to 28.18% in Time Period 5, attention to the Palestinian/Jewish Conflict slightly increased from 29.09% in Time Period 1 to 32.72% in Time Period 5 to relatively equal the former. One explanation for this is the increased terrorism and violence in Palestine by Zionists and Arabs during Time Periods 4 and 5 brought increased attention to the civil dispute along with the impending international conflict.

One conclusion from Figures V.2 and V.3 is that while relatively stable parameters are less dynamic than external system events, policy elite attention may be just as dynamic. This finding does not contradict those from Figure V.1, but places such findings in a broader context. Future research that may find that policy elite attention to relatively stable parameters is less than external system events may be more a function of the Time Period selected rather than an overall trend in policy elite attention. It also demonstrates that even relatively stable parameters are contextual and not static.



## Conclusion

This research finds that policy elite attention varies depending on the category of external events and that policy elite attention was greater for relatively stable parameters rather than external system events. As a result, the hypothesis is not supported that when changes are occurring at both levels of relatively stable parameters and external system events, policy elites will pay the same amount of attention to both sets of events.

However, this finding should be tempered by the findings based upon Figures V.2 and V.3. First, the divisions between relatively stable parameters and external system events are interconnected as the correlations demonstrate. This may mean that external system events are a result of, or dependent upon, certain types of relatively stable parameters. In addition, Figures V.2 and V.3 demonstrate that policy elite attention to events greatly varies over time. Even within the category of relatively stable parameters, policy elite attention may dramatically change.

Interpretation of these results should be made with the following caveats. The primary data source came from the FRUS archives. Note represented as well are statements from Zionist organizations or U.S. Congress. However, the use of a single archive is an inherent limitation in conducting historical research. In addition, the codes are not mutually exclusive. Arguably, such issues as the Displaced Persons and Immigration are similar, but this similarity comes from the connections made by policy elites rather than those inherent within the coding schema. However, the question of Palestine does involve substantial goal conflict involving various actors over a decade or more and may make its findings applicable to other ACF studies.

This study is important for future research because it compares policy elite attention to both relatively stable parameters and external system events. Greater policy elite attention does not necessarily mean that such an event is the cause or can explain greater variation in the case of a policy change. But, greater policy elite attention does provide a basis for which types of events policy elites are debating and which ones they view as the most important during a policy debate. Therefore, future research testing hypotheses about connecting external events to policy change should pay close attention to changes in relatively stable parameters. This research also suggests that these two types of events may not be independent and there may be strong connections or even interdependence between a change in relatively stable parameters and changes in external system events.

Research connecting external events to policy change needs to continue. A better understanding of the causal mechanisms between these events and the subsequent changes remains. This research adds to our knowledge by emphasizing that both relatively stable parameters and external system events may be important for explaining such changes in public policy.

## CHAPTER VI. COALITION ATTENTION TO CRISES AND POLICY CHANGE

### Introduction

Large-scale policy change is often preceded by crises that demonstrate the limitations of current public policy (Alink et al. 2001; Boin et al. 2005; Cortell and Peterson 1999). This argument can be found within both the public policy (Kingdon, 1995; Ostrom, 2005; Sabatier and Weible, 2007) as well as the crisis management and response literatures (Birkland, 2006; Boin et al. 2009). Research into the association between crises and policy change has found that crises are necessary, but not sufficient to cause policy change (Boin and t'Hart, 2003; Nohrstedt, 2008). This has led many to argue that more research needs to be conducted to understand why and how crises are connected to major policy changes (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Nohrstedt, 2008; Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010).

One approach from the public policy literature that connects changes in relatively stable parameters as well as changes in external subsystem events that may at times be defined as crises is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF uses a policy subsystem based approach to understand the competition policy elites engage in around contentious issues and hypothesizes that such engagement may be influenced by external forces such as a crisis (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The ACF proposes that coalitions will utilize these external forces in order to propose major policy changes (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). This proposition has been supported by research that has found policy elites within subsystems do use crisis to argue for and in some cases achieve major policy change (Nohrstedt, 2008; Nohrstedt, 2010; Albright, 2011).

In contentious policy making such as in ACF policy subsystems, these crises are not homogeneously understood. This is because policy elites possess different belief systems that filter new information (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). This leads to contention among policy elites about how a crisis should be understood (Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010). Some scholars refer to this contention as “framing contests” (Boin et al. 2008, 286) or “causal stories” (Stone, 1989) and others group such competition into the larger sphere of “minority coalition tactics” (Nohrstedt, 2008). However, this research makes an assumption that policy elites are paying attention to the same crisis. In many cases the same crisis may be the focus of policy elites within a subsystems such as 9/11 in the U.S. Government (May et al. 2009), but in other cases policy elites may be paying attention to multiple crises such as the complete or partial meltdowns at the nuclear reactors at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island (Nohrstedt, 2008).

This research will use the ACF to understand policy elite attention to multiple crises. It will use the ACF because it is a subsystem approach that allows for simultaneous and interactive external subsystem events to influence policy change. It will focus upon the coalitions and whether or not their belief systems affect their attention to different simultaneous external subsystem events.

### **Advocacy Coalition Framework**

This chapter is grounded in the ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). The framework focuses on the competitive nature of public policy where coalitions of policy elites with similar belief systems engage in a dialectic process of policy debate. These coalitions compete within a policy subsystem that may be affected by external events such as elections and changes in public opinion. Such events

may enhance or constrain the resources and/or beliefs of these coalitions and may provide the opportunity for major policy change (Sabatier and Weible 2007). There are four main components of the ACF that will be identified and defined for this study: (i) the policy subsystem, (ii) belief systems of policy elites, (iii) aggregation of policy elites into advocacy coalitions, and (iv) and the relatively stable parameters as well as the external events of policy subsystems.

A policy subsystem includes a variety of public and private organizations that are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue, and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). A policy subsystem may not be bound to a single geographic unit as studies applying the ACF to international treaties, trade agreements, crises, and health issues have found that policy domains can have an international dimension (Pierce, 2011; Farquharson, 2003; Richardson, 1996). Therefore, the emphasis when identifying a policy subsystem should be placed upon the policy problem or issue and the policy elites who seek to influence public policy (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 119).

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argue that policy elites possess a three-tiered model of beliefs. These belief systems are hierarchical in their abstractness in relation to the policy issue and their transformative nature (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987). The most abstract and least transformative beliefs are deep core beliefs. In comparison, policy core beliefs are relatively more transformative and applied to the policy issue. Individuals are motivated to convert these deep and policy core beliefs into policies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The secondary aspects of the beliefs are the most tangible and transformative.

These belief systems are not purely rational as individuals possess bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). The development of these beliefs is the result of socialization making them relatively stable over time (Festinger, 1957). As actors receive external stimuli they will filter out information that is counter to their existing belief systems (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). Therefore, people who have different belief systems, which the ACF aggregates into different advocacy coalitions, will interpret the same information differently.

The ACF aggregates policy elites operating in a policy subsystem into advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988). This study identifies coalition members based upon their belief systems similar to Zafonte and Sabatier (2004). According to Sabatier and Weible (2007), operationalizing two or three policy core beliefs is sufficient to identify at least two advocacy coalitions. Coordination is a second defining component for identifying advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999), but it is beyond the scope of this study due to data collection constraints. However, in past studies of the ACF actors clustered into coalitions based upon their belief systems have been found to have a high-level of coordination (Weible, 2005). To emphasize that coordination is not established through data analysis, this research will refer to these coalitions as belief coalitions instead of advocacy coalitions similar to Zafonte and Sabatier (2004) and Pierce (2011).

External to the competition between advocacy coalitions seeking to translate their beliefs into policy within policy subsystems are various relatively stable parameters and the external system events. The basic difference between the two categories is their relatively enduring qualities. While external system events are more dynamic and may change with greater ease, relatively stable parameters are less likely and more difficult to

change (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Relatively stable parameters rarely change within a decade or so, but external system events are more dynamic and may change substantially over periods of a decade or so (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Therefore, there are two defining components for identifying relatively stable parameters compared to external system events: (i) durability of the events and (ii) the process of the event occurring over a decade or more.

Sabatier (1998) provides a list of relatively stable parameters as well as external system event types. The relatively stable parameters are (i) basic attributes of the problem area, (ii) basic distribution of natural resources, (iii) fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure, and (iv) basic constitutional structure. The external system events are (i) changes in socio-economic conditions, (ii) changes in public opinion, (iii) changes in systemic governing coalition, (iv) policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems.

These eight different types of events are hypothesized by the ACF to be necessary for significant policy change. “[P]erturbations provide an opportunity for major policy change, but such change will not occur unless that opportunity is skillfully exploited by proponents of change” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 148). In other words, a coalition must exploit a change in one of these categories of external perturbations in order to bring about policy change. However, coalitions filter information differently dependent upon their belief systems (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979) and this may lead to coalitions paying attention to different relatively stable parameters as well as external subsystem events. Therefore,

**Research Question II.** Do different advocacy coalitions pay relatively the same amount of attention to events external to the policy subsystem?

In order to understand how competing coalitions structure a problem facing a subsystem this research will identify the belief systems of a policy subsystem, use these belief systems to identify belief coalitions, and then examine the relationship between these belief coalitions and their relative attention to various relatively stable parameters as well as external subsystem events. If the belief coalitions do not have a statistically significant difference in what relatively stable parameters as well as external subsystem events they are paying attention to it can be concluded that they are structuring the problem faced by a coalition in a similar manner. However, if there are statistically significant differences in the amount of attention a coalition pays to a relatively stable parameters as well as external subsystem events then there is a difference in the perception of the problem the subsystem faces.

### **Case Study**

One case that had a major policy change attributed to a crisis is the recognition of the state of Israel by the U.S. Government. Over the time period from 1945 until November 1947 the U.S. Government developed a policy in relation to the question of Palestine that shifted from one of dual recognition of both Arab and Jewish rights and support for a single state solution over Palestine to favoring partition and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine<sup>13</sup>. The question of Palestine refers to the conflict between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine in their attempts to gain sovereignty over the British Mandate for Palestine. Sovereignty was not the only issue at stake between the Arabs and Jews as issues about Jewish immigration, land purchases, economic development, and

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<sup>13</sup> Palestine refers to the territory under the British Mandate that was established by the 1922 San Remo conference not including Transjordan. The borders of this territory consisted of the Mediterranean Sea to the west, the River Jordan to the east, the Sinai Peninsula to the south, and Syria to the north.



control over the holy places in Jerusalem were all contentious issues between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine.

The British Government was the mandate holder or the authority in Palestine since 1922 but operated as authority since it invaded the territory in 1917. In 1917 the British Government announced the Balfour Declaration, which granted the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. This led to a delicate balancing act by the British between Arab demands for sovereignty as the majority indigenous population with the demands of the Jews of Palestine for the British to create a Jewish state in Palestine in fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration. The British attempted to balance these demands of the Arabs and Jews of Palestine but conflict often times violent erupted on multiple occasions between the three parties. The U.S. Government had officially supported the Balfour Declaration and the British mandate over Palestine since 1922. From 1922 to 1945 the U.S. Government had a policy of officially supporting the British Government attempts to bring peace to Palestine but by August 1945 under President Harry Truman the U.S. Government began to try to influence British policy in Palestine in favor of the Zionists<sup>14</sup>.

Over the next two years the Zionists and the Arabs, often represented by leaders of the Arab states, attempted to influence U.S. Government policy towards policy. In turn, the U.S. Government cooperated with the British Government in an attempt to resolve the question of Palestine in a peaceful manner. However, by the spring of 1947 it

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<sup>14</sup> Zionism is the belief that the Jews need to establish their own state to combat against anti-Semitism. Zionist organizations, such as the Zionist Organization of America, were created to bring about this objective through political means. Individuals may be Zionists and not necessarily Jewish and one may be Jewish and not a Zionist. It is a belief about the normative answer to the question concerning the relationship between Jews and people of other faiths.

was evident that the efforts by the U.S. and British Governments to bring the Arabs and Jews of Palestine together in a peaceful compromise had failed. The British Government then proposed that the United Nations take responsibility for resolving the question of Palestine. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine conducted a study of the issue in the summer of 1947 and concluded that Palestine should be partitioned into separate Jewish and Arab states. This report was supported by the U.S. Government and was ratified by a majority of General Assembly members on November 29, 1947. This marked the culmination of attempts by the Arabs and Jews of Palestine to influence the American and British Governments in the resolution of the question of Palestine. While it was not until May 15, 1948 that the state of Israel was recognized the passing of the resolution for the partition of Palestine by the UN General Assembly in November 1947 established that policy towards Palestine would be based upon a two-state solution. There were debates about how it would be implemented but the basic selection of the policy by the UN and the U.S. Government had been made.

This change of policy by the U.S. Government from a one state to a two state solution including the recognition of the state of Israel has been attributed by many as a reaction to the crisis of the Holocaust (Schechtman, 1966; Khouri, 1968; Laqueur, 1972; Postal and Levy, 1973; Benson, 1997; Christison, 1997; Anderson, 2005; Berger, 2008; Warshal, 2008; Radosh and Radosh, 2009). The basic argument proposed is that the genocide of six million Jews in Europe brought the U.S. Government to the realization that the Jewish question had to be answered with a Jewish state<sup>15</sup>. However, other

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<sup>15</sup> The Jewish question refers to the normative question of the proper relationship between Jews and those people of other faiths. While some argued for a Jewish state such as the Zionists others argued that assimilation was preferred.

scholars have argued that while the Holocaust may have been important there were other factors that influenced U.S. Government policy making in relation to the question of Palestine. These include arguments about the central role of Jewish Displaced Persons (Cohen, 1990; Benson, 2008), the 1948 general election in the United States (Snetsinger, 1974), Middle East oil (Grose, 1983; Cohen, 1994), threats of Soviet Union expansion into the Middle East (Ottolenghi, 2004), American public opinion (Wilson, 1979), as well as the hot and cold conflicts in Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews (Smith, 2001; Morris, 2008) and the regional conflict between the Arab states and Jews of Palestine (Smith, 2001; Morris, 2008). These different events and how they relate to the ACF will be discussed in more detail in the research design section.

### **Research Design and Data**

The data for this research comes from the Department of State archives known as the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS). Multiple past studies of this policy have used this archive (Ganin, 1979; Ovendale, 1989; Cohen, 1990; and Radosh and Radosh, 2009). In addition, government archives are a suggested source of data for identifying and analyzing coalitions within the ACF (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993: 237-256). The FRUS is the official archive of documents pertaining to U.S. Government foreign policy. They include, “all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State’s responsibilities, together with the appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies” (FRUS 1948; Preface, III-IV). These archives include memorandum, telegraphs, conversations, reports, public statements, and diary entries by various individuals and organizations. The vast majority of these documents

were intended to be kept confidential being classified as Secret or Top Secret by the U.S. Government. The Department of State organizes these documents by year and geographic region. In this case, the documents are identified as “Palestine 1945” (1968, Volume 8), “Palestine 1946” (1969, Volume 7), and “Palestine 1947” (1971, Volume 5). These years were selected to represent the period of time including the end of World War II and the beginning of the Truman presidential administration in April 1945 up to the decision to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on November 29, 1947.

The focus of the FRUS is upon the “Department of State’s responsibilities”. Therefore, the majority of documents include the Department of State as either the speaker or audience of each document. The data also includes documents from various organizations including: foreign governments, Legislative and Executive branches of the U.S. Government, Zionist organizations, and Palestinian Arab organizations.

Each document was identified as a single statement by an individual. There is a range of the number of statements an individual may provide from one to thirty-five. As the individual is the unit of analysis the mean of the data collected from individuals with multiple statements is used. The individual statement has been used in the past in ACF studies examining coalitions (Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004). For the time period identified from January 1, 1945 – November 29, 1947 there were 131 individuals identified. This was the population of the study. Statements that had less than two of the 19 belief components identified were removed in order to prevent against a Type 1 error. This left a sample of 111 individuals that will be examined.

## **Identifying Advocacy Coalitions**

In order to identify what advocacy coalition each individual belongs to, the belief systems of these individuals need to be identified. To identify the belief systems a codebook was developed that included both policy core and deep core beliefs adapted from Sabatier (1998) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999). In total six beliefs from Sabatier (1998) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) were then operationalized into 19 belief components. These 19 belief components can be found on Table VI.1 below. The six beliefs from Sabatier (1998) identified are on the left and their operational components are on the right. The codebook was used in a similar study for identifying coalitions within this subsystem using Congressional hearings data by Pierce (2011).

**Table VI.1. Policy Elite Beliefs and Belief Components adapted from Sabatier (1998).**

Policy Core and Deep Core Beliefs	Belief Components
Nature of Man	1. People should intervene on earth to carry out God's plan
Orientation on basic value priorities	2. The Jews are a nation
	3. The Arabs of Palestine are a nation
	4. The current majority population of a political community should have sovereignty
	5. The U.S. should seek to maintain security in the Middle East
	6. The U.S. should seek to maintain security in Palestine
	7. The U.S. should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people
Identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern	8. The welfare of the Jews is important
	9. The welfare of the Arabs of Palestine is important
Overall seriousness of the problem	10. The U.S. should use symbolic or political resources to solve the problems in Palestine
	11. The U.S. should use material resources to solve the problems in Palestine
Basic causes of the problem	12. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be prevented
	13. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be limited
	14. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited
	15. The Jews should be blamed for the problems in Palestine
	16. The Arabs should be blamed for the problems in Palestine
	17. The British should be blamed for the problems in Palestine
Proper distribution of authority	18. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from only the Jews
	19. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from only the Arabs

Content analysis of the 131 individuals was conducted for each belief component. Each statement was coded as +1 for agreement, 0 for neutral, -1 for disagreement, or a 9 for not discussed in relation to each belief component. Once the coding was completed, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted. A random sample of 37 individuals from the population of 131 individuals was taken and coded by the external inter-coder. This

random sample represents 28.2% of the population above the suggested 10% of the population needed to determine inter-coder reliability when using a randomized sample (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). Cohen's Kappa (1960) was calculated to measure inter-coder reliability of the beliefs because it is more reliable than percentage agreement and has been called "the measure of choice" by researchers (Dewey, 1983). According to Fleiss (1971), a Cohen's Kappa measurement of agreement at or above 0.40 is "fair" or "fair to good". All 19 of the belief components had a measurement of agreement at or above Cohen's Kappa of 0.40.

### **Relatively Stable Parameters and External Subsystem Events**

Previous studies of the ACF have found that events external to the subsystem may influence policy dynamics within the subsystem (e.g. Nohrstedt, 2005). According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999), these events can be divided into two broad categories (i) relatively stable parameters and (ii) external system events. The basic difference between these two categories is that the former are less likely to experience change while the latter are more dynamic (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Among the relatively stable parameters there are four different types including (i) basic attributes of the problem area, (ii) basic distribution of natural resources, (iii) fundamental sociocultural values and social structure and (iv) basic constitutional structure.

Applied to the question of Palestine two such issues relate to changes in the relatively stable parameters. The first is the civil war between Arabs and Jews within Palestine that often took the form of terrorist attacks during the time period prior to the UN partition vote. This fight was about the basic distribution of resources within

Palestine including immigration, land purchases, jobs, religious symbols and above all else future sovereignty over Palestine (Smith, 2001; Morris, 2008). This conflict dramatically changed the society and government of Palestine and eventually led to full-scale civil war in the period of time from November 1947-May 1948. It was ongoing in some form since the 1920s when the first riots and attacks occurred between the Jewish and Arab populations in Palestine.

The second type of relatively stable parameter was the Jewish-Arab conflict. This refers to the regional conflict between the Jews of Palestine and the Arab governments in the Middle East including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Trans-Jordan. While the open war between these Arab states and Israel did not begin until the founding of the state of Israel in May 1948, threats, cross-border attacks, terrorism, and the massing of troops and resources on the borders was taking place between 1945 and November 1947 (Smith, 2001; Morris, 2008). In fact, there were threats and restrictions targeting the Zionists and their goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine dating back to the Ottoman Empire (Smith, 2001). These threats and attempts to prevent the creation of a Jewish state through possible violence were practiced by many Arab governments and were popularly supported by the “Arab street” in many cases (Smith, 2001). The presence and escalation of the conflict between the Jews of Palestine and the Arab states represents a question of scope. Whether or not the threats of the Arab states were real and the escalating attacks were taking place has an effect on the perception of the basic attributes of the problem area. In particular, it distorted the perception on the question of Palestine between a local intra-state issue between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine and the regional inter-state conflict between the Arab states and the Jews of Palestine.



There are four types of external system events identified by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) and Sabatier and Weible (2007): (i) changes in socio-economic conditions, (ii) changes in public opinion, (iii) changes in systemic governing coalition, and (iv) policy decisions and impacts from other policy subsystems. Changes in socio-economic conditions are beyond the scope of this study instead it will focus on the other types of external system events.

Changes in public opinion here refer to American public opinion on the question of Palestine. According to public opinion polls in November 1945 a majority of Americans (58%) did not support or have an opinion on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (Gilboa, 1987: 16). However, this position would change by October 1947, just prior to the U.N. General Assembly vote in favor of partition, when a public opinion poll found that only 35% of Americans either opposed or did not have an opinion on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (Gilboa, 1987: 18). This demonstrates a clear change in public opinion among Americans within the time period of the case study. This analysis will examine if members of the coalitions referenced American public opinion in the policy debate.

Changes in systemic governing coalition in this case refer to the mid-term election in the United States in November 1946 and also the general election in November 1948. The general election itself falls outside of the realm of the case study but this analysis will be able to identify if coalition members are referring to it as a possible rationale for U.S. Government policy on Palestine. Many such as Snetsinger (1974) argue that the 1948 election heavily influenced President Truman and his administration's position on

Palestine throughout the build up to the UN General Assembly vote in November 1947 and the eventual declaration of Israel in May 1948.

There are four different policies identified by various scholars as policy decisions and impacts from other policy subsystems that influenced U.S. foreign policy towards the question of Palestine. The first two are interconnected in that one caused the other. They are the Holocaust and the resulting Jewish Displaced Persons (Jewish DPs) crisis in Europe. The events of the Holocaust had a deep and profound effect on Zionism and Jewish identity (Cohen, 1990). The systematic genocide carried out by the Nazis against the Jews of Europe created a trauma that influenced U.S. foreign policy on Palestine in relation to the Jewish demands for immigration and sovereignty (Radosh and Radosh, 2009). The survivors of the Holocaust became refugees in Europe and continued to live in concentration camps while the Allies attempted to formulate a policy of relocation. President Truman was emotionally moved by the reports of Jewish refugees in the camps in Europe and wanted to formulate a policy to ease their burden (Benson, 2008). Cohen (1990) refers to President Truman as having “Refugee Zionism”. This refers to the practice of connecting the problem of the refugees with the proposed solutions by the Zionists of Jewish immigration and sovereignty in Palestine. These two events, the Holocaust and Jewish Displaced Persons, are related to the question of Palestine and were connected by the Zionists as well as the U.S. Government Harrison Report in August 1945 however they did exist in different policy subsystems.

Two other issues that were policy decisions from other subsystems are the oil production and pricing policies of the Arab states (Grose, 1983; Cohen, 1994), and threat of Soviet expansion and manipulation of the Middle East (Ottolenghi, 2004). Some

scholars argue (Cohen, 1994) that American foreign policy was influenced by Arab threats to the exportation of oil. The argument is that the Departments of War and State viewed the continuation of Arab oil as a matter of national interest and should be protected from subsequent threats by Arab states to stop the exportation of oil in retaliation for U.S. foreign policy favoring the Zionists. The second issue was the belief that the Soviet Union could exploit a change in preference by the Arab states against the U.S. Government and its allies due to U.S. foreign policy favoring the Zionists in Palestine (McCoy, 1982; Rosenberg, 1982; Ottolenghi, 2004; Lansford, 2008). This would allow an expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence into the Middle East and threaten American access to oil and other strategic and natural resources in the region.

**Table VI.2. External Events Coding Rubric.**

Code	ACF event type	ACF theoretical stability	Secondary literature
Palestinian-Jewish Conflict	Basic attributes of the problem area	Relatively Stable Parameters	Smith (2001), Morris (2008)
Arab-Jewish Conflict	Basic attributes of the problem area	Relatively Stable Parameters	Smith (2001), Morris (2008)
Public Opinion	Changes in Public Opinion	External System Events	Wilson (1979)
Election	Changes in systemic governing coalition	External System Events	Snetsinger (1974)
Holocaust	Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems	External System Events	Radosh and Radosh (2009)
Displaced Persons	Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems	External System Events	Benson (2008)
Oil	Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems	External System Events	Grose (1983)
Soviet Union	Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems	External System Events	Ottolenghi (2004)

Table VI.2 identifies each of the codes for the eight different events discussed above along with their theoretical category and type as adapted from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) and Sabatier and Weible (2007). In order to determine policy elite attention to these different types of events every individual statement was read and content analysis was conducted to identify if a statement contained a particular code. Each identified code was then analyzed using key words in context (KWIC). KWIC is a form of analysis that examines how people use words in a context by comparing those words that appear before and after identified key words (Fielding and Lee, 1998). This analysis is conducted to determine if the code is relevant and should be included. For example, whether or not public opinion referred to public opinion in the United States compared to public opinion in the Arab states. If the code was both present and appeared in the relevant context, a value of “1” was recorded. In contrast, if the code was not present or if it did not appear in the context established a value of “0” was recorded. As some individuals provided multiple statements these were aggregated and a mean score for each individual per code was calculated.

## **Analysis**

### **Identifying Advocacy Coalitions**

In order to determine the belief systems within the subsystem the 111 individuals after the others were removed to prevent a Type 1 error were analyzed using Manhattan distances. Manhattan distance was calculated by the  $\sum [p_i - j_i]$ , where “i” ranges from 1 to 19 for each belief component and where p and j represent any two statements. This created an individual-by-individual matrix of 111X111. At this stage, the distance measure in each cell of the matrices represented the aggregate disagreement across the 19

belief components between any two statements. The maximum Manhattan distance between any two individuals is (38), the median distance is (19), and the minimum distance is (0). In other words, if two individuals had disagreement on all 19 belief components the Manhattan distance would be 38 units, while if they had agreement on all 19 belief components the Manhattan distance would be 0 units.

Tabu search cluster analysis was then conducted to place each individual into clusters (Borgatti et al., 2002; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). This was conducted in order to identify the number of advocacy coalitions based upon the Manhattan distances between the organizational statements (see Weible, 2005; Weible and Sabatier, 2005; and Henry et al. 2010). Using iterative simulations, Tabu search cluster analysis minimizes within cluster distances among the unit of analysis, in this case the individual, by partitioning and then rearranging the matrix where relatively lower Manhattan distances are placed within the same cluster, while those with relatively higher Manhattan distances are placed in a different cluster. In other words, Tabu Search cluster analysis places those individuals with relatively little Manhattan distance in the same cluster while those that have a relatively higher Manhattan distance are placed in a different cluster. Tabu search cluster analysis is used because it provides a relative goodness of fit ( $R^2$ ) that can be utilized to discern the optimal number of clusters (Borgatti, et al., 2002; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The optimal number of clusters identified was two with a goodness of fit of 0.323<sup>16, 17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> The  $R^2$  for three clusters was 0.384 which is relatively a better fit. However, this difference is relatively small less than 0.1 and the identification of a third coalition includes members from both Arab and Zionist organizations which did not coordinated their activities. Therefore, using the panel data set of 111 individuals, two clusters is a better fit for the case study.


This cluster analysis was used to identify the partitioning of the belief systems among the individuals. Two clusters were found to be optimal and these represent the belief systems of the two coalitions. These were identified as the “Anglo-American” and “Arab” coalitions.

The membership of the coalitions varies and includes individuals from a wide range of organizations. A list of all of the individuals and their organizational affiliation divided into each coalition can be found in Appendix B. In a few of the cases an individual name is not provided but instead an organization such as the Iraqi Government or Soviet Union Government. In these cases one or more individual statements were made attributed to the organization as a whole rather than a single individual. These organizations are treated as individuals for the purposes of this study in order to identify their attributes relative to the subsystem.

In order to verify the findings from the Tabu search cluster analysis as well as visually present the coalitions multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) is used. MDS was conducted upon all 111 individuals using all of the belief components with a stress test of 0.185 which is an acceptable fit (Kruskal and Wish, 1978). The 19 belief components were mapped onto a two-dimensional space and are presented below.

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<sup>17</sup> This finding is also supported when a factor analysis of the 19 beliefs is conducted isolating six beliefs as being significant in the variation of the individual belief systems. Conducting a Tabu search cluster analysis on only these six beliefs instead of the 19 beliefs produced similar results for the number of clusters with a slightly better fit. The  $R^2$  for the clustering of individuals using the six factor beliefs was 0.443 for two clusters and 0.468 for three clusters. This relatively small increase of fit by 0.025 by adding a third cluster supports the decision to only use clusters for identifying the coalitions.



**Figure VI.1. Multi-Dimensional Scaling of Advocacy Coalitions.**

From the Tabu search cluster analysis those individuals belonging to the Anglo-American coalition are identified by diamonds and those belonging to the Arab coalition are identified by squares. In order to identify the meaning of the X- and Y-axis the coordinates provided from the MDS for each individual were correlated with the 19 belief components. These results can be found on Table VI.3.

**Table VI.3. Means, Standard Deviations and Inter-Correlations for X and Y-axis Coordinates and Belief Components (N=111).**

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	4	5	7	8	12	13
X Coordinates	.105	.257			-.225*	-.205*	.213*	-.194*
Y Coordinates	-.090	.190	-.209*	-.287**				
4. Current majority population should have sovereignty	.037	.655		.247**	-.492**	-.420**	.674**	-.456**
5. U.S. security in Middle East	.324	.491	.247**				.439**	-.282**
7. U.S. security for Jewish People	.245	.560	-.492**			.745**	-.404**	
8. Jewish welfare is Important	.451	.558	-.420**		.745**		-.488**	.240*
12. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be prevented	-.156	.648	.674**	.439**	-.404**	-.488**		-.709**
13. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be limited	.003	.614	-.456**	-.282**		.240*	-.709**	

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .001$ .

The coordinates of the X-axis are significantly correlated with the following belief components: (7) “The U.S. should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people” (-.225\*), (8) “The welfare of the Jewish people is important” (-.205\*), (12) “Jewish immigration into Palestine should be prevented” (.213\*), and (13) “Jewish immigration into Palestine should be limited” (-.194\*). As the X-axis is a composite of these four different beliefs about Jewish welfare and security as well as immigration the X-axis on



Figure VI.1 is labeled as “Opposition to Jewish Welfare, Security and Immigration”. It is identified as opposition to as the belief components are significantly negatively correlated and the one with a positive correlation is about preventing Jewish immigration into Palestine. Therefore, those individuals who hold positive views of these beliefs besides the prevention of Jewish immigration are on the negative side of the X-axis while those possessing these beliefs are on the positive side of the X-axis. A vast majority of those individuals who are on the negative side or oppose these beliefs are among the Anglo-American coalition while all of those individuals who are on the positive side and support these beliefs belong to the Arab coalition. This provides additional support to the finding that there are two coalitions among the individuals.

In the MDS there is much greater variation among the individuals along the Y-axis as members of both the Anglo-American and Arab coalitions populate either side of the Y-axis. The beliefs that were found to be significantly correlated to the Y-axis coordinates for the individuals are the following: (4) “The current majority population of a political community should have sovereignty” (-.209\*), and (5) “The U.S. should seek to maintain security in the Middle East” (-.287\*\*). As the Y-axis is a composite of these two different beliefs about democratic priorities and the scope of security provided by the U.S. Government, the Y-axis on 6.1 is labeled as “Opposition to Majority Population having Sovereignty and Security in the Middle East”. As the individuals are relatively evenly dispersed among the coalitions between the positive and negative side of the Y-axis this dimension does not provide much analytical leverage for understanding the coalitions.

Overall, the MDS in Figure VI.1 visually presents the coalitions and based upon the significant correlations of Table VI.3 it is evident that beliefs about Jewish welfare and security as well as the prevention of Jewish immigration into Palestine are what divide these coalitions.

**Advocacy Coalition Coordination.** The two identified coalitions Arab and Anglo-American each coordinated their efforts to influence U.S. policymaking about the question of Palestine. Systematic quantitative data is not available to demonstrate this as this is a limitation of using a historical data archive and therefore, we can only designate these clusters as belief coalitions. However, based upon past research of coalition belief systems (Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004; Weible, 2005) identifying the divisions in the belief systems of clusters is a suitable manner to identify coalitions within a subsystem.


#### **Advocacy Coalitions and External Events**

As the two coalitions have been identified now the analysis turns to the association between these coalitions and the relatively stable parameters and external subsystem events. These external events can be found on Table VI.2. Once all eight codes among the 111 individuals were identified using both the content analysis and KWIC approaches, a word count or code count was conducted. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), word counts should be applied for identifying patterns, verifying hypothesis, and maintaining analytic integrity. The codes were then summed for each coalition in order to identify patterns of difference between the coalitions.

**Table VI.4. Means, Standard Deviations, and n for Attention to Events as a Function of Advocacy Coalition Membership (N=111).**

Event	Anglo-American Coalition			Arab Coalition			Total		
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Holocaust	80	0.082	0.195	31	0.146	0.281	111	0.1	0.223
Jewish DPs	80	0.249	0.357	31	0.298	0.335	111	0.263	0.351
Election	80	0.004	0.025	31	0.053	0.199	111	0.018	0.108
Public Opinion	80	0.073	0.208	31	0.137	0.302	111	0.091	0.238
Oil	80	0.042	0.171	31	0.085	0.261	111	0.054	0.2
Soviet Union	80	0.176	0.317	31	0.128	0.303	111	0.163	0.312
Arab-Jewish Conflict	80	0.296	0.377	31	0.697	0.382	111	0.408	0.418
Palestinian-Jewish Conflict	80	0.306	0.376	31	0.24	0.349	111	0.288	0.368

Table VI.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the means and standard deviation for each event code per coalition and a total. These descriptive statistics comparing event attention between coalitions is visually presented in Figure VI.2 below.



**Figure VI.2. Advocacy Coalition Attention to Events.**

The first code of note is the Arab-Jewish conflict as this appears to vary greatly between the Anglo-American and Arab coalitions. Among the Arab coalitions individuals referenced the issue almost 70% of the time in comparison among the Anglo-American coalition it was referenced by individuals 29.6% of the time. Attention to the Arab-Jewish conflict by the Arab coalition is relatively more than double the frequency than among individuals within the Anglo-American coalition. In comparison among the other events there is relatively an equal amount of attention paid by individuals per each coalition. There appears to be a clear connection between coalition membership and Arab-Jewish Conflict.

The Palestinian-Jewish Conflict received attention from almost 1/3 of all statements at 28.8%. There was little variation between the coalitions in relation to the Palestinian-Jewish Conflict with the Anglo-American coalition paid relatively more attention to the issue at 30.6% compared to the Arab coalition at 24%. The Palestinian-Jewish conflict received in total the second most attention by all individuals at 28.8% of statements by individuals.

The Arab-Jewish and Palestinian-Jewish conflicts are identified as being in the category of relatively stable parameters and received relatively more attention than any other issues. It is evident that individuals in policy subsystems pay more attention to events that are long-term in both their activity as well as effect. The hot and cold conflict between the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab states with the Jews of Palestine dates back to the beginning of the Zionist attempts to immigrate and establish a Jewish state in Palestine at the turn of the twentieth century (Smith, 2001). This conflict continued to

escalate and became violent at different times and led to long-term changes in both Palestine and the region (Smith, 2001).

In comparison to these intra- and inter-state conflicts that operate at the relatively stable parameters level, the external system events received relatively less attention by individuals within the subsystem.

Public opinion and elections both were mentioned by individuals in less than 10% of all statements. Public opinion was referenced with relatively higher frequency among members of the Arab coalition at 13.7% while members of the Anglo-American coalition referred to Public Opinion 7.3%. Elections were almost irrelevant with only 1.8% of all statements by individuals referring to them and less than 1% by members of the Anglo-American coalition. This finding goes against the work of Snetisinger (1974) among others who argue that the Jewish vote influenced President Truman and other members of the Anglo-American coalition in relation to the question of Palestine. In this case, as it was over a year prior to the general election public opinion may be a better proxy than references to election but it was still referred to by less than 10% of members of the Anglo-American coalition.

The Holocaust was only referenced in 10% of the total statements by individuals and only by 8.2% of those by members of the Anglo-American coalition. This is a relatively startling finding as much of the literature about the policy decision is about the impact the Holocaust had on the issue and policy elites. The Holocaust may have been an issue of importance during the war but by 1945 policy elite attention shifted to one of the results of the Holocaust the Jewish DPs crisis in Europe. Among the external system events that are more volatile and short-term the Jewish DPs received the most amount of

attention from both members of the Anglo-American and Arab coalitions. In total, it received attention from 26.3% of statements by individuals. Among members of the Anglo-American coalition it was referenced 24.9% and by members of the Arab coalition by 29.8% of coalition member statements. Therefore, while the Holocaust itself may have not been the flashpoint that gained policy elite attention the outcome of Jewish DPs was an issue that received relatively a great amount of attention from both coalitions.

Oil and the Soviet Union represent issues that are outside the scope of the subsystem but policy elites were aware of their influence on the question of Palestine. References to oil were made by only 5.4% of all individual statements and were relatively infrequent among members of both coalitions. However, members of the Arab coalition did refer to oil at about double the frequency, 8.5%, compared to members of the Anglo-American coalition at 4.2%. Oil may have been a threat used by the Arabs but the Anglo-American coalition was paying a greater amount of attention to the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The Anglo-American coalition members referred to the Soviet Union in 17.6% of their individual statements which was relatively greater than the other external system events besides the Jewish DPs. Members of the Anglo-American coalition were aware of the threat the Soviet Union posed and paid more attention to the issue than the Arab coalition at 12.8%. It is interesting to note that while the Arabs paid relatively more attention to the use of oil as a weapon of influence to threaten members of the Anglo-American coalition, the Anglo-American coalition paid more attention to the Soviet Union. If the Arabs had placed greater emphasis on the possible alliance and expansion of the Soviet Union into the Middle East it may have resounded better with the Anglo-American beliefs rather than oil.

It is clear that the Arab coalition had a slightly different perception of how to structure the question of Palestine than the Anglo-American coalition. While the Arab coalition clearly views the Arab-Jewish conflict as an important issue that effects the question of Palestine, this view is not shared by members of the other coalition. An independent samples *t* test was used to analyze these events in order to determine if coalition membership had a significant effect on attention to any of these events.

**Table VI.5. Independent Samples T-Test for Events as a Function of Advocacy Coalition Membership.**

Event Difference	<i>t</i>	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean difference	St. Error
Holocaust	1.37	109	0.172	0.065	0.047
Jewish DPs	0.69	109	0.496	0.049	0.072
Election	2.16	109	0.033	0.049	0.022
Public Opinion	1.27	109	0.208	0.064	0.05
Oil	1.03	109	0.305	0.044	0.042
Soviet Union	-0.73	109	0.467	-0.048	0.065
Arab-Jewish Conflict	5.02**	109	0	0.402	0.08
Palestinian-Jewish Conflict	-0.87	109	0.388	-0.066	0.078
<b>**<i>p</i> &lt; .001, *<i>p</i> &lt; .05</b>					

To investigate whether coalition membership differ among attention to various external subsystem events, a *t* test was conducted. The following assumptions were tested, (a) groups are approximately the same size, (b) the variances of the two populations are equal, (c) observations were independent, and (d) the dependent variable was approximately normally distributed. The assumption that the groups are approximately the same size is violated as the Anglo-American coalition has greater than double the population of the Arab coalition. In addition, the assumption about independent observations is not completely upheld as the data collected came from

individuals who were cooperating and sharing information with each influencing the results. Therefore, any results should be interpreted with caution. There was a statistically significant difference between Arab and Anglo-American coalition members on their attention to the Arab-Jewish conflict,  $t(109) = 5.02, p < .001, d = .96$ . Arabs ( $M = .697, SD = .382$ ) paid a statistically significant greater amount of attention to the Arab-Jewish conflict than the Anglo-Americans ( $M = .296, SD = .377$ ), and the effect size was large at 0.96 (Cohen, 1988).

### Conclusion

Of the different events identified as arguably influencing policy change the coalitions paid relatively the same amount of attention to all of them except for the Arab-Jewish conflict. The null findings that the same amount of attention was paid to the Holocaust and Displaced Persons by the Anglo-Americans and Arabs is of interest because while they may have interpreted the crisis differently the amount they paid about the same amount of attention to the issue in structuring the problem. In fact, the amount of attention was relatively lower than one would expect if it had the strongest influence among the other events in bringing about policy change.

There are many who argue that the policy was a preventive effort in order to ensure Truman would gain the Jewish vote in the 1948 election and have more Democratic support in the 1946 mid-term election. While the case study does not extend into 1948 as the policy position was established in November 1947, if this were the case one would expect more attention by the Anglo-American coalition to the coming election and also to public opinion. However, neither of these external events garnered a great amount of relative attention with elections being mentioned in about 2% and public



opinion in about 9% of all statements across all coalitions. Overall, the upcoming election was not an issue of interest for the Anglo-American coalition. The arguments of Snetsinger (1974) and others that the election was the most important cause of the policy change are not supported by these findings.

The events of oil and the Soviet Union have also gained attention by scholars for explaining U.S. policy (Rosenberg, 1982; Cohen, 1994; Ottolenghi, 2004). The argument is that the Arabs and their business associates in America used the “oil weapon” to threaten the U.S. in order to influence policy. In a similar argument the Arabs were courting the Soviet Union to threaten the U.S. into supporting the Arab position. While there is some support for the latter, the Arabs did not pay relatively more attention to oil or the Soviet Union than the other coalitions. In fact, the Anglo-American coalition paid a little more attention to the Soviet Union than the other coalitions and reflected the relative fear of the threat of the Cold War among American and British policy elites.

This research suffers from multiple limitations stemming from the data. The FRUS archive was the sole source of the belief and coalition membership data may have been disproportionately represented based upon whom the Department of State was communicating with. However, any other archive selected, such as Zionist organizational archives or British Government archives, would suffer from a similar bias. The statements themselves were made by individuals in the most part attempting to influence others. The data was not gathered using a survey or other scientific instrument that was measuring these individual’s belief systems but rather was observing the individuals in their natural environment attempting to compete to influence public policy. This is a limitation as the data is collected in many cases from attempts to persuade by individuals

rather than capture a more objective and well rounded perspective of their beliefs. On the other hand, these were the beliefs espoused by the individuals within the policy debate and the actual language, beliefs and attention to events that occurred within the policy process rather than measuring these attributes external to the debate.

There were multiple benefits of using this data source. As the purpose of the study was to understand U.S. foreign policy the Department of State is the agency responsible for such policy development. This places them in an optimal role for collecting information and connecting with all of the policy elites seeking to influence U.S. policy on the question of Palestine. Also, as a majority of these statements were memorandum and telegraphs that were classified the speakers could discuss their beliefs without public repercussions. Therefore, such statements may not have as much public influence and may better represent the true beliefs of the speaker in comparison to those in the public record at the time. The study also has limitations that only three years of data were used, No data was not collected prior to 1945 or after the UN General Assembly resolution was passed. However, the focus on the period from 1945-47 does capture the relative short-term developments that occurred in the policy process.

This research has demonstrated that different coalitions will pay attention to different external subsystem events. Past research has demonstrated that coalitions will frame the same event differently (Nohrstedt, 2008), but this research has found that coalitions may not even agree on what event is of importance for structuring the problems a policy subsystem faces. Therefore, future research into the connection between crisis and policy change should be careful to ensure that all subsystem actors are identifying the same crisis. Policy elites may not only perceive an issue in a different manner but may

also place different emphasis on an issue and its role in structuring the problems a policy subsystem faces.

## CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION

### Introduction

This research has examined U.S. foreign policy towards the question of Palestine using the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). It has made various findings that may contribute to our understanding of the ACF as well as to why the U.S. supported the creation of Israel. This conclusion chapter briefly outlines the research questions or hypotheses of the four chapters along with a summary of the results. It discusses their overall possible contribution to the literature relative to both the ACF and the policy issue. This is followed by a discussion of the limitations of the research and lastly a section about future research.

### Findings

There were four distinct empirical chapters that used different data sources, research questions, or independent and dependent variables to understand U.S. foreign policy applied to the question of Palestine. Chapter Three differed from the other chapters in using an actor specific model of foreign policy to examine the beliefs ascribed to President Harry S. Truman. While it provided insight into the beliefs and rationale of President Truman, it lacked the contextual depth that the other chapters possessed. This was on purpose as to demonstrate the juxtaposition without direct comparison between two approaches that use different levels of analysis to explain the same policy issue.

Chapter Four placed President Truman within the context of the policy subsystem and included the other policy elites as well. This was accomplished by identifying the policy elites and their membership into coalitions within the policy subsystem by

examining the stability of coalition belief systems over time. This chapter provided the context of the broader subsystem, other policy elites, and the component of time.

Chapter Five placed these policy elites inside the policy subsystem within the larger political context. It measured their attention to relatively stable parameters and external subsystem events such as the Holocaust, immigration, and the Arab-Jewish conflict. This systemic level of analysis demonstrated that there is variation in policy elite attention between relatively stable parameters and external system events and correlation among the categories in patterns of attention.

Chapter Six combined both coalitions and events external to the policy subsystem together. It identified coalitions using pooled data of individual belief systems and correlated it with the attention by the same individuals to events external to the subsystem. It found that belief systems matter in that depending upon coalition membership there was some differentiation in attention to the Arab-Jewish conflict.

The specific hypotheses, research questions, and subsequent results for each of these chapters are summarized below in Table VII.1.

**Table VII.1. Summary of Hypotheses, Research Questions and Results.**

Hypothesis or Research Question	Result
Chapter 3. What did President Truman “believe” in relation to the recognition of the question of Palestine? And, what was his rationale for these beliefs? (83)	Humanitarian considerations were the basis for President Truman’s rationale of the problem, but politics directly influenced his policy position in support of Jewish immigration into Palestine.
Chapter 4. On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of coalition members as allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so (112).	There were mixed results. For examining only the difference between Time Periods 1 and 5 there was stability. However, during Time Periods 3 and 4 there was a distinct lack of stability as multiple coalitions merged. Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected.
Chapter 5. When changes are occurring at both levels of relatively stable parameters and external system events, policy elites will pay the same amount of attention to both sets of events (145).	This research does not support this hypothesis, as policy elite attention was greater for relatively stable parameters than for external system events.
Chapter 6. Do different advocacy coalitions pay relatively the same amount of attention to events external to the policy subsystem?	This research has demonstrated that different coalitions will pay attention to different events external to the policy subsystem.

### **Contribution to the Advocacy Coalition Framework**

Chapters Four, Five and Six had findings that contribute to our understanding of the ACF. This section describes how each chapter contributed to the ACF as well as some limitations of the ACF that were identified through this research. Such limitations may be intrinsic to this case study however; the case study does use variables and hypotheses common to other ACF studies making it a typical case (Gerring, 2007).

Overall, this dissertation does support the application of the ACF to foreign, historical and normative policy issues. The use of a subsystem approach was of particular importance as demonstrated by the limited findings relating to context of Chapter Three

focusing only on the beliefs of President Truman. However, the ACF has multiple limitations in its explanatory leverage. One such limitation is a lack of focus upon decision-making. In this case, as in much of foreign policy, the President is in an authoritative position to make decisions about public policy with little input needed from other branches of Government or the support of public opinion. This makes the actor specific model of foreign policy particularly attractive for explaining foreign policy.

The role of the individual as decision-maker is de-emphasized within the ACF in order to concentrate more on the role of individuals aggregated into coalitions. Chapter Three using the actor specific model demonstrated the utility in examining the beliefs and rationale of the individual decision-maker for explaining a public policy. Such a focus may be limited to issues where a great amount of institutional authority is concentrated in one individual such as foreign or defense policy and this may be a function of the policy subsystem chosen rather than a deficiency of the framework.

### **Policy Subsystem**

The use of a subsystem level of analysis helped identify the range of policy actors and their beliefs that an individual level of analysis lacks. However, by capturing so many policy actors and treating them as relative equals does raise some issues. Policy actors may belong to multiple subsystems such as the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, even heads of agencies such as Loy Henderson Director of the NEA, but also belong to the subsystem of interest. Policy elites may be active in multiple subsystems at the same time in particular if they are government officials and they have positions with overlapping functions or jurisdictions. This issue of an individual straddling multiple subsystems makes it difficult to identify at times which actors to

include in a subsystem. Sabatier (1998) deals with this issue explicitly and sums it up as follows:

Policy domains that are intergovernmental in scope – whether between national and local units within a nation state or between international organizations and specific nation states – raise important issues about subsystem delineation: does one put all of the actors – irrespective of governmental level – into a single (undifferentiated) subsystem, or does one assume that each territorial level is a separate subsystem? ... The choice should be based primarily upon empirical considerations regarding the degree of (a) legal autonomy of each level and (b) actor integration among levels (115).

In this case the decision was made to focus only on U.S. Government policy even though British policy, as well as those of other nation states, had a dramatic effect on what happened in Palestine. Members of other nation states were included but only as they sought to influence U.S. Government policy and not as they sought to develop their own policy position towards Palestine. Within the U.S. Government the different agencies specifically the White House and the Department of State were treated as acting within the same subsystem, however, this relation probably more closely resembled nested subsystems as the Department of State did not possess the legal autonomy to override the White House. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in 1946 even stated that U.S. Government policy on Palestine was the domain of the White House and more specifically President Truman and not the Department of State.

For the past year President Truman has had personal charge of the Palestine problem. Communications between the British Government and the United States Government have been carried out by the President and Mr. Attlee – not by Mr. Bevin [Foreign Minister] and me (*FRUS*, 1946: 686).

Therefore, future research may recognize multiple subsystems and examine the interactions between the two instead of assuming that a single subsystem exists.



## **Advocacy Coalitions**

Belief systems were used to identify coalitions in both Chapters Four and Six. In Chapter Four the statement by an individual representing an organization (n=388) was used as the unit of analysis. These statements were unevenly divided over five distinct time periods depending upon specific changes in the policy debate. This research found between two (Anglo-American and Arab) and four coalitions (Anglo-American, Arab, Zionist, and Defense). In contrast, Chapter Six aggregated these same statements but used the individual as the unit of analysis (n=111) and pooled panel data set. It found that there were only two coalitions, the Anglo-American and Arab coalitions, with Zionists belonging to the Anglo-American coalition. This demonstrated that depending upon if the data is broken up into distinct time periods or pooled into a single set of panel data there may be differentiation in the number of coalitions identified. It also may provide further evidence of the existence of “sub coalitions” as identified by Weible and Sabatier (2005). Coalitions may form combining multiple sub coalitions, in this case the Zionists and the Anglo-American coalition, around some policy core beliefs in opposition to a common opponent, the Arab coalition, but may not necessarily share other policy core or secondary beliefs. Future research will be needed to determine what beliefs held together these sub coalitions and which ones caused cleavages among the coalition.

## **Belief Systems**

Chapters Four and Six identified advocacy coalitions based upon policy elite belief systems. It used two different units of analysis, the statement in Chapter Four and the individual in Chapter Six. The same six beliefs and nineteen components were identified and analyzed in each case. The research found that in both cases there was little

data on the deep core belief of the nature of man. Deep core beliefs tend not to be the focus of advocacy coalition studies (Weible et al. 2009), and while it was included in the study its presence was relatively negligible. Therefore, this discussion will focus upon the other five beliefs.

These five beliefs were assumed to be operating at the policy core level. The policy core level is defined as spanning the entire subsystem and being relatively resistant to change. Secondary beliefs are defined as the most tangible and transformative and apply to only a subsection of the subsystem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In some cases it was relatively clear across all individuals or statements when a belief was at the policy core level such as the belief “orientation on basic value priorities” with components about the Arabs and Jews being a nation. However, beliefs about the “basic causes of the problem” in this case about Jewish immigration into Palestine, may be considered policy core for some and secondary beliefs for other members of the same coalition.

For example in Chapter Four members of the Zionist organization the Jewish Agency were found to belong to the Anglo-American coalition in particular during Time Periods 3 and 4. In addition, Chapter Six found that all individuals from the Jewish Agency belonged to the Anglo-American coalition. The Zionists found in the Anglo-American coalition believe that the Jews have the right and even responsibility to immigrate to Palestine is a part of the identity of being a Zionist (Herzl, 1896[1904]). Therefore, beliefs about Jewish immigration into Palestine are at least policy core beliefs to members of Zionist organizations. However, for many U.S. Government officials beliefs about Jewish immigration into Palestine often varied depending upon the specific

monthly limitations proposed as well as the current policy of the British Government.

This may characterize the beliefs of U.S. Government officials about Jewish immigration as secondary. This raises an issue of how a belief can be at multiple levels within a subsystem and even within a coalition.

### **External Subsystem Events**

Chapter Five compared policy elite attention to both relatively stable parameters and external system events finding that greater attention was paid to relatively stable parameters. While greater amounts of policy elite attention do not necessarily mean that such an event is the cause of a policy change. It does provide evidence for what events policy elites are debating and which ones they view as the most important during a policy debate. Therefore, future research testing hypotheses about connecting external events to policy change should include relatively stable parameters, which most ACF studies do not even identify (Weible et al. 2009).

In Chapter Five, immigration was a basic attribute of the problem area, which is a relatively stable parameter. It is identified as a “basic attribute of the problem area” because U.S. foreign policy took into consideration resource allocation, land use, relations with Arabs, and sovereignty based upon democratic ideals of majority rule when formulating how many Jews should be allowed to immigrate into Palestine. However, in Chapters Four and Six beliefs about how many Jews should be allowed to immigrate into Palestine is considered a policy core belief as a belief about the “basic causes of the problem”. The issue is that “basic attributes of the problem area” and “basic causes of the problem” at least in this case are both identified as Jewish immigration into Palestine. In order to overcome endogeneity Chapter Six assumed that immigration was a policy core

belief and not a relatively stable parameter influencing the subsystem. When combining the approach for identifying advocacy coalitions, i.e. identifying and measuring individual belief systems, some of those beliefs may be about changes in the attributes of the problem area. As there is little indication how to differentiate between the two, this may lead to problems of multi-collinearity and even endogeneity of variables depending upon the hypothesis.

### **Contribution to the Case Study**

This dissertation contributed to our knowledge about U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine. It achieved this goal by using empirical methods rather than relying upon a narrative approach as traditionally applied to this case (e.g. Grose, 1983; Cohen, 1990; Radosh and Radosh, 2009). While such approaches are important and provide a depth and scale beyond this research, slight modifications to the narrative may be needed due to the findings from the following chapters.

Chapter Three found that explanations that argue that President Truman took a policy position because of either humanitarian or political concerns are too simplistic. Rather, President Truman's focus upon the problem was mostly driven by humanitarian concerns, but his policy preferences were influenced by domestic and international politics. This finding is consistent with Cohen (1990), who argues that Truman's beliefs and rationale were a mixture of humanitarian and political reasons. Greater focus should be placed upon the differentiation between problems and solutions when discussing the beliefs and rationale of decision-makers.

Chapters Four and Six examined coalition membership and found that based upon their belief systems, government officials of the British and U.S. Governments were

members of the same coalition. Chapter Four used 388 individual statements and divided the data into five time periods, providing some evidence of variation in the beliefs between the British Government and the U.S. Government, as well as the White House and the Department of State. However, the vast majority of statements from Chapter Four were clustered in the same coalition, Anglo-American, and when these statements are pooled and aggregated for individuals all British and U.S. Government officials belonged to the Anglo-American coalition. Arguments that these actors were on opposing sides of the policy debate are not supported (Wilson, 1979; Cohen, 1990). However, if the Zionist and Arab policy actors were removed the results may have been very different. The removal of these more extreme coalitions probably would have resulted in greater differentiation among British and U.S. Government officials.

Chapter Five and Six examined policy elite attention to various categories of events. Chapter Five found that attention to the Holocaust and Jewish DPs decreased over time peaking in Time Periods 2 and 3 prior to July 1946. By the time the policy debate was coming to a head at the UN in November 1947 the policy elites paid relatively little attention to these two issues. This does not provide support for those that argue these issues defined the policy debate (Clifford, 1978; Cohen, 1990; Benson, 1997; Radosh and Radosh, 2009). While policy elites did pay attention to these issues, there is relatively greater empirical support that relatively stable parameters of the regional and local conflicts along with immigration had a larger role in shaping the policy debate.

An examination of the other external subsystem events from Chapters Five and Six produced results that were unexpected based upon the secondary literature. There are many who argue that President Truman's administration had a pro-Zionist policy to gain

the Jewish vote in the 1948 election as well as during the 1946 mid-term election (e.g. Snetsinger, 1974; Wilson, 1979). Elections were only referenced in 2% of all statements across all coalitions. Overall, the 1948 election was not an issue of interest for the Anglo-American coalition or the Arab coalition. The arguments of Snetsinger (1974) and others that the election was the most important cause driving the policy of President Truman's administration were not supported.

Overall, this research has increased our understanding of U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine. It has found that elections, the Holocaust, and Jewish DPs may provide some leverage for explaining this policy, but empirical evidence suggests that these issues had less of an effect on policy elite understanding of the problem in comparison to the Arab-Jewish conflict and Jewish immigration into Palestine. The U.S. Government may have had internal disagreements about the development of a policy towards Palestine, but the vast majority of policy actors belonging to both the White House and the Department of State held common policy core beliefs. The Arabs were consistent in their beliefs and did not change their policy position. In contrast, the Zionists were more strategic, ensuring that they gained the support of the Anglo-American coalition and were more flexible about some beliefs. In the final analysis, it may be the engagement by the Zionists with the Anglo-American coalition and the negotiation of a limited Jewish state in Palestine that led the U.S. Government to support a Jewish state in Palestine.

### **Limitations**

The central limitation of this research comes from the main data source, the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). The FRUS archive was the sole source of the belief and coalition membership data for Chapters Four, Five and Six. It may have

been disproportionately represented the Department of State and some other organizations in Chapters Four and Five but Chapter Six used the individual as the unit of analysis instead of the statement with similar results. In addition, any other archive selected, such as Zionist organizational archives or British Government archives, would suffer from a similar bias.

The statements were made by individuals attempting to influence others, usually U.S. Government officials. The data were not gathered using a survey or other instrument measuring these individual's belief systems, but rather was observing the individuals in their natural environment. This is a limitation of the data collected because many statements will only refer to a few beliefs or external system events that they were attempting to convince the U.S. Government officials or other policy elites about. On the other hand, these were the beliefs espoused by the individuals within the policy debate and the actual language, beliefs, and external subsystem events that they referenced during the policy process.

Another limitation is that we cannot know what President Truman or any other policy elites really believed (Larson, 1988). Beliefs are difficult to identify and measure in any study and in the case of historical data this problem is compounded by not being able to interview the subject. However, by using beliefs that have been identified in previous replicated studies that were operationalized specifically for this case and were corroborated by an inter-coder there is internal validity to these findings.

Another limitation is the issue of history. In Chapters Three and Six the data was pooled to make panel data, while in Chapters Four and Five the data was divided into five time periods. The same individuals were not present in all time periods to measure their

beliefs and in the case of the pooled panel data the fact that the data is taken from multiple time periods from the same individual is not accounted for. This is a clear threat to the internal validity of the study but a limitation that occurs with using historical data sources.

External validity of this study to other ACF studies may be high as this is a typical case (Gerring, 2007). It is a typical case because it uses similar hypotheses and variables as other ACF studies. However, this may be tempered because the research was conducted on a foreign and normative policy issue rather than being domestic and relatively more technically oriented. This may limit the external validity of this dissertation relative to other ACF studies, but according to Sabatier (1998) this should not be the case, as the study examines policy elites competing in a subsystem with different policy beliefs.

Overall, this dissertation suffers from several various threats to internal validity. These threats stem from the use of historical archive data to empirically examine the policy process. Conducting historical policy research is difficult and there will be threats to validity such as history and independent observations, but this may be overcome by using triangulation of analyses such as multiple units of analysis and multiple quantitative as well qualitative analysis as to ensure robust results.

### **Future Research**

In the near future there are multiple opportunities to continue this line of research. The next paper will compare the beliefs of President Truman as a politically elected official with those of the bureaucracy specifically the Department of State. It will use the multiple subsystems approach to the same policy issue, which may yield different results



from the previous findings. In addition, each of these chapters will be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal during the summer of 2012 for publication.

In the long-term, this research will continue by including new theories to analyze the data including a comparative approach using punctuated equilibrium and path dependency theories of policy change. Also, other data sources will be used including the using the FRUS back to 1939. Other data sources will also be used including the archives of the British Government shedding light on their perspective of the policy process and archives of the Zionist organizations operating in the United States in order to better capture and understand their perspective and internal coalition operations.

### **Conclusion**

In the final analysis, this dissertation argued that there is analytical leverage to be gained from using the ACF for foreign policy and more specifically the question of Palestine. This research has contributed to our knowledge about how the belief systems of coalitions operate, that relatively stable subsystem parameters gain greater attention than external events, and that coalition membership effects attention to such events. It found that elections and the Holocaust are oversimplified explanations of U.S. Government foreign policy towards Palestine, and that while the Zionists cooperated and shifted their beliefs to better align with the Anglo-American coalition, the Arabs did not. This dissertation demonstrated that the ACF is a powerful and complex, yet limited tool for understanding the policy process.

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## APPENDIX

### A.1 All FRUS Statements with Speaker and Audience.

Doc #	Date	Speaker	Audience
1	1/4/45	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House
2	1/5/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State
3	1/9/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House
4	1/12/45	Iraqi Public	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House
5	1/17/45	James M. Landis White House	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House
6	1/30/45	Mahmoud Hassan Egyptian Government	Joseph C. Grew Department of State
7	1/30/45	Gordon P. Merriam Department of State NEA	Joseph C. Grew Department of State
8	1/30/45	Gordon P. Merriam Department of State NEA	Joseph C. Grew Department of State
9	1/30/45	Gordon P. Merriam Department of State NEA	Joseph C. Grew Department of State
10	1/30/45	Gordon P. Merriam Department of State NEA	Joseph C. Grew Department of State
11	2/1/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State
12	2/1/45	Stephen Wise Zionist Organization of America	Joseph C. Grew Department of State
13	2/22/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	Winston Churchill British Government
14	3/5/45	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House	Harold B. Hoskins Department of State
15	3/10/45	Abdul Ilah Iraqi Government	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House
16	3/18/45	Hamdi al Pachachi Iraqi Government	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State
17	3/20/45	Syrian Students	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State
18	3/20/45	Wallace Murray Department of State NEA	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State
19	3/22/45	Committee Against Zionism Syrian Government	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State
20	3/22/45	Hamdi al Pachachi Iraqi Government	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House

21	3/24/45	Joseph C. Grew Department of State	Hamdi al Pachachi Iraqi Government
22	3/29/45	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House	Yehya bin Mohamed Hamid Yemen Government
23	4/5/45	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
24	4/6/45	Paul H. Alling Department of State NEA	James Dunn Department of State
25	4/11/45	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State	Rashid Karame Lebanese Government
26	4/12/45	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House	Abdul Ilah Iraqi Government
27	4/12/45	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House	Shukri al-Quwatli Syrian Government
28	4/18/45	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State	Harry Truman White House
29	5/1/45	Joseph C. Grew Department of State	Harry Truman White House
30	5/14/45	Joseph C. Grew Department of State	Harry Truman White House
31	5/17/45	Harry Truman White House	King Abdullah Trans-Jordanian Government
32	6/2/45	Mahmoud Nokrashy Egyptian Government	Harry Truman White House
33	6/4/45	Harry Truman White House	Mahmud Nokrashy Pasha Egyptian Government
34	6/16/45	Joseph C. Grew Department of State	Harry Truman White House
35	6/20/45	Nahum Goldman Jewish Agency	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
36	6/22/45	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Joseph C. Grew Department of State
37	6/27/45	David Ben Gurion Jewish Agency	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
38	7/5/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Lowell Pinkerton Department of State
39	7/14/45	Charles William Baxter British Government	John Gilbert Winant Department of State
40	7/24/45	Harry Truman White House	Winston Churchill British Government
41	7/25/45	Gordon P. Merriam Department of State NEA	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
42	7/25/45	William Yale Department of State NEA	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
43	7/31/45	Clement Attlee British	Harry Truman White House

		Government	
44	8/3/45	Alexander C. Kirk U.S. Military	James F. Byrnes Department of State
45	8/9/45	Lowell Pinkerton Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
46	8/13/45	Lowell Pinkerton Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
47	8/17/45	Mahmoud Fawzi Egyptian Government	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
48	8/18/45	Harry Truman White House	American Public
49	8/18/45	Nazem al-Koudsi Syrian Government	George Allen Department of State NEA
50	8/20/45	Fadhil Jamali Iraqi Government	James Moose Jr. Department of State
51	8/21/45	Stephen Wise Zionist Organization of America	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
52	8/22/45	Iraqi Politicians Iraqi Government	Iraqi Public
53	8/22/45	Jamil Mardam Bey Syrian Government	William Porter Department of State
54	8/24/45	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	James F. Byrnes Department of State
55	8/24/45	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	James F. Byrnes Department of State
56	8/24/45	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	James F. Byrnes Department of State
57	8/27/45	Jamal Husayni Palestine Arab Party	Lowell Pinkerton Department of State
58	8/31/45	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	James F. Byrnes Department of State
59	8/31/45	Gordon P. Merriam Department of State NEA	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
60	8/31/45	Sami Bey Solh Syrian Government	George Wadsworth Department of State
61	8/31/45	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
62	9/14/45	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
63	9/16/45	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
64	9/17/45	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
65	9/18/45	Guy Gillette U.S. Senate	American Public
66	9/19/45	Henry Stimson Department of War	Frederick B. Lyon Department of State

67	9/20/45	Iraqi Press	Iraqi Public
68	9/24/45	Dean Acheson Department of State	Winant Department of State
69	9/26/45	Hamdi al Pachachi Iraqi Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
70	9/26/45	Gordon P. Merriam Department of State NEA	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
71	9/27/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Dean Acheson Department of State
72	9/28/45	Iraqi Press	James F. Byrnes Department of State
73	9/28/45	Syrian Press	James F. Byrnes Department of State
74	9/29/45	Amir Faisal Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
75	9/29/45	King Abdullah Trans-Jordanian Government	Harry Truman White House
76	10/1/45	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Dean Acheson Department of State
77	10/1/45	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
78	10/2/45	Ministry of Information British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
79	10/2/45	Dean Acheson Department of State	Harry Truman White House
80	10/2/45	Dean Acheson Department of State	Harry Truman White House
81	10/2/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	Harry Truman White House
82	10/3/45	Dean Acheson Department of State	Eddy Department of State
83	10/3/45	Mahmoud Hassan Egyptian Government	Dean Acheson Department of State
84	10/3/45	Chaim Weizmann Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
85	9/25/45	Chaim Weizmann Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
86	10/5/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
87	10/6/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
88	10/8/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
89	10/9/45	Hooper Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State

90	10/9/45	Gallman Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
91	10/9/45	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	James F. Byrnes Department of State
92	10/10/45	Dean Acheson Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
93	10/10/45	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	James F. Byrnes Department of State
94	undated	Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs Syrian Government	Department of State
95	10/12/45	Mahmoud Hassan Egyptian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
96	10/12/45	Mahmoud Hassan Egyptian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
97	10/13/45	Harry Truman White House	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
98	10/16/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	Harry Truman White House
99	10/18/45	Department of State	American Public
100	10/19/45	Lord Halifax British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
101	10/19/45	Lord Halifax British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
102	10/19/45	Lord Halifax British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
103	10/22/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Lord Halifax British Government
104	10/20/45	Syrian Press	Syrian Public
105	10/22/45	Moreland Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
106	10/22/45	Iraqi Press	Iraqi Public
107	10/23/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Hamdi al Pachachi Iraqi Government
108	10/23/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Moreland Department of State
109	10/23/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Lord Halifax British Government
110	10/24/45	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	James F. Byrnes Department of State
111	10/24/45	Consul General Saudi Arabian Government	Hooper Department of State
112	10/24/45	Shukri al-Quwatli Syrian Government	Syrian Public
113	10/25/45	Lord Halifax British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State

114	10/26/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
115	10/26/45	Syrian Public	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
116	10/26/45	Egyptian Public	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
117	10/26/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
118	10/26/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
119	10/26/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	British House of Commons
120	10/26/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Porter Department of State
121	10/27/45	James Balfour British Government	Allen Department of State NEA
122	10/27/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Lord Halifax British Government
123	10/28/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Lord Halifax British Government
124	10/28/45	Saadallah al-Jabiri Syrian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
125	10/29/45	Amir Faisal Saudi Arabia	James F. Byrnes Department of State
126	10/29/45	Malcolm Hooper Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
127	10/31/45	Costi Zurayk Syrian Government	Evan Wilson Department of State NEA
128	11/1/45	Malcolm Hooper Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
129	11/2/45	Lyon Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
130	11/2/45	Alexander C. Kirk Department of War	James F. Byrnes Department of State
131	11/3/45	Egyptian Public Egyptian Public	James F. Byrnes Department of State
132	11/3/45	Egyptian Public Egyptian Public	James F. Byrnes Department of State
133	11/3/45	Bernard Joseph Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
134	11/5/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
135	11/6/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	Chaim Weizmann Jewish Agency
136	11/7/45	Harry Truman White House	Ernest Bevin British Government

137	11/7/45	Jewish Agency Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
138	11/9/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
139	11/9/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	House of Commons British Government
140	11/11/45	Syrian Press	Syrian Public
141	11/11/45	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League	James F. Byrnes Department of State
142	11/13/45	Harry Truman White House	American Public
143	11/13/45	Ali Jawdat Iraqi Government	Dean Acheson Department of State
144	11/13/45	Stanley British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
145	11/14/45	Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
146	11/14/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
147	11/14/45	Porter Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
148	11/15/45	Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
149	11/16/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
150	11/16/45	Creech Jones British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
151	11/17/45	Lebanese Politicians Lebanese Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
152	11/17/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Winant Department of State
153	11/19/45	Harry Truman White House	King Abdullah Trans-Jordanian Government
154	11/19/45	King Farouk Egyptian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
155	11/19/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Lord Halifax British Government
156	11/20/45	Amir Faisal Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
157	11/20/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
158	11/24/45	King Abdullah Trans-Jordanian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
159	11/24/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
160	11/25/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Lord Halifax British Government



161	11/26/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Jawdat Iraqi Government
162	11/27/45	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
163	11/27/45	Iraqi Foreign Minister Iraqi Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
164	11/27/45	Sheikh Yusuf Yassin Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
165	11/28/45	Wright British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
166	11/29/45	Hamdi al Pachachi Iraqi Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
167	11/30/45	Edwin M. Wright Department of State NEA	Dean Acheson Department of State
168	12/6/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Lyon Department of State
169	12/6/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Winant Department of State
170	12/7/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabia	James F. Byrnes Department of State
171	12/10/45	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Lord Halifax British Government
172	12/10/45	Lord Halifax British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
173	12/12/45	Dean Acheson Department of State	James Moose Jr. Department of State
174	12/16/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
175	12/19/45	U.S. Congress	American Public
176	12/21/45	Lebanese Politicians Lebanese Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
177	12/21/45	Iraqi Press	Iraqi Public
178	12/28/45	James Moose Jr. Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
179	12/29/45	Fadhil Jamali Iraqi Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
180	12/31/45	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
181	1/9/46	Moshe Shertok Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
182	1/17/46	Dean Acheson Department of State	Multiple U.S. Embassies Department of State
183	1/17/46	Dean Acheson Department of State	George Kennan Department of State
184	2/5/46	James F. Byrnes Department	Schoenrich Department of State

		of State	
185	2/5/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Schoenrich Department of State
186	2/6/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Harry Truman White House
187	2/19/46	Vladimir Dekanozov Soviet Foreign Office	James F. Byrnes Department of State
188	3/1/46	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League	James F. Byrnes Department of State
189	4/16/46	Dean Acheson Department of State	Satterthwaite Department of State NEA
190	4/19/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Harry Truman White House
191	4/25/46	Anglo-American Inquiry	Multiple U.S. Embassies
192	4/30/46	Department of State	U.S. Embassy in Iraq
193	4/24/46	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Dean Acheson Department of State
194	4/27/46	Ernest Bevin Foreign Affairs	James F. Byrnes Department of State
195	4/30/46	Harry Truman White House	Ernest Bevin British Government
196	5/1/46	Clement Attlee British Government	House of Commons British Government
197	5/2/46	Jewish Agency Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
198	5/3/46	J. H. Hilldring Department of State	Dean Acheson Department of State
199	5/3/46	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League	James F. Byrnes Department of State
200	5/4/46	Iraqi Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
201	5/6/46	Iusuf Yassin Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
202	5/6/46	Dean Acheson Department of State	Harry Truman White House
203	5/8/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
204	5/8/46	Gordon Merriam Department of State NEA	Dean Acheson Department of State
205	5/9/46	Saadallah Al-Jabiri Syrian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
206	5/9/46	Ernest Bevin British Government	Harry Truman White House
207	5/9/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
208	5/10/46	Mahmoud Hassan Egyptian	Loy Henderson Department of

		Government	State NEA
209	5/13/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
210	5/13/46	Alan Cunningham British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
211	5/16/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee White House
212	5/18/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
213	5/19/46	Dean Acheson Department of State	Multiple U.S. Embassies
214	5/19/46	Dean Acheson Department of State	Harriman Department of State
215	5/24/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Harriman Department of State
216	5/27/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
217	5/27/46	Arab Higher Committee	James F. Byrnes Department of State
218	5/28/46	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	Harry Truman White House
219	5/29/46	Saadallah Al-Jabiri Syrian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
220	6/5/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
221	6/7/46	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Dean Acheson Department of State
222	6/7/46	James Balfour British Government	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
223	6/7/46	Harry Truman White House	American Public
224	6/7/46	H. Freeman Matthews Department of State	Moseley Anglo-American Inquiry
225	6/10/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
226	6/10/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Harriman Department of State
227	6/14/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
228	6/14/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
229	6/17/46	Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
230	6/19/46	Arab League	James F. Byrnes Department of State
231	6/19/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House

232	6/21/46	Joint Chiefs of Staff	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
233	6/21/46	Lebanese Foreign Office Lebanese Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
234	6/21/46	Egyptian Foreign Minister Egyptian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
235	6/25/46	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League	James F. Byrnes Department of State
236	6/25/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
237	6/26/46	Dean Acheson Department of State	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
238	6/27/46	Grady-Morrison Committee	James F. Byrnes Department of State
239	6/28/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
240	7/1/46	Amir Faisal Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
241	7/1/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
242	7/2/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
243	7/2/46	Harry Truman White House	American Public
244	7/4/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
245	7/5/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
246	7/8/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
247	7/9/46	Harry Truman White House	Cabinet Committee on Palestine
248	7/13/46	Harry Truman White House	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
249	7/19/46	Grady-Morrison Committee	Grady Harriman White House
250	7/20/46	Victor Lutski USSR Public	James F. Byrnes Department of State
251	7/22/46	Hooper Department of State	James F. Byrnes Department of State
252	7/22/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Henry Grady White House
253	7/22/46	Grady-Morrison Committee	James F. Byrnes Department of State
254	7/23/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Henry Grady White House
255	7/23/46	Harry Truman White House	American Public
256	7/24/46	Grady-Morrison Committee	James F. Byrnes Department of State

			State
257	7/24/46	Grady-Morrison Committee	James F. Byrnes Department of State
258	7/25/46	Nahum Goldmann Jewish Agency	James F. Byrnes Department of State
259	7/25/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
260	7/26/46	Henry Grady White House	James F. Byrnes Department of State
261	7/26/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Henry Grady White House
262	7/29/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Harry Truman White House
263	7/30/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
264	7/31/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Harry Truman White House
265	7/31/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Dean Acheson Department of State
266	8/2/46	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League	James F. Byrnes Department of State
267	8/7/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
268	8/9/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
269	8/9/46	Beeley British Foreign Office	James F. Byrnes Department of State
270	8/12/46	Nahum Goldmann Jewish Agency	Dean Acheson Department of State
271	8/12/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
272	8/15/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
273	8/15/46	Arab League	James F. Byrnes Department of State
274	8/15/46	Harry Truman White House	Harriman Department of State
275	8/15/46	Chaim Weizmann Jewish Agency	Hall British Government
276	8/17/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Stephen Wise Zionist Organization of America
277	8/19/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
278	8/20/46	Nahum Goldmann Jewish Agency	Dean Acheson Department of State
279	8/21/46	Ernest Bevin British	Dean Acheson Department of State

		Government	
280	8/21/46	Ernest Bevin British Government	Dean Acheson Department of State
281	8/30/46	Dean Acheson Department of State	Gallman Department of State
282	9/5/46	Harry Truman White House	Multiple U.S. Embassies
283	9/5/46	Eliahu Epstein Jewish Agency	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
284	9/12/46	Stephen Wise Zionist Organization of America	Harry Truman White House
285	9/12/46	W.L. Clayton Department of State	Harry Truman White House
286	9/17/46	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
287	9/20/46	Nahum Goldmann Jewish Agency	Ernest Bevin British Government
288	9/23/46	Arab Delegation at London Conference	Ernest Bevin British Government
289	9/27/46	George Wadsworth Department of State	Harry Truman White House
290	10/2/46	Palestine Conference London	Global Public
291	10/2/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Dean Acheson Department of State
292	10/3/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
293	10/3/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
294	10/4/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
295	10/4/46	Clement Attlee British Government	Harry Truman White House
296	10/5/46	Nahum Goldmann Jewish Agency	Ernest Bevin British Government
297	10/10/46	Harry Truman White House	Clement Attlee British Government
298	10/15/46	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	Harry Truman White House
299	10/18/46	Chaim Weizmann Jewish Agency	Arthur Creech Jones British Government
300	10/21/46	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Dean Acheson Department of State
301	10/25/46	Harry Truman White House	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
302	11/2/46	King Ibn Saud Saudi	Harry Truman White House

		Arabian Government	
303	11/2/46	Soviet Press	Soviet Public
304	11/5/46	Arthur Creech Jones British Government	House of Commons British Government
305	11/6/46	Nahum Goldmann Jewish Agency	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
306	11/22/46	Abba Hillel Silver Zionist Organization of America	Ernest Bevin British Government
307	12/2/46	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Ernest Bevin British Government
308	12/2/46	Ernest Bevin British Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
309	12/6/46	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	John Lehrs Department of State
310	12/13/46	Amir Faisal Saudi Arabian Government	Harry Truman White House
311	12/16/46	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League	James F. Byrnes Department of State
312	12/27/46	Gordon Merriam Department of State NEA	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
313	12/27/46	World Zionist Congress	Global Public
314	12/30/46	Eliahu Epstein Jewish Agency	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
315	1/6/47	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League	British Government
316	1/9/47	Abba Hillel Silver Zionist Organization of America	Dean Acheson Department of State
317	1/9/47	Arthur Creech Jones British Government	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency
318	1/13/47	James F. Byrnes Department of State	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League
319	1/14/47	Fraser Wilkins Department of State NEA	Department of State
320	1/14/47	James F. Byrnes Department of State	U.S. Embassy in Britain
321	1/15/47	Moshe Shertock Jewish Agency	Dean Acheson Department of State
322	1/17/47	Amir Faisal Saudi Arabian Government	James F. Byrnes Department of State
323	1/21/47	Dean Acheson Department of State	Lord Inverchapel British Government
324	1/24/47	Harry Truman White House	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
325	2/12/47	Dean Acheson Department of State	Lord Inverchapel British Government

326	1/28/47	Jamal Husseini Palestine Arab Delegation	Ernest Bevin British Government
327	1/30/47	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency	Ernest Bevin British Government
328	1/30/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency
329	1/31/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	Jamal Husseini Arab Higher Committee
330	1/31/47	Alan Cunningham British Government	Lowell Pinkerton Department of State
331	2/4/47	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency	Arthur Creech Jones British Government
332	2/5/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency
333	2/5/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	Jamal Husseini Palestine Arab Delegation
334	2/6/47	George Marshall Department of State	U.S. Embassy in Britain
335	2/7/47	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency	Ernest Bevin British Government
336	2/7/47	George Marshall Department of State	American Public
337	2/7/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
338	2/8/47	Soviet Union Press	Soviet Public
339	2/9/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
340	2/11/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Dean Acheson Department of State
341	2/11/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Ernest Bevin British Government
342	2/12/47	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency	Ernest Bevin British Government
343	2/12/47	George Marshall Department of State	Ernest Bevin British Government
344	2/12/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
345	2/14/47	Arab Delegation to London Conference	Ernest Bevin British Government
346	2/14/47	Jewish Agency	Arthur Creech Jones British Government
347	2/14/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	Arab Delegation to London Conference
348	2/15/47	Dean Acheson Department of State	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA



349	2/15/47	Dean Acheson Department of State	James Balfour British Government
350	2/17/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Dean Acheson Department of State
351	2/17/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
352	2/19/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	Arthur Creech Jones British Government
353	2/21/47	George Marshall Department of State	Ernest Bevin British Government
354	2/25/47	Jamil Mardam Bey Syrian Government	George Marshall Department of State
355	2/25/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	House of Commons British Government
356	2/26/47	Harry Truman White House	American Public
357	2/26/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
358	2/27/47	George Marshall Department of State	Moshe Shertok Jewish Agency
359	3/3/47	Trygve Lie United Nations	Warren Austin Department of State
360	3/6/47	Dean Acheson Department of State	Warren Austin Department of State
361	3/8/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	Alexander Cadogan British Government
362	3/20/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
363	3/19/47	Costi Zurayk Syrian Government	Henry Villard Department of State NEA
364	3/26/47	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League	George Marshall Department of State
365	3/28/47	George Marshall Department of State	Lord Inverchapel British Government
366	4/2/47	Alexander Cadogan British Government	Victor Hoo United Nations
367	4/4/47	Dean Acheson Department of State	Multiple U.S. Embassies
368	4/17/47	Trygve Lie United Nations	Warren Austin Department of State
369	4/17/47	George Marshall Department of State	Harry Truman White House
370	4/17/47	Harry Truman White House	Dean Acheson Department of State
371	4/23/47	Moshe Shertock Jewish Agency	Dean Acheson Department of State
372	4/24/47	Alan Cunningham British	Golda Myerson Jewish Agency

		Government	
373	4/29/47	George Marshall Department of State	Harry Truman White House
374	5/10/47	Soviet Union Government	George Marshall Department of State
375	5/13/47	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine	United Nations General Assembly
376	5/14/47	Andrei Gromyko Soviet Union Government	United Nations General Assembly
377	5/16/47	George Marshall Department of State	Harry Truman White House
378	5/22/47	Warren Austin Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
379	5/27/47	Andrei Gromyko Soviet Union Government	Dean Acheson Department of State
380	5/28/47	Eliezer Kaplan Jewish Agency	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
381	5/29/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Dean Acheson Department of State
382	5/29/47	Moshe Shertock Jewish Agency	Dean Acheson Department of State
383	6/4/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Department of State
384	6/15/47	Harry Truman White House	American Public
385	6/11/47	Jamal Husseini Arab Higher Committee	Arab Palestinian Public
386	6/13/47	George Marshall Department of State	Multiple U.S. Embassies
387	6/13/47	George Marshall Department of State	Warren Austin Department of State
388	6/19/47	Abba Hillel Silver Zionist Organization of America	George Marshall Department of State
389	6/23/47	Moshe Shertock Jewish Agency	Emil Sandstrom UN Special Committee on Palestine
390	6/27/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
391	6/30/47	Isser Unterman Jewish Community Palestine	Emil Sandstrom UN Special Committee on Palestine
392	7/7/47	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency	Emil Sandstrom UN Special Committee on Palestine
393	7/7/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	George Marshall Department of State
394	7/14/47	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency	Emil Sandstrom UN Special Committee on Palestine
395	7/21/47	Moshe Shertock Jewish	Emil Sandstrom UN Special

		Agency	Committee on Palestine
396	7/23/47	Saudi Arabian Government	George Marshall Department of State
397	7/24/47	Iraqi Government	George Marshall Department of State
398	8/1/47	Golda Myerson Jewish Agency	Alan Cunningham British Government
399	8/2/47	Benjamin Cohen United Nations	Herschel Johnson Department of State
400	8/7/47	George Marshall Department of State	Ernest Bevin British Government
401	8/12/47	George Marshall Department of State	Saudi Arabian Government
402	8/22/47	Harry Truman White House	Robert Lovett Department of State
403	8/22/47	Robert Lovett Department of State	Lewis Douglas Department of State
404	8/22/47	Robert Lovett Department of State	Lewis Douglas Department of State
405	8/26/47	Roger Makins British Government	George Marshall Department of State
406	8/31/47	Robert Lovett Department of State	French Government
407	8/31/47	Emil Sandstrom UN Special Committee on Palestine	World Public
408	9/2/47	Golda Myerson Jewish Agency	George Marshall Department of State
409	9/3/47	Jamali Iraqi Government	George Marshall Department of State
410	9/11/47	Emanuel Neumann Jewish Agency	George Marshall Department of State
411	9/15/47	George Marshall Department of State	Department of State
412	9/17/47	George Marshall Department of State	United Nations General Assembly
413	9/18/47	Jamali Iraqi Government	George Wadsworth Department of State
414	9/22/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	George Marshall Department of State
415	9/23/47	Faris Bey el-Khouri Syrian Government	George Marshall Department of State
416	9/24/47	George Marshall Department of State	Department of State
417	9/25/47	Creech Jones British Government	George Marshall Department of State
418	9/29/47	Jamal Husseini Arab Higher	UN Ad Hoc Committee on

		Committee	Palestine
419	9/29/47	Abba Hillel Silver Zionist Organization of America	UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine
420	9/30/47	Department of State NEA	Department of State
421	10/3/47	Emil Ghoury Arab Higher Committee	Robert Macatee Department of State
422	10/3/47	Fadhil Jamali Iraqi Government	George Wadsworth Department of State
423	10/3/47	George Marshall Department of State	Herschel Johnson Department of State
424	10/4/47	Charles Malik Lebanese Government	Paul Alling Department of State
425	10/7/47	Charles Malik Lebanese Government	Warren Austin Department of State
426	10/9/47	Harry Truman White House	Robert Lovett Department of State
427	10/9/47	Robert Lovett Department of State	Dean Rusk Department of State
428	10/11/47	Syrian Press Syrian Press	Memminger Department of State
429	10/11/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine
430	10/13/47	S.K. Tsarapkin Soviet Union Government	UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine
431	10/13/47	Fadhil Jamali Iraqi Government	Kopper Department of State
432	10/15/47	Lord Inverchapel British Government	Robert Lovett Department of State
433	10/16/47	Arthur Creech Jones British Government	Herschel Johnson Department of State
434	10/15/47	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	Bailey Department of State
435	10/16/47	Dean Rusk Department of State	Durward Sandifer Department of State
436	10/18/47	M. Gordon Knox Department of State	Herschel Johnson Department of State
437	10/19/47	Robert Macatee Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
438	10/20/47	Robert McClintock Department of State	Robert Lovett Department of State
439	10/21/47	Nuri Pasha Iraqi Government	George Wadsworth Department of State
440	10/22/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Robert Lovett Department of State
441	10/22/47	Moshe Shertock Jewish Agency	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
442	10/22/47	George Marshall Department	Herschel Johnson Department of

		of State	State
443	10/22/47	Robert Lovett Department of State	Iraqi Government Iraqi Government
444	10/23/47	George Marshall Department of State	Robert Lovett Department of State
445	10/24/47	Robert Lovett Department of State	U.S. Embassy in Egypt
446	10/24/47	Department of State	U.N. Special Committee on Palestine
447	10/25/47	Robert Lovett Department of State	U.S. Embassy in Britain
448	10/26/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	U.S. Mission at the U.N.
449	10/30/47	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government	Harry Truman White House
450	10/27/47	Oscar Gass Jewish Agency	Gordon Merriam Department of State NEA
451	10/28/47	Gordon Merriam Department of State NEA	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
452	10/28/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
453	10/29/47	Robert Macatee Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
454	10/29/47	George Marshall Department of State	Robert Lovett Department of State
455	10/30/47	Gordon Merriam Department of State NEA	Fraser Wilkins Department of State NEA
456	10/31/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	American Public
457	10/31/47	Fraser Wilkins Department of State NEA	Gordon Merriam Department of State NEA
458	10/31/47	Denis Allen British Government	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA
459	10/31/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
460	10/31/47	Robert Lovett Department of State	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
461	11/3/47	Dean Rusk Department of State	Lionel Gerber Jewish Agency
462	11/3/47	Robert Macatee Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
463	11/4/47	Tsarapkin Soviet Union Government	Herschel Johnson Department of State
464	11/4/47	M. Gordon Knox Department of State	Herschel Johnson Department of State

465	11/4/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine
466	11/5/47	Gordon Merriam Department of State NEA	Fraser Wilkins Department of State NEA
467	11/5/47	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League	Douglas Busk British Government
468	11/6/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	John Hilldring Department of Defense
469	11/7/47	Warren Austin Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
470	11/7/47	Alexander Cadogan British Government	Herschel Johnson Department of State
471	11/7/47	George Marshall Department of State	Ernest Bevin British Government
472	11/10/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	Syrian Government
473	11/10/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	George Marshall Department of State
474	11/11/47	Warren Austin Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
475	11/11/47	Warren Austin Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
476	11/11/47	Beeley British Government	Warren Austin Department of State
477	11/11/47	Robert Macatee Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
478	11/12/47	George Marshall Department of State	Warren Austin Department of State
479	11/12/47	Joseph Linton Jewish Agency	Colonial Office British Government
480	11/13/47	Fadhil Jamali Iraqi Government	George Wadsworth Department of State
481	11/14/47	Alexander Cadogan British Government	U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine
482	11/14/47	James Balfour British Government	George Marshall Department of State
483	11/14/47	Walter Smith Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
484	11/18/47	Dean Rusk Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
485	11/18/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	Robert Lovett Department of State
486	11/18/47	King Abdullah Trans- Jordanian Government	Robert Macatee Department of State
487	11/19/47	Robert Lovett Department of	Herschel Johnson Department of

		State	State
488	11/19/47	Robert McClintock Department of State	Dean Rusk Department of State
489	11/19/47	Harry Truman White House	Hilldring Department of Defense
490	11/19/47	Robert Lovett Department of State	Ernest Bevin British Government
491	11/21/47	Alexander Cadogan British Government	U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine
492	11/21/47	Warren Austin Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
493	11/21/47	Harry Truman White House	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
494	11/22/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine
495	11/22/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine
496	11/24/47	Loy Henderson Department of State NEA	Harry Truman White House
497	11/24/47	Royall Department of Defense	National Security Council
498	11/24/47	Harry Truman White House	Robert Lovett Department of State
499	11/25/47	Herschel Johnson Department of State	Robert Lovett Department of State
500	11/25/47	Warren Austin Department of State	George Marshall Department of State
501	11/25/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
502	11/28/47	Ernest Bevin British Government	George Marshall Department of State
503	11/28/47	Saudi Arabian Government	Robert Lovett Department of State
504	11/29/47	Shukri al-Quwatli Syrian Government	Memminger Department of State
505	11/29/47	UN General Assembly	Global Public

**B.1 Individual Coalition Membership based upon Tabu Search Cluster Analysis.**

	<b>Anglo-American Coalition</b>	<b>Arab Coalition</b>
1	Abba Hillel Silver Zionist Organization of America	Abd al-Ilah Iraqi Government
2	Alan Cunningham British Government	Abdul Rahman Azzam Arab League
3	Alexander C. Kirk Department of War	Amir Faisal Saudi Arabian Government
4	Alexander Cadogan British Government	Committee Against Zionism Syrian Government
5	Andrei Gromyko Soviet Union Government	Egyptian Minister Foreign Affairs Egyptian Government
6	Anglo-American Inquiry Anglo-American Inquiry	Egyptian Public Egyptian Public
7	Arthur Creech Jones British Government	Emil Ghoury Arab Higher Committee
8	Beeley British Government	Faris Bey el-Khoury Syrian Government
9	Bernard Joseph Jewish Agency	Hamdi al Pachachi Iraqi Government
10	Chaim Weizmann Jewish Agency	Iraqi Foreign Minister Iraqi Government
11	Charles Malik Lebanese Government	Iraqi Government
12	Charles William Baxter British Government	Iusuf Yassin Saudi Arabian Government
13	Clement Attlee British Government	Jamal Husseini Arab Higher Committee
14	David Ben-Gurion Jewish Agency	Jamali Iraqi Government
15	Dean Acheson Department of State	King Ibn Saud Saudi Arabian Government
16	Dean Rusk Department of State	Lebanese Foreign Office Lebanese Government
17	Denis Allen British Government	Lebanese Politicians Lebanese Government
18	E.R. Stettinius Jr. Department of State	Mahmoud Hassan Egyptian Government
19	Eliahu Epstein Jewish Agency	Mahmoud Nokrashy Egyptian Government
20	Eliezer Kaplan Jewish Agency	Paul H. Alling Department of State NEA
21	Emanuel Neumann Jewish Agency	Saadallah al-Jabiri Syrian Government



22	Emil Sandstrom United Nations Special Committee on Palestine	Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs Syrian Government
23	Ernest Bevin British Government	Victor Lutski USSR Public
24	Fadhil Jamali Iraqi Government	Wallace Murray Department of State NEA
25	Franklin D. Roosevelt White House	Iraqi Public
26	Fraser Wilkins Department of State NEA	Syrian Public Syrian Public
27	George Marshall Department of State	Iraqi Press
28	George Wadsworth Department of State	Arab Higher Committee Palestine
29	Golda Myerson Jewish Agency	Arab League
30	Gordon P. Merriam Department of State NEA	Arab Delegation at London Conference
31	Guy Gillette U.S. Senate	Soviet Union Government
32	H. Freeman Matthews Department of State	
33	Harry Truman White House	
34	Henry Grady White House	
35	Herschel Johnson Department of State	
36	Isser Unterman Jewish Community Palestine	
37	Palestine J. H. Hilldring Department of State	
38	James Balfour British Government	
39	James F. Byrnes Department of State	
40	James M. Landis White House	
41	Jamil Mardam Bey Syrian Government	
42	Jewish Agency Jewish Agency	
43	Joint Chiefs of Staff Department of War	
44	Joseph C. Grew Department of State	
45	Joseph Linton Jewish Agency	
46	King Abdullah Trans-Jordanian Government	
47	King Farouk Egyptian Government	
48	Lord Halifax British Government	
49	Lord Inverchapel British Government	
50	Lowell Pinkerton Department of State	
51	Loy Henderson Department of State	

	NEA	
52	M. Gordon Knox Department of State	
53	Malcolm Hooper Department of State	
54	Ministry of Information British Government	
55	Morrison-Grady Committee Morrison-Grady Committee	
56	Moshe Shertock Jewish Agency	
57	Nahum Goldmann Jewish Agency	
58	Nazem al-Koudsi Syrian Government	
59	Nuri Pasha Iraqi Government	
60	Oscar Gass Jewish Agency	
61	Robert Lovett Department of State	
62	Robert McClintock Department of State	
63	Roger Makins British Government	
64	Royall Department of Defense	
65	S.K. Tsarapkin Soviet Union Government	
66	Sami Bey Solh Syrian Government	
67	Shukri al-Quwatli Syrian Government	
68	Stanley British Government	
69	Stephen Wise Zionist Organization of America	
70	Trygve Lie United Nations	
71	W.L. Clayton Department of State	
72	Warren Austin Department of State	
73	William Yale Department of State NEA	
74	U.S. Congress	
75	World Zionist Congress	
76	Jewish Agency	
77	Saudi Arabian Government	
78	UN General Assembly	
79	Department of State	
80	Soviet Union Press	